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Abstract
State-sponsored terrorism (SST) has for long been used as a tool by countries to inflict costs on
rival states without direct confrontation, as the latter risks inviting limited to full-scale war. The
literature on SST has so far focused primarily on the motivations, facilitating factors, and the
timing of state sponsorship. What has been insufficiently studied, however, are the responses of
victim states to SST. Why does state response to SST vary spatio-temporally in different countries,
under different governments, and even under different leaders of the same ruling political
dispensation in a country? Under what conditions does a state respond militarily as opposed to
responding more mildly through economic sanctions, the use of diplomatic tools, and lodging
grievances with IOs? I argue that an important reason for this variation in response to SST attacks
occurs because of leader type, i.e. whether a leader is a hawk or a dove. Basing my
characterization of hawk-dove leader type on Brown (2017), Snyder and Diesing (1977), and
Keller (2005), this dissertation controls for other confounding variables and explores the above
relationship empirically using a small-n research design by examining cases from several
countries worldwide. In the first chapter, I analyze the decision-making of 12 leaders, from five
different countries, responding to 19 separate terrorist attack incidents by groups supported by
rival states. In the second chapter, I take a deep dive into the India-Pakistan rival dyad, examining
responses by three different Indian leaders to five instances of alleged Pakistan-sponsored
terrorism between 2000-2019. Finally, in my third chapter, I evaluate three responses of the
Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan and one by his predecessor, Turgut Ozal, to SST attacks
orchestrated by the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), an organization backed by multiple states
(namely, Iran, Iraq, and Syria). While the response is often the result of complex calculations by
the top decisionmakers in the victim state, I empirically demonstrate that variation in response is
driven partly by the underlying beliefs of leaders regarding the usefulness of military power.
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Introduction
The Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Doval described war as an increasingly cost-ineffective
mechanism in securing a country’s national interest and asserted instead that targeting the civil
society is a low-cost option to bleed the adversary (Doval 2021). The trend he highlighted is
corroborated by the fact that state-sponsored terrorism (SST) has for long been used as a tool by
countries to inflict costs on rival states without direct confrontation, as the latter risks inviting
limited to full-scale war. While this tool was used often in the Cold War era, it has far from
disappeared following the collapse of the Soviet regime.
SST is used in a plethora of ways. As Wilkinson (1984) observes, SST can range from intangible
support such as moral and diplomatic encouragement to provision of goods such as financial aid,
supply of weapons, training, and sanctuary. Byman (2005) further differentiates between active
and passive state support. To him, active support includes the provision of arms and ammunition,
funding, training, and other such instruments, while passive support refers simply to turning a blind
eye towards terrorist group activities and tolerating their presence on a country’s soil. Collins
(2014) argues that “State sponsorship encompasses a variety of assistance measures including,
inter alia, arms, safe haven, financing, training, intelligence, and diplomatic cover.” In this
dissertation, I use a more catholic definition of SST formulated from a combination of definitions
by Wilkinson (1984), Byman (2005), and Collins (2014), rather than the narrower one used by the
International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) database, which includes
neither passive support nor general training provided by the state to the terrorist group, but rather
includes active support only and mission-specific training for a case to qualify as SST.
While SST attacks are a small subset of all terrorist attacks, they are still far more common than
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one might think. Despite their narrow definition, ITERATE records 174 cases of SST between
1968-2018. With a broader definition, the number of cases would certainly be a lot higher,
something future research could consider looking at. Therefore, it is crucial to understand this tool
of low-intensity conflict used by myriad states against their rivals, usually a stronger rival, to
maintain deniability and escape the martial wrath of their adversary in a full-scale war. It harkens
back to a very Clausewitzian concept of continuing a state’s foreign policy through other means
ranging from destabilizing or weakening neighboring states to projecting power or even
overthrowing an adversary regime (Byman 2005). Therefore, SST is one more tool in a state’s
arsenal to secure its national interest in an international setting. While several factors play into
driving SST, shared ideological (Byman 2005) and religious beliefs (Ekmekci 2011) between the
state and the terrorist organization often promote the use of SST towards a common rival.
In recent decades, SST attacks continue as a form of low-intensity, high deniability, conflict
between rival states. From the horrific truck bombing attack by the Iranian-backed group
Hezbollah on the US Marines barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983 to the riveting, days-long, edgeof-the-seat citywide 26/11 terrorist assault in Mumbai, India, in 2008 by the Pakistan-supported
organization Lashkar-e-Taiba are two of the most dramatic examples of SST attacks. Further, the
Passover Massacre in Netanya, Israel, in 2002 in which the Park Hotel was subject to a suicide
bombing attack by the Palestinian non-state group Hamas, also supported by Iran, resulting in the
death of 30 and injuries to another 140 people is another notable example of SST. However, it is
not just these better-known attacks that comprise the full range of SST attacks. Numerous other
SST attacks do not receive as much publicity from the media. Sometimes, smaller incidents of
violence and bloodshed that continue to plague the Israel-Palestine area, Turkey and the so-called
Kurdistan region, and the regular infiltration of terrorists across the Pakistani border into India find
2

no place in the headlines.
To clarify at the outset, by using the word “terrorist”, I do not don the mantle of a judge to declare
that the terrorist group is the one necessarily at fault across the cases that I study. The tendency to
loosely attribute a pejorative connotation to terrorism is commonly seen in everyday conversations
between laypersons as it suggests certain horrific stereotypical images – in common parlance,
terrorism is those things “bad people” do. The meaning I impute to the word “terrorist” or when I
refer to an SST attack is only meant to describe the use of such tactics commonly understood as
meant to create terror – and that only is the extent of my use of terrorism/ terrorist/ SST and other
related terms. My purpose in this study is not to decide who is right and who is wrong, but to
empirically evaluate how response mechanisms to SST work.
Current research on SST severely lacks an understanding of response mechanisms by the victim
state against the state sponsors and/ or against the terrorist groups that execute the attacks on behalf
of the sponsor. Therefore, an essential element related to SST research seems to be lacking in the
terrorism literature. This study then traces a lesser-known aspect of SST – viz. the decision-making
processes behind responses to such attacks.
The literature on SST has so far focused primarily on the motivations (Byman 2005), facilitating
factors, and the timing of state sponsorship (Chhabra 2020). What has been insufficiently studied,
however, are the responses of victim states to SST. Why does state response to SST vary spatiotemporally under different governments, and different leaders of the same ruling political
dispensation in a country? Under what conditions does a state respond militarily as opposed to
responding through economic sanctions, with the use of diplomatic tools and lodging complaints
with international organizations (IOs)/ fora, or hitting back in a Rapoport-esque tit-for-tat with
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their own SST? For instance, India demonstrated a variety of responses for different SST attacks
on its soil between 2000 and 2020. The USA and Israel mostly adopted comparatively hawkish
military stances against SST. On the other hand, the UK, however, only took economic measures
against Libya for supporting the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) by freezing their assets
within the UK.
Further, while other factors such as severity of SST attack may seem directly proportional to
response, the case is often counterintuitive. One of the highest profile SST attacks on Indian soil
(Mumbai 26/11), causing tremendous infrastructural damage and fatalities, only led to diplomatic
isolation internationally of the state sponsor, Pakistan, by India. The then leader, Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh, was moderate and perceived to be somewhat weak, sharing power with the
leader of his political party. On the other hand, even for relatively smaller-scale SST attacks
compared to 26/11, the current Indian right-leaning leader, Prime Minister Modi, chose as his
response military “surgical strikes” in the sponsor’s soil.
Thus, one finds wide variation in terms of responses across rival dyads and by different leaders,
both in terms of how victim states deal with terrorist groups as well as with the alleged state
sponsors of terrorism. The purpose of this dissertation is to empirically ascertain the causes of this
variation. While Byman (2005), among others, has highlighted the various kinds of responses that
states may usually opt for, whether any one or a combination of the following – including
diplomatic tools such as complaints through international organizations/ fora, economic sanctions,
military options, or counter-SST – the extant work builds on that preliminary research to
empirically test the reasons behind the varied responses of states to SST.
While the response to SST is often the result of complex calculations by the victim state, I argue
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and empirically demonstrate that variation occurs because of leader type. Basing my
characterization of leadership traits in terms of hawk and dove based on Snyder and Diesing
(1977), Keller (2005), and Brown (2017), I posit a theory hypothesizing what leader type should
be more (or less) likely to deliver a military response to an SST attack versus a non-military, milder
response.
The term hawk was introduced by Smith and Price in 1973, who applied the logic of animal conflict
to leader personalities, a metaphor that gained currency (Bakker 2018). Leader personality should
explain response to SST because it is usually the more hawkish, right-wing type leaders that would
be keen on responding aggressively, that is by using the military to strike back, in line with their
beliefs and calculations, while dovish leaders would rather seek solutions beyond military
aggression.
As Snyder and Diesing (1977) observe, hawkish and dovish decision-making elites have distinct
personalities consisting of different world views, images of self and opponents, and preferences
over strategies. For them, a hawkish world view is one in which the international arena appears
highly conflictual. Might makes right in a hawk’s world and a hawkish decision maker therefore
strives to maintain or increase their state’s military power and deterrence capabilities.
Accommodation has little place in a hawk’s world for fear of looking weak in their opponents’
eyes as “image of the opponent” is a crucial factor in their decision-making calculus (Snyder and
Diesing 1977: 299). Hawkish elites tend to view their opponent in simple black and white terms –
as a cool, monolithic aggressor that cannot be given the upper hand. A hawkish decision maker
also assumes that their opponent is a bluffer, which explains the importance hawkish elites assign
to deterrence.
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On the other hand, according to the Snyder-Diesing typology, dovish world views are those in
which one sees the potential for harmonious relations and believes that what conflict does exist
can be addressed via mutual accommodation. A dovish decision-making elite is more amenable to
accommodation and not worried about being judged as weak for that. Rather, a dove is more
concerned that military strength may seem belligerent by opponents. A dove sees their opponent
as an internally divided and emotional (as opposed to cool) actor whose long-term goals are
“limited, specific and independent, not linked together in some grand design for world conquest”
(Snyder and Diesing 1977: 299). Dovish elites see their opponents’ goals as partly legitimate and
have a more nuanced decision-making schema. A dove also believes in eventual, if not immediate,
peace, achievable once their opponent achieves its goals, which are not total hegemony and
imperialism.
Brown (2017), on the other hand, proposes a more detailed six-fold typology comprising three
hawkish and three dovish decision maker types, distinguishing among them via differing
operational codes, leader type, hypothesized susceptibilities to cognitive errors/biases, and
hypothesized foreign policy positions. For the purposes of this dissertation, however, I only use
the two basic umbrella terms of hawk and dove.
Brown (2017) further explains that hawks have a “high task focus” while doves have a “low task
focus”. This implies that the former is more concerned with solving problems single-mindedly
with little regard for others’ feelings and concerns while the latter tends to accommodate the
adversary’s concerns and do not solve problems as single-mindedly. Doves exhibit a low task
focus in their concern for mutual accommodation, sensitivity to the role of opponents’ emotions,
and fear that military strength and intransigence will be threatening to opponents all indicate a low
task focus.
6

While there can be significant overlaps in support of doves and hawks among the moderates,
domestic supporters of hawks generally tend to be those individuals/ citizens in the country who
share the same perspective as the hawkish leader – the more conservative or right-wing people in
a country (Barzilai and Inbar 1996; Pedahzur 2001; Koch and Cranmer 2007; Clements 2011;
Clare 2014; Bakare and Iqbal 2020), often including those in the military and representatives of
the military-industrial complex, who likely have an axe to grind. On the other hand, the supporters
of doves tend to be violence-averse and share the same foreign policy views as doves. They may
be representatives of certain industries in countries that share cultural or economic ties, among
other things, with the rival state and therefore do not wish any harm to befall those ties due to war.
A belligerent policy choice that is usually made by hawks against relatively limited SST attacks
may alienate the extreme left/ liberal political parties and support base (unless a serious attack
occurs and there is a rally around the flag effect), while a pacifist response to an SST attack would
tend to alienate the more conservative political groups as well as right-leaning citizens. A relatively
tepid or moderate response may result in pleasing the moderate political parties and moderate
individuals in opposition parties but might end up alienating the extremists in either political party.
Other considerations such as nature of targets, timing (for example, before elections) and severity
of the SST attack, domestic political mood in the victim state or public opinion, political party in
power, gender of leader, and previous military experience of a leader may play some role in
determining SST response and, in Chapter 1, I account for whether these alternative explanations
really do play any significant role. Further, the question of nuclear deterrence can be raised in the
case of India and Pakistan as a singular variable that may play a role in determining the kind of
response from the Indian side to SST attacks sponsored by its western neighbor. While I briefly
touch upon the rivalry between these two nuclear-armed rivals in Chapter 1, I more fully explore
7

the dynamics between these two countries as my first case study for this dissertation in Chapter 2.
However, I assert that leader type is an important driver. Ergo, ceteris paribus, a change in leader
type will in most cases result in a change in the severity of SST response. Extant scholarship has
so far failed to examine the relationship between leader type, severity of SST attacks (trigger), and
response to SST. This is the primary motivation for this thesis and the fuel that drives it.

Importance (So What!)
This study is important because it explores a hitherto understudied area. Academically, this
dissertation fills a lacuna in current research on terrorism and is generalizable across states. Little
has been empirically ascertained as to why states respond to SST the way they do. Under what
conditions do victim states use military force against state sponsors of terror as opposed to nonmilitary responses? Which types of leaders are more (or less) likely to adopt such means?
Addressing these academic questions, this study also concludes with broader implications and realworld lessons on the choices available to policy practitioners, to determine what responses to SST
work best for countries. Finally, my own government in India faces a continuing threat of SST
from recalcitrant neighbors. Being part of the law enforcement and national security apparatus
there, this dissertation that has both strong policy implications and contributes to big questions in
the political science field by offering a tentative explanation on responses to SST, would be
relevant to my own career as a scholar-practitioner, as well as for Indian policy makers.
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Research Design/Evidence
In this dissertation, the effect of leader type on SST response is examined over three chapters. The
study is tailored to provide a comprehensive understanding of this connection while also focusing
on alternative explanations that temper this relationship. It provides a granular theoretical
explanation for why leader type matters in explaining responses to SST by a victim state and how
hawkish and dovish leaders differ in terms of their response choice. By combining qualitative
theory-building and process-tracing within case studies of India and Turkey as well as a small-N
analysis of 19 SST cases, the dissertation attempts to both explore the causal mechanisms involved
in determining SST responses and unearth the best policy choices available to practitioners.
In Chapter 1, I discuss multiple instances of recognized SST attacks across several countries, with
all the selected cases occurring after 1980. I use a most similar research design for this study. This
is one of the most appropriate methods to empirically test my hypotheses using these cases because
the latter are mostly similar to one another, in that all the countries were representative democracies
at the time of the selected incidents - at least on paper - and they are all cases of state-sponsored
terrorist attacks by one state on its rival within a rival dyad. Primarily what varies are the types of
leaders that were in power in the victim state when the SST incident occurred – that is, hawkish or
dovish – the severity/ nature of the SST attack, and the nature of the response. Thus, the most
similar research design makes it easier for me to control extraneous factors that are not causal
agents and thereby isolate the independent variable (i.e. leader type) that contributes in explaining
the severity of my dependent variable (i.e. response to SST).
My second and third chapters are case studies crafted to explore the Indian and Turkish situations
in-depth to examine the very same question that drives this thesis – that is, how leader type and
severity of SST attacks correlate to the kind of response carried out by a victim state. I select these
9

two states for three reasons. First and foremost, they have both been among the worst affected as
relates to SST and continue to be so. Cross-border state-sponsored terrorist attacks have been
occurring in these two countries for decades and continue to happen until the present day. Perhaps
no other country except Israel has suffered as many damaging losses in terms of sheer numbers of
SST attacks inflicted and has had to spend as many resources in tackling what is purely an SST
problem as in the case of these two. While the USA and the UK both have suffered multiple
instances of SST, I did not select the USA or the UK for my in-depth case studies because of the
following reasons. For example, while the USA decided to invade Afghanistan and pursue statebuilding activities there after dislodging the Taliban from power following 9/11, which has turned
out to be a long and costly affair, the USA does not have neighbors that are strategic rivals and
inflict SST attacks on a regular basis in that country. The UK is also no stranger to SST. However,
SST attacks in England have significantly lessened now ever since the Troubles ended, despite a
few terrorist attacks and a small presence maintained by splinter groups of the original IRA, such
as the Continuity IRA, Real IRA, and New IRA. Second, the leaders at the helm of these states
when the SST attacks in the selected instances occurred show a wide variation in personality,
which makes it convenient to test my hypotheses and try to ascertain objectively how far leader
type and severity of SST attacks contribute to determining a victim state response.
However, what finally leads me to select Turkey and India over Israel for my individual case
studies is that both these states exhibit puzzling responses to SST attacks and in stark contrast to
each other. For almost all less severe attacks in this study, Turkey’s responses were major (use of
military force), while for most severe attacks in this study, India demonstrates considerable
restraint and minor responses (non-military options such as diplomatic ones, tit-for-tat, covert
action, and showcasing military strength but not use thereof). This makes the study of these two
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countries especially intriguing, requiring more nuanced study than any of the other states facing
SST attacks.
I derive several interesting conclusions from this study. The first chapter adopts a new approach,
leveraging Brown’s (2017), Snyder and Diesing’s (1977), and Keller’s (2005) typologies of
leaders to find a link between leader type in an SST victim state and the latter’s response. It has
tracked spatio-temporal variation in the responses to state-sponsored terrorist attacks by twelve
different leaders across nineteen cases between 1982-2020. The cases have been selected from five
countries across South Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and North America that have suffered
numerous SST attacks. In terms of SST responses, hawks generally counter SST attacks with major
responses (69 per cent cases), while doves typically resort to minor responses (83 per cent cases),
which attests to the role played by leader type in determining response. Further, twelve of the
nineteen cases studied are severe SST attacks and seven less severe attacks – seven of the severe
attacks see a minor response, while three of the less severe attacks saw a major response, which
signals that something other than severity of SST attack accounts for variation in SST response.
My findings in Chapter 2 bring several important points to the fore. I argued that SST responses
from a victim state directly covary with a change in leader type as defined by Brown (2017) and
Keller (2005). I hypothesized that the more hawkish a leader, the likelier they are to use aggressive
and major responses, with the aid of the military, against their adversaries when provoked with
low-intensity SST attacks. I analyze the personality types and backgrounds of three different
Indian prime ministers and subsequently evaluate their responses to five different SST attacks
sponsored from neighboring Pakistan. I found evidence to support my argument. While the more
dovish (Manmohan Singh and Atal Bihari Vajpayee) leaders had the more restrained, minor
responses even for severe SST attacks, the more hawkish leader (Narendra Modi) was more likely
11

to respond militarily even to a less severe SST attack. The Uri attack, which according to this
thesis, was a less severe attack, was dealt with heavy handedly by the Indian dispensation under
PM Modi using a military response across the Indian Line of Control into disputed territory under
Pakistani administration, but the 26/11 SST massacre, which was far graver in terms of most
parameters, only evoked a meagre response in comparison. Severity of attack does not seem to
matter to determine SST response, as demonstrated by responses to the cases of SST faced by
India. Even though 4/5 (80 per cent) of cases examined here were severe attacks, India’s responses
were major only to two of the severe attacks, or to 2/4 (50 per cent). Both of those instances were
with a hawkish leader, Narendra Modi, in power. The two other dovish leaders, Vajpayee and
Singh, afforded minor responses in three different scenarios cumulatively, even when two of those
were severe SST attacks.
Chapter 3 helps illustrate the above point further, this time through the responses of Turkey’s
hawkish leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and dovish leader, Turgut Ozal. I analyzed the personality
type and background of Erdogan, President of Turkey since 2014, a post he held onto even after
abolition of the post of Prime Minister in 2017. Erdogan was also Prime Minister previously
between 2003-2014 which was the more powerful of the two posts between itself and that of the
President until 2014, and therefore has been the de facto leader of the country ever since 2003. I
subsequently evaluate his responses to three different SST attacks by the PKK, which is sponsored
by multiple states including Iran, Syria, and Iraq, among other countries. The hawkish Erdogan
responded aggressively to all three SST attacks studied in this thesis, whether they were more
severe or less severe. Further, Ozal, being more on the dovish end of the spectrum, only offered a
minor response to a severe SST attack. In other words, while 2/3 (67 per cent) of my cases relating
to Erdogan were less severe attacks on Turkey and only one of them was severe, Ankara delivered

12

major responses in all three instances (100 per cent). Moreover, the only SST attack analyzed in
Ozal’s time was severe and the response minor testifying thus to the role played by leader type in
SST response decision-making. Severity of attack does not seem to matter in determining SST
response in the Turkish cases either, just like in the Indian cases. Even though two of the PKK
attacks studied here were less severe, Erdogan’s responses were major to them, militarily
assaulting PKK bases even across the border in their Iraqi camps and shelters. And while the attack
during Ozal’s leadership was severe, that President’s response was only minor.
In all three chapters, I found evidence to support Hypothesis 1 (H1) which hypothesized that
hawkish leaders, ceteris paribus, are more likely than moderate or dovish leaders to respond
aggressively to state-sponsored terrorist attacks. However, evidence with respect to Hypothesis 2
(H2), which hypothesized that the higher the severity of an SST attack, ceteris paribus, the greater
the likelihood of a major response by the leader of a victim state, regardless of leader type, seems
to be lacking.
Finally, my findings in the Indian and Turkish cases help prove a bigger point. In democracies,
one finds that the more hawkish the leader type, the likelier they are to use force against SST
attacks by an adversary. The hawkish leader uses force to demonstrate to their rival country(ies)
as well as the terrorist group(s), and perhaps even to their domestic audiences, that such limited
cross-border breaches and low-intensity conflict shall not be tolerated and will be met with force.
This is because hawkish leaders are more willing to adopt aggressive and violent solutions over
non-confrontational ones, which doves would rather opt for first.
These observations have implications for both academia as well as policy practitioners. Creating
a detailed account is meant to aid scholars and policymakers in generating a more systematic,
sophisticated understanding of what leads to the selection of a certain response to an SST attack.
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Responses to SST are meant to create certain outcomes (Menon 2021). In most cases, especially
with respect to India, Turkey, and Israel, which are among the states most affected by SST, there
is evidence that neither variety of response has worked as well as the states may have hoped for.
Attacks continue even after decades of conflict with no end in sight. While there may have been
calmer periods after a certain response (for instance, after Mumbai 26/11 in India), a lasting peace
has not been achieved in any of these cases. It seems that the type of response is only a secondary
consideration. So long as the root geopolitical issue is not solved and a state sponsor can align with
a terrorist organization to jointly achieve some of their political goals by harming another state,
SST is likely to continue. Eradicating a terrorist organization as well as its sponsor entirely may
be the other solution, but that is certainly not a viable one, and is likely to spark an escalating
conflict and international interference in the matter.
Avenues for future research exist in this thematic area. First, there is scope to extend the study on
SST to other rivalries and leaders to assess the entire universe of SST cases. Second, this study
can be followed up with more fieldwork, and archival work in a few local languages in both the
state sponsor’s territory as well as the victim state. Conducting further interviews of leaders and
key personnel in governments belonging to both the alleged sponsor state as well as victim state
is useful. Third, a separate research track can be used to ascertain effectiveness of SST responses
and predict the best choices available for different SST attack instances. Lastly, the exploration of
how 9/11 in the USA and 26/11 in India changed not only the structure of the departments dealing
with counterterrorism or created new dedicated departments to that effect in the United States and
in India, but also the decision-making process is another worthwhile endeavor. Such research
possibilities should thus be explored more fully to ensure that the most optimally calibrated
response to an attack is carried out.
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CHAPTER 1
Linchpin? Leader type and responses to state-sponsored terrorism
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Abstract
State-sponsored terrorism (SST) has for long been used as a tool by countries to inflict costs on
rival states without direct confrontation, as the latter risks inviting limited to full-scale war. The
literature on SST has so far focused primarily on the motivations, facilitating factors, and the
timing of state sponsorship. What has been insufficiently studied, however, are the responses of
victim states to SST. Why does state response to SST vary spatio-temporally under different
governments or even different leaders of the same ruling political dispensation in a country?
Under what conditions does a state respond militarily as opposed to using non-military/ covert
means? Further, while other factors such as severity of SST attack may seem directly proportional
to response, the case is often counterintuitive. The purpose of this dissertation is to empirically
ascertain the causes of the wide variation in SST responses. While the response is often the result
of complex calculations by the top decisionmakers in the victim state and affected by multiple
variables, I argue and empirically demonstrate in this chapter through a small-n study of 19 cases
from five countries that the response covaries with leader type – that is, hawkish or dovish.

Introduction

26/11 (Nov. 26) of 2008 was to India what 9/11 of 2001 was to the United States. Both events
occurred in their respective financial capitals - Mumbai and New York. In the case of Mumbai,
there was carnage for three entire days. When it began, Indian authorities and news channels were
perplexed as to what was going on – a reaction akin to the initial moments of the September 11
attacks until the second plane hit the North Tower of the erstwhile World Trade Center, when their
US counterparts started fathoming the very real possibility of a premeditated attack. Flabbergasted
citizens watching the news across India were literally unsure whether they had turned on a thriller
on Netflix or they were indeed watching live one of the most horrific and dramatic incidents of
their lives – synchronized and cold-blooded mayhem caused by a well-armed and well-trained
foreign terrorist group simultaneously at multiple famous locations in perhaps what is the most
forward-looking city of India.
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Mumbai is home to Bollywood, one of the world’s biggest movie industries, and is also the
backbone of India’s economy. Suddenly there was this mishmash of tragic news coming in from
all quarters of lives being lost, destruction, bravery, tragedy, and anarchy. The silhouette of one of
the most recognized luxury hotels in the country, the Taj Mahal Hotel in Mumbai, burning would
be branded into the minds of the Indian people for decades to come. And when the dome of the
hotel started to burn, observes Goswami (2008), “that was quite a moment, because suddenly you
realized that it was your country that was under attack. This was not just any other terrorist attack.”
Following the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi, the coordinated attack on
Mumbai and its landmarks in 2008 was a clear sign that the terror groups were trying to harm the
two things they hated most about India – its democracy and its economic progress (Goswami
2008).
The terrorist attacks, however, were not just any random assault on the fabric of Indian democracy
by a non-state actor group, later revealed to be the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The calculated attacks
had hidden implications beyond the terrorist group itself. Implications that led to India’s western
neighbor, viz. the Pakistani state, and the regular nourishment the government of that state provides
to terror groups on their soil to conduct covert operations on their behalf, very often against the
Indian state. The Mumbai incident points to the use of state-sponsored terrorism (SST) by certain
countries against their rivals, a tactic that seems to be reminiscent of Sun Tzu’s ancient statement,
“The art of fighting without fighting” – directly, at least – and raises an unanswered question that
then becomes an important issue for policy makers to tackle not only on the Indian subcontinent,
but globally, where their rival states use this tactic to harm them – why do victim states of SST
respond to such aided and/ or abetted terrorist attacks in the manner that they do?
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“Leadership matters,” observes Leon Panetta, former US Secretary of Defense (Panetta and
Newton 2014). This study explores the relationship between leader type and government responses
to SST attacks. By leader type, I refer to a notion akin to Snyder and Diesing’s (1977) typology of
hawks and doves as part of explaining international conflict bargaining and decision-making, as
well as Keller’s (2005) conceptualization of “leadership styles.” Keller (2005) observes that all
leaders do not respond in the same fashion as responses are not determined by immutable domestic
structures alone. Leader perceptions on foreign policy issues matter. From a statistical analysis of
154 foreign policy crises, Keller (2005) finds that “constraint challengers” (akin to a hawkish
leader type) are prone to responding aggressively, while “constraint respecters” (like a dovish
leader type) typically are pacific in their crisis response. Therefore, the study of leader type helps
in understanding why decision-makers respond the way they do. My analysis seeks to contribute
to the existing literature on SST and empirically ascertain for perhaps the first time how SST
responses are in effect determined by government leadership. Previous scholars have tried to
identify the causes of SST (Wilkinson 1984; Erickson 1989; Byman 2005; Byman 2010; Conrad
2011; Ekmekci 2011, and so on), but few if any have looked at the varying relationship between
leader type and responses to SST.
I argue that responses to SST attacks depend on leader type, though other factors including severity
of SST attack, nature of attack, timing of attack, and/ or domestic public opinion, among other
things may also play a role. Leader type remains a causal factor in determining SST response
despite top echelon decisionmakers in the victim state subordinate to the leader making complex
calculations accounting for multiple factors, especially a.) domestic public opinion, b.)
international image of leader and country, c.) sending a message/ signal to rival state as to what it
will or will not tolerate, and d.) party position. As Hussain (2011) observes, personality and
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cognition play an important role when assuming that leaders in a complex environment are
nonetheless taking decisions themselves.

Previous Studies on Responses to SST and their Limitations
There has been some prior work relating to SST responses, though limited in scope. Bialos and
Juster (1986), for instance, study the responses to Libyan SST by the West, and observe that there
can be various styles of responses – economic sanctions, military force, diplomatic pressure,
freezing of the country’s assets as far as possible, travel restrictions imposed, and/ or stopped or
reduced trade. Dorschner (2016) studies the SST attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001 and
catalogues various possible responses to the Pakistani provocation available to India but does not
find any of the options particularly attractive or meaningful. Similarly, Menon (2016) finds India’s
diplomatic and non-military responses in the aftermath of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks to be prudent
and “the least bad option” (also see Kaura 2020, Mahadevan 2012, Desai 2017). Sasikumar (2019)
analyzes the more recent SST attack against India on the Uri army base in 2016, and the response
consisting of targeted “surgical strikes” against terrorist launchpads across the border into
Pakistan. She finds that while the strikes were not unprecedented, the publicity given by the
government to these strikes right after they were carried out certainly was. Durrani, et al. (2018)
find that the Uri SST response by India “served its purpose” in the form of a well-planned
“befitting response” to Pakistan. Bakare and Iqbal (2020) probe through the prism of the Pulwama
SST attack of 2019 why different leaders react differently to SST attacks and argue that personality
and religious ideology are the main causes1 (see also Feyyaz 2019; Pegahi 2019; Singh and Amin

Bakare and Iqbal’s (2020) study tip their proverbial hat to the Behaviourist School which emphasizes the
importance of both context and human agency in foreign policy decision-making. This is opposed to the rationalist
1
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2019; Siyech 2019). Erickson (1989), Cohan (2002), and Maogoto (2003) look at SST response
through the lens of international law, with Erickson ascertaining what a legitimate response to SST
may constitute, Cohan discusses the criteria that goes into formulating a state's response to SST
including a state’s right to self-defense and the doctrine of proportionate response, and Maogoto
discussing the use of military force in combating terrorism in the context of the UN Charter regime
on the use of force.
However, no extant work empirically analyzes the relationship between leader type in a victim
state and its SST response. That is what I aim to do in this study. I find that SST response
significantly covaries with leader type in a victim state. While several other factors as listed above
are also important determinants in SST response, leader type cannot be ignored.
The first section of my paper introduces SST; the second section discusses factors that cause or
drive SST; in section three, I explain my theory about how and why leader type is an important
determinant of SST response; section four comprises my research design, case selection, and
empirical analyses; in the fifth section, I present the limitations of my study, followed by the
conclusion and directions for future research. Two tables list the personality types of the twelve
different leaders in my study, and SST attack with corresponding response magnitudes,
respectively. The study leverages Adam David Brown’s (2017) six-fold typology of leader types,
while collapsing the six types into two, and notes that it is indeed a spectrum. Brown’s (2017)
work, in turn, draws from Margaret Hermann’s Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA).2

school that highlights the role of rationality/ rational choice in determining foreign policy. Therefore, the
background of a leader – the context in which he was groomed – is important to understand responses to SST
attacks.
2
The LTA research program in political psychology was developed in Hermann (1999) and allows for a sophisticated
and replicable way to study leader personality traits and type. It is an empirical method that allows for predictions of
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What is State-Sponsored Terrorism?
The idea of SST has received many epithets over time. It has been called variously (Erickson 1989)
as “a new form of warfare,” (O’Ballance 1978) a “tool of low-intensity warfare,” (Kupperman
1982) “protracted political warfare…a form of ‘indirect aggression’,” (Sloan 1986) as well as
“surrogate warfare” (Christenson, 1978). However, despite these incidents having happened in the
past, it was not quite until 9/11 happened that state-sponsored terrorism was paid attention to in
the way it is today. While terrorist acts pre-9/11 were perceived as violent incidents carried out by
non-governmental entities or private actors, the link between Al Qaeda and its host, the Afghan
Taliban regime, caused a major armed intervention by a foreign power (Panetta and Newton 2014),
an action that received massive support from the international community (Maogoto 2003). As
Bruce Hoffman noted at St. Andrews University in 1992, “In the future terrorists may become the
ultimate fifth column: a clandestine cost-effective force used to wage war covertly against a more
powerful rival or subvert neighboring countries or regimes” (Duncan 2011).
SST can occur in various forms. It can range from intangible support such as moral and diplomatic
encouragement to provision of goods such as financial aid, supply of weapons, training, and
sanctuary (Wilkinson 1984). Byman (2005) defines SST as a government’s intentional assistance
to a terrorist group to help it use violence, bolster its political activities, or sustain the organization.
Though just like the broader notion of terrorism, there is no clear-cut definition for SST, the
method often involves the use of proxies to wage a low-intensity conflict against an adversary
(Conrad 2011). In the nuclear age, this is a particularly attractive way of inflicting harm without

how different political leaders will behave or direct their governments. It uses spontaneous material such as interviews
and leadership style, that is the way leaders interact with people around them, to form a picture of leader type.
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risking major escalation. Wilkinson observes that this is because of three factors – it does not carry
the risk of extreme escalation, it is relatively cheap, it can generate high yields (Wilkinson 1984).
While articles examining aspects of SST are rather rare and SST remains an “(under)developed,
peripheral topic” (Jackson et al. 2017), in one of the preliminary studies that do exist on the role
of interstate rivalry leading to the use of SST, Conrad finds this phenomenon commonplace, and
even acute, in the case of rival states. After examining all transnational terrorist attacks worldwide
between 1975-2003, he observes that “states involved in ongoing rivalries with other states are the
victims of more terrorist attacks than states that are not involved in such hostile interstate
relationships” (Conrad 2011).
SST has a few general characteristics. First, it is conducted covertly so that proving the perpetrator
state’s involvement becomes supremely difficult. The act is clandestine (O’Brien 1996) resulting
in an “uncertainty about the origin of the threat” (Kupperman et al. 1982) and thereby carries with
it the requirement of plausible deniability. Second, the perpetrator state will, of course, deny
involvement in any terrorist attack that takes place against the victim state, thus putting the burden
of proof on the latter. Third, the use of intelligence agencies by perpetrator state in carrying out
such attacks is commonplace. Fourth, precisely because of state involvement, SST organizations
usually have access to better weaponry and superior firepower. For instance, the Provisional Irish
Republican Army (IRA) and Hezbollah were far more lethal as terrorist organizations because of
state support (Pienaar 2008). Fifth, the SST organization has an advantage in terms of the element
of surprise and, finally, an SST attack against the victim state puts the latter government in a tough
position between high domestic pressure to act against the perceived enemy state and oftentimes
a more mollifying and pacifist international community attempting to broker peace and defuse
rising tensions (Wilkinson 1984).
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What Drives SST?
Several traditional theories postulate what factors cause state-sponsored terrorist attacks. The first
factor postulated is that strategic interest is a key determinant of SST. Akin to the renowned
Clausewitzian statement, ‘war is the continuation of politics through other means’, SST then seems
to be a continuation of a state’s foreign policy through other means to achieve its objectives
(Erickson 1989), which could range from destabilizing or weakening neighboring states to
projecting power or even overthrowing an adversary regime (Byman 2005). This view was
supported further by a US Senate report in 1985. The report observed that terrorism could be
“another tool for nations to project military and political power. Terrorism [becomes] an
instrument that can be brought into action whenever a state wishes to project its power into the
territory of another without accepting the responsibility, accountability, and risks of avowed
belligerency” (Stein 1982). States that are strong in conventional military capabilities might wish
to garner the support of terrorist groups that are masters of unconventional tactics or other forms
of warfare suited to a particular military or political objective of the state (Byman and Kreps 2010).
Thus, states align with groups that share similar interests with it (Sick 2003; Conrad 2011). When
threats to the national security of a country increase, states’ support for terrorist organizations also
tends to increase (Ekmekci 2011). The SST method then allows for cost-cutting when full-fledged
wars of aggression are expensive and risky (Laqueur 1996).
The second factor rests on the belief that lending support to terrorist organizations fulfills an array
of ideological aims for a regime, such as “enhancing their prestige” or exporting the ideology they
subscribe to (Byman 2005). For instance, the Taliban providing refuge to the Al-Qaida in
Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia supporting Palestinian radicals in return for using them as weapons
elsewhere, the Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi’s support of left-wing Palestinian groups in the
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1970s (Byman and Kreps 2010), and so on. Often, as a US Senate Hearing found, “the political or
ideological purpose” of SST “is the strengthening of one state at the expense of another” (Senate
Hearing 1986). In the case of the India-Pakistan rivalry, groups such as the LeT and the Al Qaida
are ideologically motivated to recover “lost Muslim lands” in Asia as well as in Europe to
ultimately establish an Islamic Caliphate (Tellis 2012). This ambition then fits in rather snugly
with the hardline views within the Pakistani state that the disputed territory of Muslim-majority
Kashmir should be wrenched out of India’s grasp in its entirety, as they aspire to have the Muslims
of Kashmir be a part of Pakistan. As a result, the Pakistani state and terrorist organizations such as
the LeT have become natural allies with this major overlap in their political and ideological
objectives against an economically dynamic, secular, and democratic India.
The third factor stresses a common religious belief to be the primary driver behind SST (Ekmekci
2011; Senate Hearing 1986), such as the Iranian state support to the Shia radical group Hezbollah
or Pakistani support to Islamic fundamentalist groups in both the disputed territories of Kashmir
as well as domestically within Pakistan. A common religious belief creates an affinity between the
state sponsor and the terrorist organization as they work towards a common goal, even if the
reasons for doing so may be somewhat different. The two parties thrive on this symbiotic
relationship.
Factor four emphasizes that support for terrorist groups emerge from the goal of supporting
insurgent movements. As Byman (2005) observes, “not all terrorist groups are insurgencies, but
almost every insurgent group uses terrorism”. For instance, the support provided by Pakistan to
militants in Kashmir to take up arms against India is an example of this variety. Especially since
Pakistan realized in the early 1990s that India could not be seriously harmed by fomenting
domestic insurgencies such as the ones in its Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir regions, the Inter24

Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) began to breed battle-hardened militants from its western
front with Afghanistan. These were warriors that had little to nothing in common with the local
Kashmiris and thus were not hesitant unlike moderate Kashmiri separatists to use brutal violence
on the local soil.
The fifth element speaks to the notion of how domestic factors play an important role in giving
rise to SST. Such factors include support for who they see as their own people who may need
assistance or bolstering a terrorist group so that they can help battle domestic adversaries (Byman
2005). As Ashley Tellis notes in the South Asian context, the “LeT not only does not bite the hand
that feeds it but actually protects its patrons against other domestic opponents” (Tellis 2012). The
prevention of the growth of any political movements at loggerheads with the state or its intended
goals is a key reason for the use of SST (Figueroa Ibarra 1991; Weiss Fagen 1992). For instance,
in Guatemala, the enforced disappearance of persons and extrajudicial executions by death squads
sanctioned by the government were rampant (Afflitto 2000).
SST has therefore continued to prevail in various parts of the world because of one of the above
factors. In the Middle East, ever since the inception of the Hezbollah in 1985 in Lebanon (a group
created by Iran), initially a “rag-tag collection of Shiite fighters,” but now well-trained and armed,
we also find that the average number of attacks (though intermittent over the years) has by and
large increased according to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Hezbollah has become today
indispensable not only to Iran but also to Syria (Levitt 2007). Gradually, Hezbollah became a
power projection tool for Iran, not only enabling it to indirectly harm Israel, but also other enemies
in Europe and parts of the Middle East (Norton 2007).
Along with Hezbollah, Iran has also actively supported a few other non-state groups, among them
Hamas, created in 1987 two years after Hezbollah. Iran says the support is not military, but only
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moral and financial. Though Hamas is also considered a terrorist organization by much of the
Western world, including the US and Europe, in conjunction with Israel, they are considered a
resistance group in most Middle Eastern territories fighting Israeli “occupation.” This is much in
line with the perception of Hezbollah when it was created – fighting the Israeli occupation in
Lebanon successfully. Hamas is, in fact, considered a democratically elected political party in the
Palestine, even though it has the destruction of Israel as part of its Charter. GTD displays a
dramatic rise between 1987 and 2017 in the number of attacks carried out by Hamas on Israel.
While Hamas is not the most militant group in Palestine, but its size, resources, and local support
base make it highly influential (Roy 2003).
Another modern case of the use of SST is that of the support garnered by the Irish Republican
Army (IRA) from Muammar Qaddafi’s Libya (Pienaar 2008). The IRA intended to force Northern
Ireland out from the United Kingdom’s hands, and Libya wished to use this group to its advantage
against the USA and its allies, namely the UK. Though the IRA called for a final ceasefire in 1997
and ultimately disarmed in 2005 under international supervision, it was the primary actor in
hundreds of terrorist incidents across Great Britain and Northern Ireland mostly between the three
decades from 1970 until the turn of the millennium. Libya thus provided the IRA with military
support that partly helped the latter replace its anachronistic small arms with more modern
weapons. It was clear that the Libyans could not directly challenge these Western powers and
hence resorted to the use of terrorist acts through the IRA, among other tools, to defy their might.
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Theory - Leader Type and Victim State Response to SST
In this analysis, I pick up where the extant literature has left the study of SST responses. Earlier
research has paid scant attention to the connection between leader type in a victim state and
responses to SST attacks. While leader decision-making in foreign policy and security issues is a
complex process, comprehending their cognitive processes while they make decisions is
supremely important. There is little doubt that multiple variables and complex calculations are
likely part of a victim state’s planning and execution of a response – including orientation of
political party in power, severity of SST attack, nature of attack, timing of attack, and domestic
public mood/ opinion, among other things. I argue that leader type, along with these other factors,
plays a critical role in determining SST response.
Analyses of leaders and leadership in political science has been prevalent since at least Machiavelli
in Western literature writing about how a leader should function (Ahlquist and Levi 2011). In the
modern International Relations context, while studying war and foreign policy decision-making,
numerous scholars have debated the relative importance of the leader vis-à-vis domestic
intervening variables at the state level and constraints arising out of the international state system
or comity of nations. While some of the early works of Classical Realism emphasized the primacy
of human nature in foreign policy including those of Morgenthau, Niebuhr, Kennan, and others,
later Neo-Realists such as Waltz, Mearsheimer and others, while attesting to states being the
primary actors and not the individual, also argue that the international system generates pressure
on states, and that is the real decision-making factor behind foreign policy. A third group of
realists, the Neoclassical, such as Gideon Rose and Randall Schweller, added domestic constraints
at the state level as intervening variables between systemic pressures and a foreign policy decisionmaking. While there is no conclusive evidence yet that either leaders, domestic constraints or the
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international structure is solely or primarily responsible for a state’s foreign policy decisions, I
argue that the study of leaders is indeed important to determining outcomes in this sphere, with
my focus on the role played by a leader in evaluating and choosing SST response options.
While the range of alternatives available to leaders may be limited because of domestic,
organizational (Allison 1971), and international systemic constraints, decision-makers nonetheless
choose policies within the available options that are consistent with their values, motivations, and
belief structures (Sprout and Sprout 1956). Early studies connected leaders’ childhood personal
experiences to their later decision-making. Later studies assessed leaders in terms of behavioral
traits or personality traits – for instance, dogmatism, nationalism, control over events, and
cognitive complexity in Hermann’s (1974, 1980) works – and connected these traits to overall
foreign policy decision-making (Brule and Mintz 2010).
The role of leaders in decision-making has continued to attract the attention of scholars. The studies
of personality have diverged in two directions with one assessing the impact of leadership styles
such as delegation and management on foreign policy (Kissinger 1966, Hermann et al. 2001) and
the other research agenda assessing operational codes. The latter analysis argues that decisionmakers’ belief systems create a prism or lens through which they filter their information, and it
comes across as a certain color. This impacts the way leaders decide on foreign policy and may
lead them to follow certain courses of action and not some others (Brule and Mintz 2010). The
Operational Code Analysis (OCA) research program further gave rise to a Theory of Inferences
about Preferences (TIP) that subscribes to three master beliefs - the basic nature of politics,
especially political opponents; the decision maker’s ability to influence events and historical
development relative to others’ ability to do so; and optimal strategies for political action (Marfleet
and Walker 2006). The OCA, along with the LTA then, is a well-established research program
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meant to analyze belief systems of leaders, and Brown (2017) uses them in his study of hawkish
and dovish leaders.
Theories about rational actor decision-making also gained currency since the late 1970s. Game
theory and expected utility theory are important theories, wherein the leader is expected to be
rational and chooses the most viable alternative with the “largest net gain” (Bueno de Mesquita
1984). While the focus of such theories emphasizes the rationality of decision-makers, the role of
the cognitive structure of leaders that contributes to decision-making in the case of SST response
cannot be overemphasized either. That is, how a leader responds to the actors, objects, and
environment around them. It aids them in organizing the vast information and data they need to
process every single day. While initial information about a certain issue that works against these
preconceived notions of leaders may be summarily dismissed by the latter, copious amounts of
information contrary to their beliefs, multiple data points, and trend analyses that prove otherwise,
may persuade the leader to recalibrate their decision or opinion about the issue (Brule and Mintz
2010).
From the above discussion it should be amply clear why the study of leader type then, becomes
invaluable when it comes to understanding SST response decision-making. Leaders’ persona and
preferences directly correlate to the kind of SST response delivered as elucidated in Figure 1.
While other factors also matter, leader type also plays an important role.
There is an abundance of research attesting to hawkish and dovish behavioral patterns. Hawks are
typically perceived as being more aggressive, especially in times of crisis, and doves are usually
considered more inclined towards non-aggressive solutions, preferring cooperation and dialogue
over violence to solve international problems. Barnes (2011) observes that hawkish behavior is
"too aggressive to establish a long-term stability and peace," and dovish behavior is "too weak to
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Figure 1: Causal Process of SST Response Decision-Making
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deal with the messy problems in harsh war zones". Arce and Sandler (2009) classify hawkishness
and dovishness as two extreme forms of behavior where they denote “dove” as a form of full
cooperation and “hawk” as the symbol for pre-emption. In his study of public opinion in the UK,
Clements (2011) categorizes men as more hawkish than women because they “tend to be more
likely to support overseas military interventions”, another attestation to the aggressiveness of the
hawk. Allison, et al. (1985) observe that the hawk motto is “peace through strength” and that they
counsel resolve in times of crisis. Weakness or the perception of it must be avoided at all costs so
that the adversary does not get a chance to behave like Hitler despite being appeased after the
Munich Agreement of 1938. On the other hand, doves worry about arms and counsel “reassurance
and compromise” in times of crisis.
Arndt (2013), while admitting that the hawk/ dove dynamic itself is centered on the simple question
of whether one is pro-war or anti-war, also maintains that this categorization is “fungible” or part
of a continuum, and similarly to Allison et al. (1985), notes that a hawk is neither in one hundred
per cent of cases baying for the enemy’s blood for bloodshed’s sake (but to create a greater peace)
nor is a dove always a pacifist. If certain red lines are crossed, even a dove can strike back, or in
other cases a hawk can sometimes function less aggressively. There can be relatively hawkish
doves and relatively dovish hawks (Schultz 2005). Arndt (2013) also notes several different tests
for judging hawkishness and dovishness – such as airpower policy, defense spending in general,
(de)escalation of conflict, foreign military aid inter alia – and concludes that hawkishness in one
category does not by default signal hawkishness in another. Thus, the consensus of the scholarly
community is clearly that a hawk tends to behave aggressively in matters of national security and
interest.
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Exceptional circumstances also sometimes produce confounding courses of action that go against
my theory, but that is not the norm. For instance, a Hezbollah attack in 1983 on a US Marines base
in Beirut, Lebanon, left 241 American casualties in its wake. Ronald Reagan, a hawkish
Republican President in his first term, in response to this SST strike ended up not retaliating
militarily but, rather, by withdrawing the US Marines from Lebanon altogether. Looking beneath
the surface, one might see that the President may have been influenced more by the likes of his
then Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, who did not see much value in hitting terrorists
back militarily, a view quite different from that of George Schultz’s (Toaldo 2012). Weinberger
(2001) observes that he had opposed the deployment of the US Marines as part of the Multinational
Force in Lebanon (MNF). Reagan further seems to have realized as well as mustered the political
courage to take what could have well been a politically disastrous step when he realized the folly
of being there without good reason or clear objectives. In his diaries, Reagan (2007), who within
a week of starting his presidency started discussing terrorism matters with his intelligence chiefs
and secretaries, seems to be mentally wrestling with the tough decisions about maintaining US
troops in Beirut over several months starting October 22/23, 1983, following the attack on the
Marines, until the denouement was reached in late February 1984 together with his close advisers.
Reagan’s solution was to keep US Army personnel trained in anti-terrorism tactics stationed in
Lebanon while relocating the Marines offshore to ships nearby, and not retaliate against Iran or
Hezbollah.
Another puzzling example of a hawk, Menachem Begin, not responding aggressively as expected
is when in November 1982, Hezbollah militants conducted a vehicle bombing of the Israeli
Defense Forces headquarters in Tyre, Lebanon, resulting in over 89 deaths and an unknown
number of injured (Norton 2007). While the answer to this remains a mystery, it may be perhaps
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because Israel never agreed that it was a suicide bombing by Hezbollah, but rather claim that “The
Israeli military government building in Tyre collapses due to gas leakage” (Israel Ministry of
Foreign Affairs). Davis (2017) observes that the Israeli internal security agency, Shin Bet, at first
tried to cover up stating that an inadvertent cooking gas leak resulted in the explosion. However,
a Hezbollah video made public in 1995 after the Israeli military evacuated the village of the person
said to be the suicide truck bomber in the 1982 Tyre case, Ahmad Qassir, refutes this “fairytale.”
However, these instances are exceptions to the rule and a hawkish leader typically responds more
aggressively and a dovish leader is usually risk- and violence-averse.

This logic leads to the following hypothesis regarding the relationship between leader type and
response to SST H1: Hawkish leaders, ceteris paribus, are more likely than moderate or dovish leaders to respond
aggressively to state-sponsored terrorist attacks.
Now, as stated previously, there is more behind an SST response than leader type alone. Severity
of attack is another critical variable that may exhibit direct covariance with SST response. More
violent attacks typically produce more forceful responses. Leng (1983) finds that coercion begets
coercion, because policymakers’ functioning may be rooted in some kind of “folklore” that
venerates aggression and sees a pacifist as a weakling or compromiser. Here, demonstration of
resolve often becomes more important than prudence. Prins (2005) cautions that the signaling of
resolve between rivals in a dyad can follow a dangerous escalating spiral of increasingly coercive
behavior by either state. He argues that military action in crisis responses increases with violent
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triggers (see also Keller 2005) and that “war strengthens the hand of generals at the expense of
diplomats.”
This argument leads to my second hypothesis H2, that: The higher the severity of an SST attack,
ceteris paribus, the greater the likelihood of a major response by the leader of a victim state,
regardless of leader type.
It may be noted here that while these two hypotheses may be intuitive, extant scholarship has so
far failed to examine the relationship between leader type, severity of SST attacks (trigger), and
response to SST.
Like adding fuel to fire, the probability of a violent response can multiply with a hawkish leader
at the helm of the victim state (Keller 2005). The greater the threat to state survival, the more
aggressive the response. Also, with the deepening of protracted rivalries, military action becomes
the norm while responding to the adversary. Further, Fearon’s (1998) theoretical model posits that
it is unlikely for democracies to back down once in a conflict or targeted because of latent electoral
costs. They would readily reciprocate militarized demands in response to provocations (Chan
1997). Keller (2005) confirms this when he writes a set of scholars opine democracies believe in
reciprocity which discourages any form of exploitation, and any attempt at exploitation is met with
force in defense of the national interest. Strong feelings of distrust or nationalism in a leader
(hawkish tendencies) can make the need for use of force even stronger to protect this interest,
according to him.
Leader type is important then in determining the response to an SST attack. In the Indian context,
for instance, the Prime Minister is paramount and usually the face of the nation. When a
“Presidential” style hawkish leader such as Narendra Modi takes over the reins of government, the
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contrast with the country’s real President becomes even more pronounced, especially if the head
of state (Indian President) adopts a more subtle approach or is a lesser-known political figure visà-vis the head of government (Indian PM). For Modi and his party then, the image of Modi
becomes the selling point for the party’s election gains. The image of a strong leader, which goes
hand in hand with the image of a militarily powerful and economically robust India, sets the stage
for rule based primarily on leader type.
While in the case of a dovish leader’s response to SST attacks – that is, a leader that avoids
confrontations as far as possible with other states – other factors such as severity of attack, right
or left party, public opinion, and military service may matter more; in the case of a strong, hawkish
leader that “wears the pants” in the decision-making household these factors tend to matter less. It
is true that every leader wishes to remain in power for as long as possible, and if not personally, at
least for their political party to remain in power even after their term is over.
Prior research has linked foreign policy behavior of leaders to public opinion or winning coalitions.
Kertzer and Zeitzoff (2017) present a cogent overview of the various schools of thought – the illinformed and the well-informed publics. There has been a debate about how far really citizens’
opinions constrain foreign policy choices. The first wave of scholars believed more that there is
no real nexus between public opinion and foreign policy decision-making. Aldrich, Sullivan, and
Borgida (1989) question whether leaders “waltz before a blind audience” as relates to foreign
affairs. Baum and Potter (2015) find that public support seems more easily available when going
into conflict against countries that are already rivals and there has been conflict before. Citizens
delegate voluntarily and temporarily their sovereign power to their elected leaders, who are trusted
to take carefully considered decisions by insulating them from the passions of the public. However,
they are also expected to faithfully represent the will of the public while they are in power, or else
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face the music at election time. This is all good in theory; in reality, however, leaders in power
manipulate information to the point that their failures are obscured with the media which is often
in cahoots with them. As a result, citizens wallow in the quagmire of political ignorance. Destler,
Gelb and Lake (1984) also believe that the conventional wisdom among a wide range of academic
analysts is that public opinion does not constrain nor impel presidents on foreign policy issues.
However, more recent scholars feel that public opinion matters in influencing foreign policy. For
instance, Jordan and Page (1992) concluded that “[a]nalyses of aggregate data have indicated that
foreign policies correspond with what a majority of Americans favor in more than 90% of the cases
examined….” Tomz, et al. (2020), Getmansky, et al. (2019), Goldsmith and Yusaku Horiuchi
(2012), Reifler et al. (2011), Todorov and Mandisodza (2004), and Kapur (2009) in the case of
both the USA and India, find a noticeable effect of the former on the latter. Kumar (2018) finds
that PM Narendra Modi in India pays attention to public opinion through initiatives such as “Mann
Ki Baat” (heart to heart talk), somewhat reminiscent of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s “fireside
chats” in the USA in the 1930s and 40s, through which the Indian PM communicates with citizens
and conveys his views on national issues to them. Greene (2015) writes that Netanyahu has often
followed public will by supporting a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine but was not under
pressure to have to succeed. Hlavsová, et al. (2018) opine that US and Turkish foreign policy
towards Syria changed once public opinion changed on whether to go to war against the latter
state. Adding to the Turkey story, Luleci-Sula (2020) also finds that in a 2010 speech relating to
Iranian nuclearization, Erdogan spoke in a manner conforming to public opinion in his country.
Neack (2013) observes that public pressure caused foreign policy decisions to be taken in a certain
way so that the central/ federal government could remain in power. These cases include the United
Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition government in India almost canceling a much-vaunted
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nuclear deal with the USA, Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak foregoing a significant accord regarding
Palestinian sovereignty and forcing Russian leaders Yeltsin and Putin to adopt neo-imperial and
belligerent policies that sent democracy veering off course. Rothschild & Shafranek (2017) argue
that media frames shape public opinion and thereby generate democratic constraints for leaders.
Gordon (2008) presents a slightly distinct perspective. He holds that leaders in the United States
manipulate the public into believing that their opinions indeed impact foreign policy decisionmaking. Realist assumptions in foreign policy are coated with liberal paint to make them palatable
to the American public and gain support for actions. There are also multiple takers for the theory
that public opinion plays a significant role in determining US foreign policy towards Israel (e.g.,
Leigh, 1976; Trice, 1976; Cotton, 1986; Gilboa, 1987; Zureik and Moughrabi, 1987; Russett and
Graham, 1989; Brooks, 1990; Organski, 1990, Krosnick and Telhami 1995).
Strong hawkish leaders win over public opinion in their favor as a natural corollary by standing
calm and resolute in the face of adversity in front of a large domestic audience (Campbell 2003) –
and this holds equally true for SST responses by leaders. One would find public opinion to be
highly in favor of the political leadership after an SST attack from a rival state – for example, the
sense of indignation and revenge bubbling to the surface of the Indian populace after 26/11 (2008),
Uri (2016), and Pulwama (2019), and similarly, the rallying around the flag effect in the USA after
9/11, when almost the entire country wanted their leader President George W. Bush to take
revenge/ military action against al Qaeda, the perpetrators of that attack. Further, hawkish leaders
typically tend to counter SST attacks on their soil with a firm hand – regardless of the severity of
the attack (whether severe or less severe), they tend to take aggressive military measures to deter
the adversary (both state as well as associated terrorist groups). Even a minor provocation may
result in a major response.
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Moreover, military service usually tends to make a leader less hawkish as determined by Horowitz
and Stam (2014), and Robinstain (2019) from the latter’s study of Israeli leaders and 102
concessionary decisions. On the other hand, a leader can be hawkish without military service, and
major responses to even minor SST attacks have not necessarily been taken by those with a military
past. PM Modi of India, for instance, does not have a military background – nonetheless, his
responses to SST attacks have often been major since 2016, once the diplomatic route the Indian
government previously adopted seemed to be ineffective against Pakistan’s provocations. Neither
Margaret Thatcher nor Indira Gandhi, two strong-willed female Prime Ministers, served in the
military, but they were perceived as hawks as they took ironfisted steps in responding to challenges
from their adversary states – Argentina and Pakistan, respectively. In 1982, PM Thatcher did not
hesitate to go to war with Argentina thousands of miles away over possession of the Falkland
Islands. PM Gandhi, sometimes referred to as the “only man in her Cabinet,” did not hesitate in
carving up the erstwhile Pakistan into two different countries after a major war either - the
Bangladesh Liberation War - leading to the genesis of Bangladesh in 1971.
Previous research and history also show that right-leaning parties tend to select more hawkish
leaders and left-leaning parties typically select more dovish leaders. Unless demonstrated to the
contrary, voters usually assume that Democratic leaders in the United States, for instance, are more
dovish, and that Republicans are defense hawks (Koopman, et al. 1998; Koch and Cranmer 2007;
Whitten and Williams 2011; Bittner 2011) because it does, in fact, work that way (Klingemann,
Hofferbert & Budge 1994; Prins 2001; Palmer, London & Regan 2004; Koch 2009; Williams
2014). If a dovish leader turns out to be aggressive and a hawkish leader not so, they may even
pique their voter base (Kiratli 2020). With the increasing personalization of politics, parties choose
those candidates as leaders that best personify the party to the public (Bermanis, Canetti-Nisim
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and Ami Pedahzur 2004; Pilet and Cross 2014) and would help them achieve their objectives
(Green and Harris 2019). Calin (2010) asserts that “foreign policy decisionmakers act in a manner
consistent with the ideological principles presented in their political platforms, party manifestos,
and their voters' expectations” and aggressiveness of governments increases the further rightleaning it is. Party leaders then are expected to make the biggest contributions to the party’s
political performance (Ennser-Jedenastik and Mueller 2015). In Presidential systems, the whole
Cabinet headed by the President is typically in favor of the party (Barber 2019). US Presidential
candidates, for instance, are spokespersons of their parties first and spokespersons for the
American public only later (Brewer and Stonecash 2009). Pedahzur (2001) writes that most of the
supporters of both Shas, a Mizrahi (representing Jews originating in Muslim countries) Haredi
(ultra-orthodox) party, as well as Israel Our Home, an immigrant’s party, hold hawkish views and
82.2 percent of the former party’s voters and 94.4 percent of the latter party’s voters supported the
conservative right-wing candidate Benjamin Netanyahu in the 1999 elections.
Therefore, ruling political party orientation can also be an important determinant in SST responses
by a state’s leader. The leader is typically selected from the ruling party, and they would likely not
go entirely against their party’s stance. However, a strong hawkish leader who already has
tremendous party support as well as public opinion tilted in their favor – with the population of a
country looking up to them in times of crisis – tends to take the ultimate decision of how to respond
to an SST attack. In the Indian case, it has usually been the Prime Minister who has taken the final
decision for SST responses.
Thus, while other key factors all play into a leader’s decision-making calculus about how to
respond to an SST attack, leader type is also important. It is organically tied to political party
support and public opinion, as mentioned above, and sometimes consultations with other
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leadership top brass. Leaders, very often when they are young rookies in the political arena, join
specific political parties (viz. Narendra Modi joining the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh or RSS
in 1978 and later the Bharatiya Janata Party or BJP in India) or attempt to create new ones with
the ideology they subscribe to when no such party exists (Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon
creating the Likud Party in 1973 in Israel). Then they rise in the party ranks through their political
achievements and capital. They also feel that their support base should be as widespread as possible
and steady, and certain classes of voters will vote in their favor based specifically on the kind of
ideology the leader professes. Therefore, if a leader follows a hawkish or dovish ideology from
the start, they will typically continue to do so. Otherwise, they risk alienating the public and their
support base. Also, the ideology of the political party that leaders belong to, and public opinion,
especially of their support base, is important to the leader. After all, it is the political party that
selects their candidate for the top spot, who upon electoral victory occupies the leadership position
in a country.
In sum, the argument that hawkish leader types typically respond more aggressively to statesponsored terrorist attacks and dovish leader types are more likely to respond more pacifically has
not been empirically assessed. Judging by the evidence available across democracies globally, this
relationship seems to obtain. The latter relationship is not restricted in any way except for one - it
is only applicable to democracies, because in other systems of government such as autocracies or
anocracies, free and fair elections either do not exist or not adequately – therefore, the leader of
such states tends to accumulate a tremendous amount of power in their hands.
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Research Design
The existing literature on SST contains interesting insights but is limited by the type of data
analyzed. There is a dearth of material that empirically evaluates how responses are determined.
The available data is not well suited to the analysis of the relationship between leader type and
SST response. I fill this gap in the literature by using data on 19 SST cases worldwide between
1982 and 2019. To test my hypotheses about responses to SST, I assess the responses of 12 leaders
from five countries in these cases. The leaders, in the Brown (2017) typology, range all the way
from warhawk to dove, wherein he classifies leaders as warhawks, hawks, chickenhawks, owls,
ravens, and doves in a decreasing order of propensity to use military means. I collapse Brown’s
(2017) six leader types into two categories – hawk and dove – because it suffices for my theory,
and these leaders are drawn from a wide variety of cultures, geographical regions, ideologies, and
backgrounds. Eleven of the twelve leaders are male except for Margaret Thatcher. Eight of the
leaders selected are hawks and four are doves.
In this study, my IV is “leader type” and DV is “SST response.” First, I classify the IV, “leader
type,” following Brown’s (2017) work. I shall categorize individual actions/ responses adopted by
a leader of the victim state for specific attacks (viz. the cases I am working on in this dissertation)
into the typology proposed by Brown (2017).
I measure the Dependent Variable by creating a simple dummy that flags cases with either “minor
response” or “major response.” For the DV, I operationalize “major response” as “overt punitive
or coercive uses of military strikes by the victim state on infrastructure/ combatants of either the
terrorist group and/ or the state sponsor in location(s) within the sponsoring state’s territory to a.)
inflict costs or b.) in extreme cases, to bring about regime change.” A “minor response” is
operationalized as “any response by a victim state other than a major response, including
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diplomatic isolation in international organizations/ fora, economic sanctions, minor covert
operations behind enemy lines, sponsoring terrorists in rival’s territory in a tit for tat response,
engaging the state sponsor in dialogue, or lack of a response.” I find ten major responses to SST
attacks out of my nineteen cases, with the other nine being minor responses.
I also differentiate between a severe SST attack and a less severe one, based partly on a distinction
drawn by GTD on the same. I find ten major responses to SST attacks out of my nineteen cases,
with the other nine being minor responses. I further operationalize a “less severe attack” as an
incident where the “casualty count is less than 25, and/ or financial damages to the victim state are
up to $1 million, and/ or no notable landmarks/ buildings/ seats of government are attacked.” A
“severe attack” on the other hand occurs when “either the casualty count is a minimum of 25, and/
or property damages to victim state equals or exceeds $1 million, and/ or notable landmarks/
buildings/ seats of government are attacked.” I chose 25 casualties and property damage equaling
or exceeding $1 million to be that turning point when a less severe attack becomes a severe attack
in accordance with the classification of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which calls 25 or
more fatalities in a single terrorist attack as highly lethal, and property damage equaling or
exceeding $1 million as “major.” Twelve of the nineteen cases were severe attacks and seven were
less severe.

Case Selection
I justify my case selection based on variation in leader type, identifying cases in which leaders of
the victim state were hawkish, and others in which the leaders were dovish. To understand how
this gamut of leaders responds to various kinds of SST attacks, I included SST attack instances

42

that vary in severity as well, thereby ensuring a study of responses by a variety of leaders in
different situations. I selected some of the most prominent SST attacks since the 1980s on some
of the worst SST-affected states in the world, and some perhaps lesser-known attacks to maintain
a balance in attack severity.
Second, the cases selected are all reflective of dyadic rivalry between the state sponsor of terrorism
and the victim state that responds to the terrorist attack. All these cases are examples of SST attacks
orchestrated by one state against its rival within a dyad, and the rival state (victim) responding to
it in some fashion. For instance, all the attacks on India listed below are believed to be perpetrated
by terrorist groups based out of Pakistan with the blessings of the Pakistani “deep state” which
has, ever since its inception in 1947, been India’s major south Asian rival. The attacks on US
interests by Hezbollah had support from Iran, and those by al Qaeda show obvious signs of passive
support at the very least by the then Taliban dispensation in Afghanistan, two governments that
are known for their anti-Western stance. Turkey’s struggle with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(PKK) became more difficult because of sponsorship/ support that PKK enjoys/ enjoyed from
multiple states that rival/ dislike a strong Turkish presence in the region including Syria, Iraq, Iran,
Greece, Cyprus, and debatably Armenia. Similarly, Israel is kept on its toes by Hamas and
Hezbollah. While the former organization has received support by Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Syria,
among others, Hezbollah receives Iranian support. Thus, both Hamas and Hezbollah, similarly as
other SST groups as mentioned above, receive support from states that wish to repel a dominant
Judaic Israel in the Middle East and would rather be the dominant players there. Finally, the UK
faced a protracted struggle against the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in its various avatars and
under multiple names. The IRA received support from Libya under Muammar Qaddafi, at a time
when Libya’s relations with the western world, particularly the USA and the UK, were low – in
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other words, an anti-Western Libya supported non-state groups such as the IRA against a rival
government whose policies they were both fighting against.
Third, I have selected the individual terrorist attack cases within each rival dyad to minimize
extraneous variance and to demonstrate that vastly different attacks (in terms of severity) do not
necessarily result in a proportional response from the victim state. Rather, I employ novel testing
strategies to demonstrate empirically that it is the personality of the leader of the victim state that
is strongly correlated with response to SST.

Empirical Analysis
The straightforward hypothesis (H1) suggests that all other things remaining equal, a hawkish
leader will be more likely to respond aggressively than a dovish leader. As a glance at Table 1
reveals, out of the nineteen cases selected, hawkish leader types do in fact respond militarily more
often than dovish leader types both in case of severe and less severe attacks. In fact, hawks respond
more aggressively more often even in case of less severe attacks when compared to doves
responding to severe attacks. In each of my nineteen cases, I first hold severity of the SST attack
constant and then vary leader traits. I test whether hawkish and dovish leaders respond differently
for both severe as well as for less severe attacks. While in case of severe SST attacks, the general
propensity to deliver a major response increases for hawks and doves, and there is a reduced
proclivity to do so in case of less severe SST attacks, there is undeniably a wide gap between
response varieties between hawks and doves in both categories. I find that hawks counter SST
attacks with major responses (69 per cent cases), while doves typically resort to minor responses
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TABLE 1: LEADER TYPE
VICTIM
STATE
ISRAEL
ISRAEL
ISRAEL
ISRAEL
TURKEY

YEAR

LEADER NAME

LEADER TYPE

1982
2002
2004
2015
05/2007

HAWK3
HAWK4
HAWK
HAWK5
HAWK6

TURKEY

10/2007

TURKEY

2020

UK

1983

UK

1987

MENACHEM BEGIN
ARIEL SHARON
ARIEL SHARON
BENJAMIN NETANYAHU
RECEP TAYYIP ERDOGAN
(PM)
RECEP TAYYIP ERDOGAN
(PM)
RECEP TAYYIP ERDOGAN
(Pres.)
MARGARET
HILDA
THATCHER
MARGARET
HILDA
THATCHER

HAWK
HAWK
HAWK7
HAWK
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TABLE 1 CONTINUED
VICTIM
STATE
UK
USA
USA

YEAR

LEADER NAME

LEADER TYPE

1996
1983
1993

DOVE8
HAWK (At this point)9
DOVE10

USA

1998

USA
INDIA
INDIA
INDIA
INDIA

2001
2000
2001
2008
2016

INDIA

2019

SIR JOHN MAJOR
RONALD WILSON REAGAN
WILLIAM
JEFFERSON
CLINTON
WILLIAM
JEFFERSON
CLINTON
GEORGE WALKER BUSH
ATAL BIHARI VAJPAYEE
ATAL BIHARI VAJPAYEE
MANMOHAN SINGH
NARENDRA DAMODARDAS
MODI
NARENDRA DAMODARDAS
MODI

DOVE
HAWK11
DOVE12
DOVE
DOVE13
HAWK14
HAWK
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(83 per cent cases). Overall, therefore, we see a significant effect of the leader type measure on
SST response. In other words, we see a fair amount of support for the primary hypothesis of the
leader type argument.
H2 hypothesizes that all other things remaining equal, a severe SST attack would elicit a major
response compared to a less severe SST assault, and that too regardless of leader type. Analyzing
Table 2 makes it evident that empirical support for hypothesis (H2) is wanting. Out of the nineteen
cases therein – twelve of those being severe SST attacks and five less severe attacks – seven of the
severe attacks see a minor response, while three of the less severe attacks saw a major response.
This result may be counterintuitive, but it only proves that other factor(s) play a more vital role in
determining magnitude of SST response than severity of attack, one of them being leader type.
Given how deeply seated the conventional idea that a severe attack would draw the ire of the victim
state more than a less severe attack is, we see astonishingly little support for it empirically. The
findings referred to above are uniform across cases, countries, and time periods. From 1982 to
2019, the hypotheses hold mostly true in the USA, India, Israel, the UK, and Turkey. In India, PM
Vajpayee, a dove, delivered a minor response to the 2000 Red Fort attack. The following year,
while mobilizing almost 500,000 Indian troops in response to the Parliament attacks, he did not
give a final go-ahead to them for a large-scale military confrontation. Further, PM Manmohan
Singh, another dove, as elaborated earlier, affords only a minor response to the severe Mumbai
26/11 assault in 2008. On the other hand, the more hawkish PM Narendra Modi twice responded
militarily against SST attacks in 2016 and 2019. While even Modi did not respond militarily to
every SST incident in India, it is important to note that a hawkish leader would be more likely to
deliver a major response to provocations, even if they do not follow through every single time.
This is noticeable from the above examples.
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TABLE 2: SST ATTACK AND RESPONSE MAGNITUDES
VICTIM

YEAR

ATTACK SEVERITY

RESPONSE SEVERITY

ISRAEL

1982

Severe

Minor

ISRAEL

2002

Severe

Major

ISRAEL

2004

Less severe

Major

ISRAEL

2015

Less severe

Major

TURKEY

05/2007

Less severe

Major

TURKEY

10/2007

Severe

Major

TURKEY

2020

Less severe

Major

UK

1983

Less severe

Minor

UK

1987

Less severe

Minor

UK

1996

Severe

Minor

USA

1983

Severe

Minor

USA

1993

Severe

Minor

USA

1998

Severe

Major

USA

2001

Severe

Major

INDIA

2000

Severe

Minor

INDIA

2001

Severe

Minor

INDIA

2008

Severe

Minor

INDIA

2016

Less severe

Major

INDIA

2019

Severe

Major

STATE
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In the USA, barring the exceptional minor response of the otherwise hawkish Ronald Reagan to
the Beirut US Marines barracks attack, that is, withdrawing US troops from Lebanon, we find that
George W. Bush and Clinton respond to SST attacks as expected. George W. Bush, a hawk,
invaded Afghanistan immediately after 9/11, which turned into America’s longest war, while
Clinton, more of a dove and who had presented himself as a moderate “New Democrat” (Panetta
and Newton 2014), delivered a minor response to a severe SST attack earlier in 1993 and
responded militarily to a severe SST attack on US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. The
severe SST attack by a dove is possible in extreme cases because as discussed earlier, sometimes
doves may have to respond aggressively if the attack is too severe and other factors such as public
opinion may effectively take decision-making beyond a leader’s control if they wish to remain
popular and in power.
In the case of Israel, the exception to my theory is Menachem Begin, who despite being hawkish
did not respond militarily to an SST attack in 1982 (perhaps because Israel denied that there were
casualties from that attack in the first place while Hezbollah, the group that likely caused the attack,
claimed that there were multiple Israeli deaths).
Nonetheless, I mostly find support for my theory in that Ariel Sharon, a hawk, had major responses
to two SST attacks, one major and one minor. Finally, Benjamin Netanyahu, another hawk, who
perceives the world as hostile to the Jewish people (Katzir 2019), delivered a major response of
air and ground strikes against Hezbollah in 2015 following a less severe SST attack. Netanyahu
perceives himself as the savior of the Jewish homeland and he feels that anyone who disagrees
with his views is misled from the way historical and political processes work. His high suspicion
of other people, including his closest advisers, makes him a particularly tough leader, and therefore
relies on a few “yes men” and close family in making his foreign policy decisions. Netanyahu
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perceives politics as a world where only the strong survive according to the law of the jungle
(Katzir 2019).
Even in the UK, the dovish John Major produced a minor response to severe SST attacks by the
IRA in 1996, known as the London Docklands or Canary Wharf bombing. Though Margaret
Thatcher was a hawk, the two cases selected during her tenure as British PM are less severe, and
therefore she likely delivered a minor response because as noted earlier, it is not necessary that a
hawk responds militarily to every single provocation. Thatcher had no notable response for the
1983 Harrods bombing and only pursued economic sanctions against Libya following the 1987
Remembrance Day bombing.
Finally, the empirical evidence for Turkey paints a similar picture under its leader, Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, another hawk. Of the three cases selected for study, two SST attacks were less severe
and only one was severe. The Erdogan government, however, responded militarily (major
response) to all three attacks, asserting once again that hawkish leader types are prone to
responding aggressively compared to dovish leader types. The interaction of leader type with SST
attack severity is catalogued in Table 3. The final table in this chapter, Table 4, thereafter lists the
various SST groups considered in this dissertation, their sponsors, and the type of sponsorship
provided.
There are similarities in this article with other prior scholarly works. For instance, Bakare and
Iqbal’s (2020) work suggests that leader personality or type is an important determinant in foreign
policy decision-making including SST response. That is what I empirically ascertain in this piece.
Further, my results are like those of Keller (2005) in that both our studies find that hawkish leader
types or “constraint challengers” respond more aggressively to provocations, while dovish leader
types or “constraint respecters” opine that aggression is counterproductive and therefore try to
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TABLE 3: LEADER TYPE AND SST ATTACK SEVERITY INTERACTION
Hawk (Major)

Hawk (Minor)

Severe Attack Erdogan (10/07) Begin (’82)
Bush (11/01)

Reagan (’83)

Dove (Major) Dove (Minor)
Clinton (’98)

Major (’96)
Vajpayee (’00)

Modi (’19)

Vajpayee (’01)

Sharon (’02)

Singh (’08)
Clinton (’93)

Less Severe

Sharon (’04)

Attack
Netanyahu (’15) Thatcher (’83)
Erdogan (5/07)

Thatcher (’87)

Erdogan (‘20)
Modi (’16)
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TABLE 4: SST GROUPS AND SPONSORS
SST GROUP

SPONSORING STATE TYPE OF SUPPORT

Hezbollah

Iran, Syria

Refuge, training, finance

Hamas

Iran, Syria, later Qatar

Finance, refuge

Lashkar-e-Taiba

Pakistan

Refuge, training, finance

Jaish-e-Muhammad

Pakistan

Refuge, training, finance

Al Qaeda and affiliates

Afghanistan, Sudan

Refuge

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) Syria, Iran, Iraq

Refuge, active military

and affiliates

protection against Turkey

Irish Republican Army (IRA)

Libya

Arms supply

(See Appendix 3 for more information)
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avoid violent confrontations. Further empirical tests with more accurate ways of measuring are
clearly necessary. However, this article empirically raises new perspectives on both the role of
leader type as well as severity of SST attacks on victim state response. Severity of attacks does not
seem to affect SST response to a large degree.

Alternative Explanations (Control Variables)
Severity of Attack – Dichotomous (Severe/ Less Severe). The higher the severity of an SST
attack, the greater the chances of a major response should be. Does not matter.
Party in Power – Dichotomous (Right/ Left). A right-wing, conservative party in power at the
time of the SST attack should lead to a more aggressive response, while a left-wing, liberal party
in power should lead to a less aggressive response. Empirically does not matter.
Public Opinion – Dichotomous (Favorable/ Unfavorable) – Not enough data to assess whether
public opinion matters.
Relative State Capacity (vis-à-vis state sponsor/s) – Ordinal (>/=/<). Victim state stronger in all
cases than terrorist group and in most cases than the state sponsor(s). Only in Israel’s case, relative
state capacity is somewhat equivalent to that of Iran’s and Saudi Arabia’s, if nuclear weapons are
not considered. If nuclear weapons are in the equation, Israel is by far the stronger side. Does not
matter.
Gender of Leader – Dichotomous (M/F). Not enough data to assess whether gender matters.
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Previous Military Experience of Leader – Dichotomous (Yes/ No). According to previous
studies, previous military experience should reduce inclination to fight. However, judging by my
cases, it does not seem to matter.

Limitations of the Study
This study, however, faces certain limitations, opening opportunities for future research. The first
limitation is that covert links between a state and terrorist organizations are often hard to prove.
States do not typically declare their links with terrorist organizations when waging proxy wars on
other states, usually more powerful rivals – evidence is only circumstantial. Such a declaration
would be tantamount to an act of war and would only invite severe retaliation from the rival and,
even criticism from the international community. Thus, SST acts tacit making hard evidence
difficult to find. Definitions of terrorism vary, reporting by state governments about deaths,
injuries, and damages caused may or may not be accurate at times either deliberately or
inadvertently – thus leading potentially to incorrect results at times. In this study, I have selected
cases accepted widely by the international academic and policy communities as involving acts of
state-sponsored terrorism.

Conclusion and Implications
This article has leveraged Adam David Brown’s (2017) typology of leaders to find a link between
leader type in a victim state and the latter’s response to SST. It has tracked spatio-temporal
variation in the responses to state-sponsored terrorist attacks by twelve different leaders across
nineteen cases between 1982-2020. The cases have been selected from five countries across South
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Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and North America that have suffered SST attacks. While only one
leader in the selected cases is a female (former British PM Margaret Thatcher), the others are all
males. In terms of SST responses, hawks typically counter SST attacks with major responses (69
per cent cases), while doves resort to minor responses (83 per cent cases), which attests to the role
played by leader type in determining response. Further, twelve of the nineteen cases studied are
severe SST attacks and seven less severe attacks – seven of the severe attacks see a minor response,
while three of the less severe attacks saw a major response, which signals that something other
than severity of SST attack is more important in determining response. Creating a detailed account
is meant to aid scholars and policymakers in generating a more systematic, sophisticated
understanding of what leads to the selection of a certain response to an SST attack.
Avenues for future research exist in this thematic area. First, there is scope to extend the study on
SST to other rivalries and leaders to assess the entire universe of SST cases. Second, this study
can be extended with more fieldwork, and archival work in a few local languages in both the state
sponsor’s territory as well as the victim state. Conducting further interviews of leaders and key
personnel in governments belonging to both the alleged sponsor state as well as victim state is
useful. Third, a separate research track can be used to ascertain effectiveness of SST responses and
predict the best choices available for different SST attack instances. Lastly, the exploration of how
9/11 and 26/11 changed not only the structure of the departments dealing with counterterrorism or
created new dedicated departments to that effect in the United States and in India, but also the
decision-making process is another worthwhile endeavor. Such research possibilities should thus
be explored more fully to ensure that the most optimally calibrated response to an attack is
conducted.
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In the ensuing chapter, I do a deep dive into the India-Pakistan rival dyad to evaluate my theory of
leader type effecting SST response by the victim state. I use process tracing, archival research
including local language sources, and a personal interview of a key government official, Shiv
Shankar Menon, who served as India’s Foreign Secretary during the 26/11 Mumbai SST attack
and later as National Security Advisor, to bolster the study. I find further evidence to suggest that
leader type is important in unlocking a complete understanding of victim state responses to SST.
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Chapter 2
Leader Type and Responses to State-Sponsored Terrorism
Case Study: India
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Abstract
State-sponsored terrorism (SST) has long been an instrument of state policy to inflict costs on rival
states without direct confrontation and maintain plausible deniability in front of a global audience.
The literature on SST has so far focused primarily on the motivations, facilitating factors, and the
timing of state sponsorship. The responses of victim states to SST have, however, only been glossed
over. Why does state response to SST vary spatio-temporally, under different governments, or even
under different leaders of the same ruling political dispensation in a country? This chapter
provides an in-depth qualitative analysis of the link between leader type and response to SST by
looking at examples of three Indian heads of government following the turn of the millennium
under whose leadership India’s responses varied dramatically to SST provocations from
neighboring Pakistan. With process tracing, I analyze the responses of Prime Ministers Vajpayee,
Singh, and Modi, and connect it to the broader topic of how leader type effects responses to SST.
I use personal interviews of relevant high-ranking government officials as well as archival
research in multiple Indian languages as aids in testing my theory. I find that leader type is an
important determinant of SST response.

Introduction
In Chapter 1 of this thesis, I presented an overview of state-sponsored terrorism (SST) and what
the extant literature on SST has so far focused primarily on. I pointed out that the responses of
victim states to SST attacks have been insufficiently studied, specifically the question of why state
responses to SST vary spatio-temporally in different countries, under different governments, and
even under different leaders of the same ruling political dispensation in a country? I argued that
the primary reason for this variation in response to SST attacks occurs because of leader type, that
is, whether a leader is a hawk or a dove. While the response is often the result of complex
calculations by the top decisionmakers in the victim state, I empirically demonstrated that variation
in it occurs because of leader type.
Basing my characterization of hawk-dove leader type on Brown (2017), Snyder and Diesing
(1977), and Keller (2005), I posited a theory hypothesizing what leader type should be more (or
less) likely to deliver a military response to an SST attack as opposed to a milder, non-military
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response or no response at all. The chapter explored the relationship between victim state leader
type (categorized into “hawks” and “doves”) and SST response (categorized into “major” and
“minor”) using a small-n research design by examining 19 cases with 12 different leaders at the
helm of affairs from five different countries. In this chapter, I present a case study involving India
and Pakistan to afford a more granular look into important decision-making processes in my
proposed leader type-SST response relationship. India is a state known to be severely affected by
ongoing SST and, therefore, makes for a useful case study.
In the wee hours of Feb. 26, 2019, over a dozen Indian jets, including twelve fighter-bombers,
scrambled from Indian Air Force (IAF) bases and performed an act they had refrained from ever
since the 1971 war between India and Pakistan. They entered Pakistani airspace without warning
following an SST provocation twelve days earlier, one that had resulted in severe casualties among
Indian paramilitary forces. Whether or not, and if so, how much damage was caused to Pakistanbased terror camps became and remains a matter of controversy, and Pakistan denies that any
severe damage was at all done to the camps. The Indian side, on the other hand, claimed initially
that there had been many Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) terrorist casualties after their fighter pilots
bombed these terror camps across the Line of Control (LoC) (Pegahi 2019). Leaving that
controversy aside, the Balakot airstrikes, as the Indian pre-emptive assault came to be known, was
interesting for perhaps at least two reasons. First, India seemed to have called Pakistan’s nuclear
bluff, established that it had the political will to respond, and was not deterred any longer (Feyyaz
2019). Second, as mentioned above, the Indian Air Force crossed the Pakistani LoC after 47 years
to conduct what the then Indian Foreign Secretary, Vijay Gokhale, referred to as a “non-military
preemptive action” (MEA 2019). The message to JeM that had supported the SST attack and
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Pakistan, the state sponsor, was that “such attacks would come at a cost and no matter where you
are, be it PoK or Pakistan proper, we will get you” (Dhanoa 2019).
While the Balakot airstrikes, and even the earlier Uri 2016 response to an extent, were a crossing
of the Rubicon in the way the Indian government responded to Pakistan-sponsored SST, military
responses have not always been the norm. Other Indian leaders have responded in multiple nonmilitary ways to SST attacks. This chapter aims to provide an in-depth qualitative analysis of the
link between leader type and response to SST by evaluating the nuances in leader types and foreign
policy decision-making with a focus on SST response. The responses are based on decisions taken
by three Indian heads of government, that is, Prime Ministers,15 who demonstrated varying
responses to provocations from neighboring Pakistan by way of using terrorism as a form of lowintensity conflict against a much larger and stronger adversary.
I begin this study by detailing the existing research on SST in South Asia, with respect to India
and Pakistan. I discuss the possible reasons Pakistan uses SST against India. Next, I briefly justify
the rationale behind my case selection of the India-Pakistan dyad and point out the limitations to
my study. Thereafter, I detail the relationship between leader type and SST response. Following
this, I provide backgrounds to each of the three leaders that I study, tracing their evolution in public
service, and then move on to discussing the five SST cases analyzed to study responses of three
different Indian Prime Ministers from across the hawkish-dovish as well as political spectra. In
other words, I analyze the SST responses of Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 2000 and 2001, Manmohan

15

The Government of India has an official document ordering the hierarchy of officials representing it. This
document is referred to as the Order of Precedence List. This list ranks the President or the head of state of the
country at the topmost spot in terms of protocol rank. However, it is the Indian Prime Minister or the head of
government, number three on this very list (preceded by the Vice-President of India), that really runs the show. The
Prime Minister can be considered the true leader of the country, while the President of India is more of a nominal
head. In this chapter, therefore, we study a total of five SST responses determined by three Prime Ministers of India
– chronologically they are Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh, and Narendra Modi.
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Singh in 2008, and Narendra Modi in 2016 and 2019, respectively, and connect it to the broader
topic of how leader type effects responses to SST. I find evidence to support my hypothesis that
the type of leader in power in a state is a crucial factor determining variation in SST response. In
other words, I find that SST response covaries with leader type.

Existing Research on State-Sponsored Terrorism in India
The former Indian PM, Inder Kumar Gujral, was accurate when he described the Indo-Pak
relationship as a “tormented one” (Kumar, et al. 2016). Both sides blame each other for inciting
SST inside their respective countries. Pakistan has supported what is known as asymmetric warfare
or counterinsurgency supporting militants within Kashmir to confront India through proxies at
least since the 1960s, if not earlier, whether in Bangladesh, the Punjab region, the northeast region
of India, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and in Indian cities. It is a revisionist power, conventionally
inferior to India, and creates strategic instability in South Asia by breeding terrorist groups.
However, Pakistan also accuses India of having supported insurgency and SST attacks in
Balochistan, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP), and Sindh. Fair (2014), drawing on Glaser (2010), refers
to Pakistan as a greedy state, or one that is "fundamentally dissatisfied with the status quo, desiring
additional territory even when it is not required for security". This greed, then, leads Pakistan to
sponsor terrorism. As Neil Joeck observes, “Pakistan has a strange relationship with terrorism writ
large, because historically…Pakistan has tried to support what it sees as freedom fighters inside
Kashmir to oppose India, to try and prevent India from consolidating its grip on Kashmir and from
Pakistan’s point of view, to support those Muslims in Kashmir who would like to throw India out
of Kashmir” (Joeck 2008). Bruce Riedel maintains that Pakistan is the world’s biggest state
sponsor of terrorism. Riedel avers, “Pakistan today is afflicted with a severe terrorist problem. Yet,
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it is also a country with a long track record of being in bed with many of the terrorist organizations”
(Riedel 2013). Christine Fair assesses a particularly tricky situation for the Modi government in
India with the Pakistani LeT’s nurturing of the Indian Mujahideen, a domestic terror group in
India, as Prime Minister Modi’s image with a large cross-section of Indian Muslims is that of a
Hindu nationalist, and not particularly amenable to Muslim interests (Fair 2015). In the context of
an unstable Afghanistan post-American exit, Fair (2021) also observed that the Pakistani state tries
to maintain an instability in Afghanistan that it can manage, while using terrorism as an instrument
of state policy against India, and “be thought of as the fire brigade, when Pakistan is in fact, the
arsonist.”
SST allows Pakistan to fuel its ideological warfare against the Indian state more than assuaging
any security concern for Pakistan (Fair 2014). Kashmir has been the biggest flashpoint between
India and Pakistan ever since the two states gained independence in 1947. Pursuant to this as well
as to the adage that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter, Pakistan’s stance is that
they wish to support fellow Muslims who wish to throw off the Indian yoke there. Of course, from
the Indian perspective, the Pakistani-sponsored fighters supporting local insurgents in Kashmir are
nothing more than terrorists wreaking havoc on Indian soil. Also, the Indian side feels that
Kashmiris have full voting rights within the country and are an integral part of India, so the
question of warfare between India and Pakistan does not arise in a matter considered in New Delhi
as intrinsic to Indian domestic politics.
Conventional wisdom holds that it is in weak states with failing governments that transnational
terrorism thrives (Piazza 2008; Tikuisis 2009; Arsenault and Bacon 2015). However, it is also true
that state-sponsored transnational terrorism does not thrive in all weak states. It becomes a question
then of what makes SST thrive in certain states while not in others. In states such as Pakistan where
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it has flourished, it is probably that the state itself has an “ambiguous or ambivalent relationship”
with SST organizations and “in some cases [supports] them for its own purposes. … the Pakistani
government has been extremely divided internally over how to deal with extremist Jihadi groups”
(Patrick 2011). Thus, while its government claims it is indeed cracking down on these Jihadi
groups, at the same time it is fomenting unrest by its state sponsorship to the very same groups.
Multiple reasons encourage Pakistan to support Jihadist proxies as part of its foreign policy and
warfare toolkit. First, they help Pakistan in achieving its immediate foreign policy objectives when
it comes to dealing with Afghanistan or India by pinning down thousands of soldiers close to the
border. Second, it also helps Pakistan to stoke unrest in Kashmir and try to have India overreact
and create more trouble for itself in the region by causing Kashmiri fatalities. Third, the costs of
using SST are significantly lower compared to a full-fledged or even limited war. Finally, using
militant proxies while being a nuclear armed state allows Pakistan to collect donations from other
states, and bolstering its meagre economy because it is “too dangerous to fail” (Fair 2019).
As a corollary, numerous defense statistics exhibit the growing disparity between the Indian and
Pakistani military might. Military Balance 2019 finds that India’s defense spending as a percentage
of total Asian defense spending for 2017 to be 14.1% while Pakistan’s is 2.8% (The Military
Balance 2019). India’s defense budget is, in fact, equivalent to about 25 per cent of Pakistan’s total
GDP (nominal) and according to the Pakistani newspaper The Express Tribune (2019), “the size
of Indian defence budget is six times bigger than the total outlay of Pakistan’s defence.”
The widening gap in military expenditure between these two states has resulted in greater export
of terrorism from the Pakistani state to operationalize their former President Zia-ul-Haq’s strategy
to ‘bleed India through a thousand cuts’ (Sharma et al. 2011) which, itself was a follow up to
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s waging of a ‘thousand-year war’ against India. This allows Pakistan to deny
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allegations of direct military assault on Indian forces and therefore the devastating costs associated
with a full-scale or even limited war against India. The latter country has been high up on the list
of countries with the highest number of terrorism fatalities consistently (NCTC Report 2006,
2007), and many of these fatalities are the result of Pakistani SST.
Definitions of terrorism abound in political science literature, but I choose to use one of the most
widely accepted ones by Bruce Hoffman. Hoffman’s definition of terrorism incorporates five key
elements: first, ‘‘ineluctably political in aims and motives’’; second, ‘‘violent – or, equally
important, threatens violence’’; third, ‘‘designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions
beyond the immediate victim or target’’; fourth, ‘‘conducted by an organization’’; and fifth,
“perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity” (Hoffman 1998).
Now, though there is no clear-cut and universally accepted definition for state-sponsored terrorism,
just like the broader notion of terrorism, the method often involves the use of proxies to wage a
low-intensity conflict against an adversary (Conrad 2011). SST can occur in various forms. It can
range from intangible support such as moral and diplomatic encouragement to provision of goods
such as financial aid, supply of weapons, training, and sanctuary (Wilkinson 1984). Byman (2005)
defines SST as a government’s intentional assistance to a terrorist group to help it use violence,
bolster its political activities, or sustain the organization. In the nuclear age, this is a particularly
attractive way of inflicting harm without risking major escalation. Wilkinson observes that this is
because of three factors – it does not carry the risk of extreme escalation, it is cheap, it can generate
high yields (Wilkinson 1984). While articles examining aspects of SST are rare and SST remains
an “(under)developed, peripheral topic” (Jackson et al. 2017), in one of the preliminary studies
that do exist on the role of interstate rivalry leading to the use of SST, Conrad finds this
phenomenon commonplace, and even acute, in the case of rival states. After examining all
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transnational terrorist attacks worldwide between 1975-2003, he observes that “states involved in
ongoing rivalries with other states are the victims of more terrorist attacks than states that are not
involved in such hostile interstate relationships” (Conrad 2011).
India and Pakistan have had a bitter history of mistrust and mutual suspicion and periods of
intermittent hostilities ever since their independence from the English in 1947 when British India
was carved into these two countries – akin to two estranged siblings, separated at birth. Several
factors make the examination of the rivalry dynamic between them particularly attractive and
meaningful. First, their geographical proximity to each other. Second, the intense rivalry between
their governments and oftentimes their citizens as evident even from sporting events such as
cricket matches or at their joint border ceremonies at Wagah-Attari. Third, the decades-long use
of cross-border terrorism by Pakistan to foment unrest in India as well as indiscriminately massacre
the Indian symbols of democratic and economic progress such as the Parliament, luxury hotels,
train stations, and other famous landmarks.
The Indian cricketer R. Ashwin sums up this dynamic cogently: “This rivalry is huge, it’s very
hard to put a finger and tell you how huge. … As far as the Indians and Pakistanis go, I don’t think
they watch this as a game of cricket. It’s more of a border rivalry. They want to get one up on each
other. People put their emotions into the game….” Even a preliminary look at this historic rivalry
seems to suggest both countries would use any means Machiavellian or Kautilyan (no holds
barred) for this one-upmanship. However, Pakistan is more compelled to use such tactics being
outmatched in terms of conventional military power relative to India, a difference expected to grow
in the coming years much to the concern of the military top brass in Islamabad.
Figure 2 represents the recorded incidents of SST allegedly backed by Pakistan against the Indian
state between 1970 to 2018. Several terrorist outfits are widely believed to be receiving continual
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funding and support from the de facto, albeit behind the scenes, masters of the Pakistani state, viz.
the Pakistani military and the highly controversial Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),
which is the country’s principal intelligence agency founded in 1948, a year after independence
(Gul 2011). Ergo, from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), I selected nine terrorist groups
widely known to be affiliated to the Pakistani state and involved in operations against India as their
raison d’etre (Byman 2005). These include the Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent, the Haqqani
Network, Harakat-ul-Mujahidin (HuM), Jaish al-Adl, Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Jammu and
Kashmir Liberation Front, Lashkar-e-Omar, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) (Tellis 2012), and the Sipahe-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP), (Byman 2005). These nine groups have been among the most prolifically
used instruments of destruction by Pakistan since the 1980s against India and, therefore, merit a
closer look. Table 5 provides a snapshot of what type of support each of these groups receives (See
Appendix 3 for more information).
I draw data from the GTD for terrorism incidents in India between 2001 to 2018. The graph for
what I consider SST events in India by Pakistan using nine different proxy organizations has
numerous synclines and anticlines. However, there is a major uptick in the number of SST
incidents between 2016 to 2018. The graph peaks at over eighty incidents in a single year in 2018.
The total number of recorded SST incidents including any disputable ones are 340 during this
period. On the other hand, Figure 3 depicts the total number of terrorist incidents in India between
the same years, 2001 to 2018. This graph includes all terrorist incidents including non-SST ones
by any group. The average number of attacks seems to have risen over the years with a peak of
about 1,000 incidents in a single year in 2016.
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Figure 2: Pakistan-sponsored SST incidents in India between 2001-2018 perpetrated by 9
groups.

Figure 3: Total number of terrorist incidents in India between 2001-2018.
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TABLE 5: SST GROUPS WORKING WITH PAKISTAN AGAINST INDIA
GROUP NAME

TYPE OF SUPPORT

Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent

Sanctuary

Haqqani Network

Sanctuary

Harakat-ul-Mujahidin (HuM)

Sanctuary, finance

Jaish al-Adl

Sanctuary

Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)

Sanctuary, training, finance

Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) Historically, Pakistan through ISI
Lashkar-e-Omar

Sanctuary

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)

Sanctuary, training, finance

Anjuman Sipah-e-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP)

Sanctuary, finance
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A total of 9,632 incidents are recorded. Therefore, SST attacks in India by Pakistan in my count
are about 3.5 per cent of total terrorist attacks in the country between 2001-2018. Several factors
are responsible in driving the variability in attacks – much of it is being driven by leader type, and
other external factors such as the instability in Afghanistan. Tough geopolitical decisions taken by
PM Modi in recent years including the abrogation of Article 370 removing the special status of the
Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir and so on is an appropriate cue for Pakistan to clamor against
an “ultra-nationalistic, non-secular” India, which according to them is harsh on those that do not
adhere to the BJP’s model of Hindutva. Therefore, by causing unrest against a seemingly
provocative and right-wing Hindu leader through covert SST attacks, Pakistan may be trying to
blanketly show that Indian Muslims are unhappy with the current dispensation and therefore the
unjust government of the day is to blame for any so-called terrorism. However, Pakistan is
continually on the hunt for any excuse to foment unrest in India while casting the latter in bad light
to ensure the “continuation of (its) politics through other means” in front of a global audience.

Theory – Leader Type and Victim State Response to SST
Little available research, if any, empirically evaluates how a leader in a state subject to an SST
attack responds against its aggressors – that is, either the SST perpetrator state or the terrorist
group, or both. There is little doubt that foreign policy decision-making is a complex process and
involves multiple variables in the calculation of a response, however my theory is that leader type
matters in this calculation. Leader type is a principal element in crafting the final decision along
with other factors such as orientation of political party in power, severity of SST attack, nature of
attack, timing of attack, and domestic public mood/ opinion, among other things. I argue that leader
type, along with these other factors, plays a critical role in determining SST response and,
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therefore, being able to comprehend leaders’ cognitive processes while they make decisions is
important.
It is likely that multiple environmental factors whether domestic, organizational (Allison 1971)
and international systemic ones restrict options available to leaders, but those in the decisionmaking seat typically choose those policies that align with their belief systems, motivations, and
values (Sprout and Sprout 1956). Studies of leaders have undergone significant evolution. While
childhood subjective experiences were of paramount important to early studies of leaders, later
research emphasized personality traits such as dogmatism, nationalism, control over events, and
cognitive complexity instead. Hermann’s (1974, 1980) works are a prime example of the latter
trend, which then linked said traits to leader decision making (Brule and Mintz 2010).
Scholars continued to be attracted to studying the role of leaders in decision-making. While this
has not percolated down to the level of researching the role of leaders in responding to SST until
this study, the studies of leader personality traits bifurcated with the first branch evaluating the
relationship between various leadership styles including delegation and management on foreign
policy (Kissinger 1966, Hermann et al. 2001) and the second stream assessing operational codes.
Studies of operational codes argue that personality traits and belief systems of leaders creates a
prism or lens of a certain color through which leaders perceive the world around them, leading to
their selecting certain policy options and not others (Brule and Mintz 2010). Along with
Hermann’s Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) then, the Operational Code Analysis (OCA) is a wellestablished research program meant to analyze belief systems of leaders.
A significant amount of research exists on studies of leaders. Picking up from the works of Snyder
and Diesing (1977), Keller (2005), and Brown (2017), I categorize leaders into the well-known
templates of hawkish and dovish. While hawks are perceived as more aggressive, dovish leaders
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are known to prefer more amicable solutions in international politics. Doves would rather select a
non-military option if they can help it, while hawks are prone to adopting pugnacious policies.
Barnes (2011) observes that hawkish behavior is "too aggressive to establish a long-term stability
and peace," and dovish behavior is "too weak to deal with the messy problems in harsh war zones".
Arce and Sandler (2009) classify hawkishness and dovishness as two extreme forms of behavior
where they denote “dove” as a form of full cooperation and “hawk” as the symbol for pre-emption.
Clements (2011) analyzes public opinion in Britain and categorizes men as more hawkish than
women because they “tend to be more likely to support overseas military interventions”, another
attestation to the aggressiveness of the hawk. Allison, et al. (1985) observe that hawks believe in
the dictum “peace through strength” and counsel remaining resolute through adversity. To the
hawk, a display of weakness is not an option to avoid a situation like Neville Chamberlain’s
appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s and the latter’s actions thereafter. On the other hand, doves
abhor violence and counsel “reassurance and compromise” in times of crisis.
However, these categories are not watertight. Arndt (2013) admits that the hawk/ dove dynamic
itself is centered around the simple question of whether one is pro-war or anti-war and maintains
that this categorization is “fungible” or part of a continuum. Allison et al. (1985), likewise note
that neither is a hawk always bloodthirsty nor is a dove completely non-violent. Rather, it is about
how far they may be pushed to take a certain course of action. There can be relatively hawkish
doves and relatively dovish hawks (Schultz 2005). Arndt (2013) also notes that state policies such
as airpower policy, defense spending, (de)escalation of conflict, foreign military aid, inter alia can
all be separate tests of hawkishness and dovishness and concludes that these traits in one category
does not automatically carry over to other categories. Nonetheless, with these exceptions in mind,
it is to be noted that the consensus of the scholarly community is clearly that a hawk tends to
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behave aggressively in matters of national security and interest, and doves are unlikely to take that
route.
Therefore, decision-makers’ belief systems create a prism or lens through which they filter all
kinds of information from the various sources that they receive about the world around them.
Leaders organize this vast information and data they need to process every single day according
to their worldview. They then choose policies within the available options that are consistent with
their values, motivations, and belief structures for making decisions about their state’s foreign
policy, including when deciding responses to acts of SST perpetrated against their country.
Further, in this study, my Independent Variable (IV) is “leader type” and Dependent Variable (DV)
is “SST response.” First, I classify the IV, “leader type”, following Brown’s (2017) work. I
measure the Dependent Variable by creating a simple dummy that flags cases with either “minor
response” or “major response.” For the DV, I operationalize “major response” as “overt punitive
or coercive uses of military strikes by the victim state on infrastructure/ combatants of either the
terrorist group and/ or the state sponsor in location(s) within the sponsoring state’s territory to a.)
inflict costs or b.) in extreme cases, to bring about regime change.” A “minor response” is
operationalized as “any response by a victim state other than a major response, including
diplomatic isolation in international organizations/ fora, economic sanctions, minor covert
operations behind enemy lines, sponsoring terrorists in rival’s territory in a tit for tat response,
engaging the state sponsor in dialogue, or lack of a response.”
I also differentiate between a severe SST attack and a less severe one, based partly on a distinction
drawn by GTD on the same. I further operationalize a “less severe attack” as an incident where the
“casualty count is less than 25, and/ or financial damages to the victim state are up to $1 million,
and/ or no notable landmarks/ buildings/ seats of government are attacked.” A “severe attack” on
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the other hand occurs when “either the casualty count is a minimum of 25, and/ or property
damages to victim state equals or exceeds $1 million, and/ or notable landmarks/ buildings/ seats
of government are attacked.” 25 casualties and property damage equaling or exceeding $1 million
is what I consider the turning point when a less severe attack becomes a severe attack in accordance
with the classification of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which defines 25 or more fatalities
in a single terrorist attack as highly lethal, and property damage equaling or exceeding $1 million
as “major.”
This logic leads to the following hypothesis regarding the relationship between leader type and
response to SST H1: Hawkish leaders, ceteris paribus, are more likely than moderate or dovish leaders to respond
aggressively to state-sponsored terrorist attacks.
However, as noted earlier, leader type is not the only factor that determines SST response. Severity
of attack is another critical variable that may covary with SST response. More violent attacks tend
to produce more forceful responses. Leng (1983) finds that coercion begets coercion, for a state to
avoid being perceived or branded as weak. Demonstration of resolve may override prudence in
such a case. Prins (2005) cautions that the signaling of resolve between rivals in a dyad can follow
a dangerous escalating spiral of increasingly coercive behavior by either state. He argues that
military action in crisis responses increases with violent triggers (see also Keller 2005) and that
“war strengthens the hand of generals at the expense of diplomats.”
This argument leads to my second hypothesis:
H2: The higher the severity of an SST attack, ceteris paribus, the greater the likelihood of a major
response by the leader of a victim state, regardless of leader type.
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It may be noted here that while these two hypotheses are not controversial, extant scholarship has
yet to ascertain the relationship between leader type, severity of SST attacks (trigger), and response
to SST.
Leader type is important then in determining the response to an SST attack. In this chapter, I focus
on the rivalry between India and Pakistan, and how Indian leaders determine responses to Pakistansponsored SST. Table 6 lists the five different SST cases detailed in this chapter through process
tracing. The India-Pakistan dyad is a special case in the universe of rivalries involving SST as an
instrument of state policy because it is the only one involving two nuclear-armed states. Therefore,
nuclear deterrence is an additional factor to take into consideration while evaluating Indian leader
responses to SST attacks.

Leadership in the Indian Government
In the Indian context, the Prime Minister is paramount when it comes to national security decision
making vis-à-vis other Cabinet Ministers or even the President of India (Menon 2021). When a
“Presidential” style hawkish leader such as Narendra Modi takes over the reins of government, the
contrast with the country’s real President becomes even more pronounced, especially if the head
of state (Indian President) adopts a more subtle approach or is a lesser-known political figure visà-vis the head of government (Indian PM). For Modi and his party then, the image of Modi
becomes the selling point for the party’s electoral gains. The image of a strong leader, which goes
hand in hand with the image of a militarily powerful and economically robust India, sets the stage
for rule based primarily on leader type.
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TABLE 6: INDIA SST ATTACKS AND RESPONSE MAGNITUDES
VICTIM

YEAR

LEADER

STATE

ATTACK

RESPONSE

SEVERITY

SEVERITY

INDIA

2000

Vajpayee

Severe

Minor

INDIA

2001

Vajpayee

Severe

Minor

INDIA

2008

Singh

Severe

Minor

INDIA

2016

Modi

Less severe

Major

INDIA

2019

Modi

Severe

Major
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Leader Type: Dove - Atal Bihari Vajpayee
The Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee was elected to his position three times but only
served one full term from 1999 to 2004. He was one of the co-founders of the Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) in 1980, which can be translated as the Indian People’s Party. While his party is
considered right-leaning, Vajpayee was a moderate leader and a peaceful negotiator (Dass 2004).
While Vajpayee is a difficult case as some may seem categorize him as slightly hawkish, while
others may place him in the slightly dovish bracket, I go with the latter view. I argue that Vajpayee
was more dovish than hawkish, because of several reasons.
By his own admission, his biggest weakness was that he could never hit back (Singh 1996). During
1999 to 2004, he served at the head of a coalition government, called the National Democratic
Alliance (NDA). He navigated tremendous pulls and pushes from both his coalition partners as
well as the extreme Hindutva hardliners within his own party, the BJP. He efficiently consolidated
his power in the weeks following his appointment by strategically testing and declaring India as a
nuclear weapons power and becoming a national hero (Baru 2014). In fact, the secular Indian
Congress party had been no more conciliatory towards Pakistan than the Vajpayee-led NDA
which, in fact, was responsible for major peace initiatives with Pakistan including the 1999 “bus
diplomacy” followed by the Lahore Declaration, the 2001 Agra summit, and the 2004 Islamabad
summit (Miller 2014).
Vajpayee always gave peace a chance and was a firm believer in peaceful coexistence and
maintaining friendly relations with neighboring countries (Dass 2004). He asserted at the United
Nations that “It is our policy to resolve issues peacefully” (Dass 2004). He believed that a state
could choose its friends, but not its neighbors and, therefore, India should resolve all outstanding
disputes through dialogue (Gurjar 2018). For instance, when the Kargil War between India and
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Pakistan began in 1999, Vajpayee rang up his Pakistani counterpart, Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif’s office and made the latter speak with one of India’s most famous Muslim film actors of
yesteryears, Yusuf Khan (better known as Dilip Kumar), who was originally born in Peshawar,
Pakistan. Kumar, in turn, pleaded with Sharif to stop this conflict as it made life difficult for
Muslims in India (Kasuri 2015), as an India-Pakistan war could be framed as a Hindu-Muslim
conflict there. Vajpayee has been perceived as a visionary statesman who rose above party loyalties
(Kumari 2021) as well as one of modern India’s most beloved leaders.
One can discern qualities of a dove within a right-leaning party in Vajpayee from a few behavioral
indicators. His openness towards amicable solutions with other states whenever feasible (Vajpayee
2003a, Andersen 2001), emphasizing peace when he could (Vajpayee 2003b), such as in an
election rally in Amritsar in 2004 – “Earlier we were firing bullets. Now we are playing cricket"
(Moreau and Mazumdar 2004) is the first indicator. Second, he believed in the possibilities
emerging out of bilateral, multilateral, regional, or international cooperation (Vajpayee 1998).
Third, his personal level of patience and tolerance following an attack by a Pakistani state-bred
terrorist organization called the Lashkar-e-Taiba (or Army of the Pure/ Righteous/ Good) also
known as Jamaat-ud-Dawa and the Filah-i-Insaniat Foundation, on one of India’s historic
landmarks, the Red Fort in New Delhi, on December 22, 2000, in trying to continue ongoing peace
talks with Sharif. Finally, his commitment to global nuclear disarmament (Vajpayee 1998; Sharif
and Vajpayee 1999) was clear from India’s impeccable nonproliferation record despite its having
tested nuclear weapons and having become a nuclear power. This both served to achieve a
longstanding dream of early Hindu nationalism as well as for a security measure against the
neighboring Chinese behemoth (Maxwell 1999; Miller 2014) and a Sino-Pakistani nexus (Bidwai
2006) during his second term, while maintaining a “No-First-Use” policy. Vajpayee’s tremendous
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stature both within his party and in India allowed him to pursue peace talks with the Pakistani
leadership – both Nawaz Sharif and later Pervez Musharraf – keeping the hard-liners within his
coalition government in check (Moreau and Mazumdar 2004).
At the same time, Vajpayee was not a leader to preach peace at any cost. This flexibility and
moderation were among his unique qualities that made him a leader liked and respected by most
across the political spectrum. In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in
2002 speaking on SST emanating from Pakistan, he demonstrated these very qualities when he
observed: “As far as India is concerned, we have repeatedly clarified that no one in our country
wants a war—conventional or otherwise. … But absolutely everyone in India wants an end to the
cross-border terrorism … We are determined to end it with all the means at our command. Let
there be no doubt about it in any quarter” (Vajpayee 2002). Further, speaking to India as Prime
Minister from New Delhi in late 1999, Vajpayee stated that the life of every Indian citizen was
precious, and that any act of terrorism would invite a response based on a Zero Tolerance policy
(Vajpayee 1999). While Vajpayee was always of the opinion that peace with Pakistan was the ideal
goal, he also was quite aware that stable peace was not a “gift of the Gods,” and came only through
strength and strong policy (Vajpayee and Ghatate 1996, 15-16).
Vajpayee’s approach to tackling SST, therefore, constituted a mix of tenderness with toughness.
However, his worldview was that peace should always get a chance first, and this dovish
worldview led him to process the information in the manner he did and choose from the range of
policy alternatives available at his fingertips, resulting in the minor responses he demonstrated
after both severe SST attacks on India as referenced in the cases below.
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First test for Vajpayee’s leadership – 2000 Red Fort Attack
Among the most formidable security challenges that the Vajpayee government faced were the
Kargil War and cross-border SST emanating from Pakistan (Shukla 2008) backed since 1998 by
the latter’s nuclear shield (Swami 2007). In early 1999, Vajpayee took steps to develop good
relations with India’s western neighbor, such as starting a Delhi to Lahore bus service, and in fact
used the inaugural bus to visit his counterpart, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan. However,
peace was short-lived, as the deadly Kargil War erupted in May 1999 and only ended after two
and a half months of violence and bloodshed.
However, open hostilities were not the only problem India was facing then. Multiple suicide
attacks from Pakistani-backed fidayeen (guerillas) followed the 1999 Kargil War between the latter
country and India. While there were dozens of such bombings in the Kashmir area around the turn
of the millennium including one at the Jammu & Kashmir (then an Indian state) Legislative
Assembly, a few other serious SST attacks penetrated deeper into the Indian heartland right into
the national capital.
Just two days after the declaration of a ceasefire between India and Pakistan with the attack on an
army garrison/ intelligence facility/ high-security interrogation cell inside the Red Fort on
December 22, 2000, that the LeT boasts of on its website (Kumar 2002), a landmark of historic
importance in the heart of New Delhi, as well as the Indian Parliament attack of December 13,
2001, the Pakistani proxy war machinery certainly remained well-oiled. These were serious
challenges for PM Vajpayee’s leadership.
The 2000 Red Fort attack by Kashmiri members of the LeT (Gordon 2004) killed three Indian
Army personnel. While the perpetrators of the crime escaped, within a few days, investigators
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traced the incident to a Pakistani citizen and purported LeT militant, Mohammad Arif aka Ashfaq,
and arrested him. Ashfaq and several others were prosecuted in the case, and Ashfaq was sentenced
to death (Batra 2007). India had instituted a unilateral ceasefire against Pakistan on November 22,
2000, as a measure of peace, but called it off six months later, on May 23, 2001, following the Red
Fort attack. Though the Pakistani leadership overtly appreciated India’s overtures for peace, in
practice, further SST attacks in 2001 vitiated diplomatic ties and the creation of increased hostility
and suspicion between the South Asian neighbors. The Kashmir shatter belt would simply not
allow peace to prevail (Khurshaid, et al. 2017).

Second test for Vajpayee’s leadership – 2001 Indian Parliament Attack
Cross-border terrorism remained rampant through the Vajpayee era with multiple incursions even
after the 2000 Red Fort attack. Among the most prominent ones was the SST attack using firearms
and the explosive RDX on the Indian Parliament, which the Indian government denounced as a
direct attack on Indian democracy (Ganguly, 2006). At 11.40 am on December 13, 2001, a group
of five terrorists arrived in an official-looking government vehicle with the bearings of one that
seemed like it had the necessary clearances to enter the Parliament complex. The plan was going
well for the terrorists until the driver inadvertently rammed into the back of the car of India’s then
Vice-President, Krishan Kant, leading to unforeseen problems in which they were asked to pull
back by security, which resulted in the shootout (Swami 2008). The attack resulted in a total of 14
casualties including six police personnel and two parliament security personnel (Khurshaid, et al.
2017). Instructions to the attackers were passed on by the ISI, according to the Delhi Police (Vishu
2001).
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The attack on the Indian Parliament became the proverbial last straw for India to start
contemplating proactive response options to the Pakistani SST menace, and this was inspired by
the US logic of the “war on terror” (Mitra and Carciumaru 2015). Eighty percent of the Indian
population were baying for blood when this happened and were in favor of retaliation (Mueller
2006; Mueller and Schmidt 2009). Even the USA, while asking India to exercise caution, was not
against India’s right to self-defense. Nonetheless, the Vajpayee administration’s attempt at
maintaining peace ensured that even despite massive mobilization of about 5,00,000 Indian troops
along the India-Pakistan border as part of Operation Parakram, there would not be war (Jha 2002).
Vajpayee followed a three-pronged strategy of coercive diplomacy to try and bring Pakistan to
book – military mobilization (first across the LoC in Kashmir then along a further 2,200 miles of
shared border) with troops remaining until October 24, 2002; drawing international attention and
applying pressure to the SST issue which came from the UK and the USA; and bilateral pressure
from the Indian side. The Indian government also shut down all travel or transport with and into
Pakistan, recalled her High Commissioner from Islamabad (Kumar 2002), forced a reduction in
the Pakistan High Commission staff in New Delhi, and delivered a formal demarche to Pakistan
demanding crackdown on the terrorist organizations based on its soil that were harming Indian
interests (Shukla 2008; Adnan 2013).
While India remained distrusting of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf’s promises to end SST
infiltrations into India (Ministry of Defence, India 2002), all these measures did achieve limited
results, such as Musharraf’s outlawing of some terrorist groups such as the JeM or Army of
Mohammad and the LeT, condemning religious extremism, and putting behind bars numerous
terrorists based in Pakistan though only for a brief period. After the Parliament attack, LeT changed
its name to Paspen-e-Ahle Hadith but is still commonly known as LeT (Gordon 2004). However,
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despite its objectives being important – that Pakistan should not support its insurgency in Kashmir
and handover 20 terrorists purportedly based in Pakistan (Bhardwaj 2013) – the military buildup
seemed an inadequate response to most Indians and perceived mostly as a futile exercise (Bahadur
2003) due to the perceived threat from a Pakistani nuclear retaliation (Shukla 2016).

Leader Type: Dove – Manmohan Singh
PM Manmohan Singh, while in office, referred to the ideals of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal
Nehru, two of the most prominent personalities of the Indian independence movement – those are
of non-violence and peaceful coexistence, respectively (Mitra and Schoettli 2007). In a 2007
speech, PM Singh called for not conflict of civilizations, but a “confluence of civilizations.” He
reminded his audience that in a world full of malice and hatred, the pluralist way of enlightened
self-interest, the very idea on which modern India is built, remains a beacon of hope in international
relations (Wojczewski 2019). Basrur (2019) avers that unlike his successor, Narendra Modi,
Manmohan Singh did not have a strong or assertive personality. Sanjaya Baru (2014), a close aide
to Manmohan Singh, writes that Singh perceived himself as an “accidental prime minister” at least
in his first term, as he had not been the first choice for the job, and he was aware that other
circumstances had placed him there. This included party chief Sonia Gandhi’s nod of approval as
well as his being a good “consensus” candidate across parties in his coalition government.
As mentioned earlier, Singh was soft-spoken, and his personality did not really allow him to
confront or discipline his detractors even within his own party that allowed them to “run with the
hare and hunt with the hounds” (Baru 2014). This more dovish personality trait, in keeping with
his softer image in the public, spilled over into his foreign policy decisions as well, resulting in a
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minor response to a major SST attack, that was Mumbai 26/11. Even earlier in July 2006, despite
proven Pakistani links (Menon 2016), Singh’s response to the deadly Mumbai train bombings,
with even more casualties that 26/11, was also minor (Watson and Fair 2013). However, while
Singh was compelled to give up a lot of his turf and his say when it came to domestic politics,
given that his cabinet members hailing from other political parties in the coalition were often
understandably loyal to them, he zealously guarded his hold over foreign policy decisions. As Baru
(2014) notes, Singh was firmly “in the [foreign policy] saddle.”
Singh’s worldview was one of peace rather than bellicose, just as in the case of Vajpayee, and
Singh chose from all the options presented to him by his advisory circles. While these options were
of a wide variety and included major and minor responses, his dovish worldview resulted in a
minor response in the aftermath of the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai. It is, therefore, appropriate to
consider him a dove rather than a hawk.

Test for Manmohan Singh’s leadership – 26/11 (2008) Mumbai Attacks
When the 26/11 attacks occurred in Mumbai, Singh was at the helm of a 14-party coalition
government in India called the United Progressive Alliance (UPA). At the time, Singh himself was
the leader of the party with the most seats in that coalition, the left-leaning Indian National
Congress (INC), a party historically closely tied with India’s freedom struggle and subsequent
independence from the British Raj (or “rule”).
The attack turned out to be a violent spectacle broadcasted on live television. This was no ordinary
SST attack in which a bomb explodes, bodies are removed, broken glass is cleaned up, and life
goes back to normal (Hoffman 2008). On the contrary, this was a sophisticated military style
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operation indicating the high likelihood of official agencies in Pakistan being involved in the
planning and the execution. In the United States, it not only became part of pre-Thanksgiving news
but was designed to sit in the news for a while. Further, the international citizenships of many of
the victims; the coordinated, simultaneous attacks at multiple sites in the same city; as well as the
duration of the gun battle between the LeT terrorists and Indian security personnel made it the
most infamous SST attack in post-independent India, widely discussed in Western media as well.
The attack was targeted at important landmarks in Mumbai, the very symbol of Indian economic
progress, resulting in the indiscriminate killing of 166 people (both Indians and 28 foreigners
including Americans, Britons, Australians, Singaporeans, and Israelis) and leaving over 308
wounded (Menon 2016).
The Pakistani motives behind such an attack seem to be nothing new. Several factors played into
Pakistani calculations while sending their covert “informal” weapons of war – i.e. the LeT
operatives across the border to carry it out. Whenever the two civilian governments of India and
Pakistan had progressed through dialogue in the direction of peace, such as in PM Vajpayee’s time
or otherwise, the Pakistani “deep state” comprising the top military brass and the ISI seems to have
come together to unleash the militant outfits they had trained to disrupt talks. Further, the terrorists
and their masters wished to hamper India’s economic progress by making Mumbai – India’s
business hub – a target, to deter foreign investments from coming into the country (Menon 2016).
Former Indian National Security Adviser (NSA), Shivshankar Menon (2016), who in 2008 as
Foreign Secretary was party to the SST response machinery at the time of the Mumbai attacks,
observed that "the decision makers concluded that more was to be gained from not attacking
Pakistan than from attacking it". He maintained that the then military chiefs got together with PM
Singh and the NSA, M. K. Narayanan, who was Menon’s predecessor, and outlined various
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military and kinetic strike options. Menon supported these options – he wanted India to retaliate
and to be seen to retaliate as well to deter further attacks, garner international support, and appease
the domestic public sentiment for justice – but was ultimately overruled by Singh despite the plan
gaining some traction with perhaps Pranab Mukherjee, then Indian Minister of External Affairs,
and later President of India (Menon 2016; see also Kaura 2020). Menon (2016) also notes that
personalities of leaders and top echelon decisionmakers matter, and with others at the helm, the
response to this serious Pakistani provocation may have been quite different.
While a few scholars and policy analysts, among them Siddharth Varadarajan and C. Raja Mohan,
did praise Manmohan Singh for his non-violent response to the Mumbai 26/11 SST attacks, Singh
also faced massive criticism at home for the same and subsequent overtures to Pakistan (Mukherjee
and Malone 2011). However, Singh believed in a positive-sum game and not in a zero-sum game
in South Asia – that is, the subcontinent had to and could rise together. While India would lead the
way for this rise, in Singh’s estimation, the other countries in South Asia could also benefit from
overall regional development, if there would be peace. Despite his insistence that Pakistan take
definitive action against the LeT (Gul 2011), this positive-sum view of the world is what drove
Singh to press on in his untiring efforts to keep the peace with his counterparts in Pakistan,
President Asif Zardari and Prime Minister Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani, even after the grave
provocation that was 26/11 (Baru 2014). In fact, Gul (2011) clearly thankful for Singh’s response
to 26/11, observes that “fortunately India had voted out the ultranationalist BJP, and its new prime
minister, the Congress Party’s Manmohan Singh, decided to resist the calls for revenge. Despite
the massive hue and cry accompanied by demands to teach Pakistan a lesson, better sense did
eventually prevail. Singh joined the chorus for a while but then toned down his rhetoric….”
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Singh’s hope for peace with Pakistan despite the 2006 Mumbai SST attacks and especially 26/11
demonstrates his low need for power. Further, his propensity for relying on cooperative strategies
fully believing that states (including adversaries) are good and friendly, and the political world is
harmonious speak to his dovish nature. Doves believe not only in cooperation from their own end,
but also believe that opponents wish to cooperate over exploit (the latter method is Plan B for
them). This was the case with Manmohan Singh in his understanding of Pakistan. His “accidental
prime minister” feeling speaks directly to the notion of him believing that he was not in control of
many occurrences around him. Therefore, following Brown’s (2017) typology, Manmohan Singh
displays features that most closely characterize a dovish leader.

Leader Type: Hawk – Narendra Modi
Narendra Damodardas Modi early in life subscribed to the ideology of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS), a Hindu right-wing paramilitary group with over 5 million members and regarded
as the BJP’s parent organization (Tramballi and Missaglia 2018) and continues to be wedded to it.
While fulfilling his duties as the Chief Minister of the Indian state of Gujarat, Narendra Modi was
more inwardly focused on his state apart from promoting Gujarat internationally as a trade and
business hub. However, when he took over the country’s reins as prime minister, national security
and counterterrorism became an important part of his agenda.
In the very first years of his leadership, 2014 and 2015, he tweeted through his handle
‘@narendramodi’ condemning the terrorist attacks at Peshawar and Paris, respectively. For
Peshawar, he tweeted: “Strongly condemn the cowardly terrorist attack at a school in Peshawar.”
For the attack on Charlie Hebdo in Paris, he observed, “Condemnable & despicable attack in Paris.
Our solidarity with people of France…” (Lalwani 2019). By the time of his 2019 election
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campaign, national security and counterterrorism issues had become a highlight (Varshney 2019).
He also adopted a less timid stance towards China noting that the two countries should look eye to
eye and India should not be lowering its eyes (Bajpai 2018). Further, the Modi government realized
that the only way to stop China from nibbling at Indian territory was to stand firm and not give
ground (Gokhale 2017), precisely what happened in the Ladakh area in Summer 2020 leading to
physical confrontations between some soldiers of the two militaries and subsequent casualties.
Under Modi, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) comprising the United States, India,
Australia, and Japan intended to balance China economically and militarily in the Asia-Pacific was
resurrected in 2017 after the original Quad started in 2007 was dissolved in 2010. These are all
signs of a hawkish personality.

Further, Modi’s image as the leader of India has been of a tough, no-nonsense person in-charge,
who used all the latest communications tools available as well as power dressing to emphasize his
“masculinity” (Jain and Ganesh 2020). A now well-known phrase of a “56-inch chest” he once
uttered is used today to refer to his machismo, as well as sarcastically by his detractors. Even by
the right-wing BJP standards, Modi has been called a hardliner: “What limits Modi’s power is not
the party and its organizational structure, not his cabinet colleagues, but his own ability and his
own imagination.” (Venkateshwar 2019). A Twitter profile of Modi used the Hindu incantation
Ahimsa parmo dharm, Hinsa Tathaiva cha. When translated, it means: “Non-violence is the
ultimate dharma. So, too, is violence in service of Dharma” (Pal 2015).

Modi’s appearance as well as actions has often supported such statements calling him tough. From
featuring in popular British television host and adventurer Bear Grylls’s show Man vs. Wild in
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2019 to dressing up in military fatigues and riding atop a tank in the deserts of Rajasthan, India in
2020, reminiscent of Vladimir Putin’s shirtless horseback riding, Modi embodies physical
hardiness. As for decisive actions, the abrogation of Article 370 revoking special status to the
former Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, as well as sudden demonetization of a sizable
percentage of Indian currency notes to combat corruption, have been some of the bold moves taken
by his government. This demonstrates that Modi will not shy away from a fight if it comes to that.
Therefore, he is a hawkish leader.

Narendra Modi centralized foreign policy decision-making to himself, his National Security
Advisor, and to the then Foreign Secretary (now Minister of External Affairs) S. Jaishankar,
sidelining then Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj. Foreign policy authority in several
states, including in India, has been slowly wrenched out of the hands of their respective foreign
ministries (Plagemann and Destradi 2019). Therefore, the responses to SST attacks under Modi
would have been decided directly by the Prime Minister in consultation with his close aides, a sign
of personal representation.
Modi’s worldview is more hawkish than that of either Vajpayee’s or Singh’s. With his more
centralized style of foreign-policy decision-making coupled with the hawkish perception of his
country navigating what is to him the highly fluid, turbulent, and shark-infested waters of
international politics, Modi certainly is assertive about foreign policy. His understanding that
strong military responses are more often optimal to best protect India’s interests against external
threats, including SST attacks, led him to pursue the course of a major response in both instances
of Uri and Pulwama as detailed below.
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First test for Narendra Modi’s leadership – 2016 Uri attack and “surgical strike”
On September 18, 2016, a group of JeM terrorists assaulted an Indian Army brigade headquarters
at Mohura near Uri with grenades, in the troubled Jammu and Kashmir region of India. The attack
led to the deaths of 19 Indian soldiers as well as injuries to about two dozen other soldiers. As per
my classification borrowed from the GTD which deems under 25 casualties from a terrorist attack
as less severe, the SST attack in Uri 2016 was less severe. However, other smaller attacks including
at Gurdaspur in July 2015 and Pathankot in January 2016, were already testing the patience of the
population as well as the leadership of India. Diplomatic moves in the international arena, such as
banning of certain terrorist organizations/ putting their leaders behind bars or trying to blacklist
Pakistan in FATF, had not been working effectively (Kronstadt 2019; Siyech 2019).
As Vasquez (1993) notes, leader type is a critical factor in foreign policy decision-making. Indian
PM Narendra Modi, known for his tough speeches and hawkish predisposition, someone having
the image of a strongman, was to respond in somewhat different ways compared to earlier times,
when the leadership was usually not as hawkish. Modi’s domestic economic policies had already
been tough (for example, he abruptly demonetized Rs. 500 and Rs. 1000 bills with minimal
warning to the entire Indian population to crack down on corruption, contrasted with the previous
government which had become riddled with financial scams). His public image was that of a man
who believed in the swift delivery of justice, and one who undauntedly took on the Herculean task
of bringing major reforms to the Indian bureaucracy.
Uri was an attack on Indian security forces, creating ironically a sense of heightened insecurity
and a high fear of exploitation. After Uri, the Indian government was facing tremendous pressure
to stand its ground. It would have to produce responses that “assuage the public, soothe fears in
the international community, deter future support by Pakistan, and stay under Pakistan’s red lines”
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(Sasikumar 2019). Modi’s decision of a strong but limited response therefore displayed maturity
in that it ensured that multiple issues were taken care of at the same time through the kind of
response he chose – First, signaling to Pakistan that sponsoring of cross-border terrorism would
not be taken lightly. It demonstrated to the Pakistani powers-that-be that their plan to terrorize
India would be futile and would only incur a strong response/ punishment as well as major costs
every time (Kaura 2020). Second, it would also send a different signal to the international
community – demonstrating that India is a responsible military and nuclear power and uses
restraint. Third, it would signal to the increasingly attentive and demanding domestic audience that
the government is serious about countering cross-border terrorism (Sasikumar 2019) which would
go down well with the electorate (Colaresi 2004). It was an assurance to the people that India now
had a strong enough leadership to mete out justice to an irresponsible neighbor, that India would
not take cross-border SST attacks lightly and may at any time and place of its choosing respond
with military “surgical strikes” on Pakistani soil across and along the Line of Control. Finally,
Modi’s image of a tough no-nonsense leader willing to take difficult, risky, and initially unpopular
decisions in the national interest would thereby also remain intact (Ruparelia 2015).
The philosophy behind the surgical strikes was that the use of military force works to create a
deterrent effect against the perpetrators of SST attacks – both terrorists and their state sponsors. At
the same time, a limited response (not attacking Pakistani military establishments, but only
focusing firepower on terrorist camps) signals no larger threat is intended towards the sovereignty
of the adversary. This kind of a major response with the use of limited military assets, therefore,
seems appropriate when trying to change an adversary's behavior through coercion a la Tom
Schelling and James Fearon.
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Violent triggers increase probability of conflict escalation between rival states (Keller 2005;
DeRouen and Sprecher 2004; Ben-Yehuda 1999), and the probability can multiply with a hawkish
leader at the helm of the victim state (Keller 2005). Extrapolating more generally, with a hawkish
leader in power in a state, the tendency to respond with a firm hand against SST would also be
higher than if a non-hawkish leader were at the helm.
While scholars and Indian officials opine that the surgical strikes India resorted to in response to
Uri 2016 has been conducted earlier, the element of publicizing it was certainly new. There are
different views as to why it was publicized: Then Indian Director General of Military Operations
(DGMO) observed that the surgical strikes were focused on ensuring that the terrorists are not able
to cause destruction and endanger the lives of Indian citizens (Indian Express, 2016). Modi’s
relations with Pakistan consists in extracting maximum concessions out of that state without
conceding anything substantial, and such a stance works well with his party’s base (Hindutva, as
a driver of change in political culture, contends that India must overcome its millennia-old aversion
to the use of force). Talks are designed to manage a recalcitrant neighbor as well as deflect
international pressures (Mazumdar 2017; Pant 2015). However, neither country has a major
incentive to normalize relations (Hussain and Silverman 2015).
Because leaders risk electoral punishment for foreign policy failures, the leader typically accounts
for the domestic mood and public opinion before taking any military action to solve international
contentious issues (Mintz 2004; Kaarbo 2008). Domestic, regional, and global audiences would
therefore get the message that Modi’s India would not tolerate and was prepared to militarily deal
with cross-border incursions. Modi’s India behaved similarly by not backing down when
confronted with violent aggression against China in 2020, a much more formidable adversary
when compared to Pakistan. According to one of the commanding officers of the surgical strike,
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an unnamed Colonel, “the idea was to let them know that we know where you are based and where
you launch your attacks from and more importantly, we know where to hit you” (Gokhale 2017).
In response, Islamabad only chose the face-saving device of denying that any attack of particular
significance occurred. “The Indian military was wiser and didn’t go for a deeper strike. They just
fulfilled the wishes of the political leadership without causing any major disaster,” observed Major
General Mahmud Ali Durrani, a former ambassador to the United States (Gowen, 2016).

Second test for Narendra Modi’s leadership – 2019 Pulwama attack
Provocations to the Indian state continued in the form of multiple SST attacks even after Pathankot
and Uri, and despite India’s earlier use of “surgical strikes” in response. These SST attacks include
the ones at Nagrota in November 2016 and Sunjuwan Camp in February 2018, respectively.
However, the Pulwama attack conducted by operatives of the JeM on Valentine’s Day in 2019,
viz. February 14, was another watershed moment for India in terms of SST response.
At Pulwama, a car laden with over 300 kilograms (660 pounds) of explosives, driven by an
apparently radicalized local youth of Kashmir, Adil Ahmad Dar, rammed into a bus, which was
part of a 78-vehicle convoy of a certain Indian paramilitary force known as the Central Reserve
Police Force (CRPF). The explosion killed 40 CRPF personnel while injuring many others. It was
the very first case of suicide terrorism in the Kashmir Valley. Prime Minister Modi condemned
the attacks and his Minister of Defence, Rajnath Singh, promised a strong response. Not only were
the immediate planners of the Pulwama attack neutralized by Indian armed forces personnel, but
the Modi government decided to conduct airstrikes against JeM camps located in the vicinity of
Balakot in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan on February 26, 2019. This led to a
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counter-airstrike by Pakistan the following day, which resulted in the shooting down of an Indian
fighter plane and subsequent capture of the pilot, Abhinandan Varthaman. However, under
international pressure as well as to avoid escalation in tensions, Pakistan handed over the captured
pilot to Indian authorities within two days.
Pulwama was another low-cost, low-intensity provocation by Pakistan against the Indian state
using SST – fomenting the grievances of a certain section of Kashmiris and weaponizing them
against India to demonstrate to the international community the apparent discontent of the
Kashmiri population in being part of India. And that too just two months before elections in the
region. While Pakistan denied allegations of links with the JeM in planning this attack, the JeM
itself claimed responsibility and released a video of the assailant, Adil Dar (BBC 2019). Whether
India successfully destroyed terrorist camps became and remains a matter of debate and one would
tend to receive different answers depending on who they ask. However, the important point to note
here is that this was the first time since 1971 that the two countries’ air forces crossed the Line of
Control (LoC) between them and that too after both countries became nuclear powers. And this
occurred under the hawkish leader type that is Narendra Modi. While this was indeed a severe SST
attack resulting in over 25 casualties (the lower limit for an attack to be severe by our definition),
if any leader were to deliver a major response, it would likely be one of the hawkish types. That is
exactly what happened. This case also demonstrates that a hawkish leader responds more
aggressively to SST attacks, the source of which is a rival state. While India’s more aggressive
stance owes also to futile diplomatic efforts in isolating its western neighbor, and failed attempts
at curbing terrorist financing (Siyech 2019), leader type remains key in determining response.
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Discussion
The findings in this chapter suggest several things. I argued that SST responses from a victim state
directly covary with a change in leader type as defined by Brown (2017) and Keller (2005). I
hypothesized that the more hawkish a leader, the likelier they are to use aggressive and major
responses, with the aid of the military, against their adversaries when provoked with low-intensity
SST attacks. I analyze the personality types and backgrounds of three different Indian prime
ministers and subsequently evaluate their responses to five different SST attacks sponsored from
neighboring Pakistan. I found evidence to support my argument. While the more dovish
(Manmohan Singh) and (Atal Bihari Vajpayee) leaders had the more restrained and minor
responses even for severe SST attacks, the more hawkish leader (Narendra Modi) was more likely
to respond aggressively even to a less severe SST attack. The Uri attack, which according to this
chapter, was a less severe attack, was dealt with heavy handedly by the Indian dispensation under
PM Modi using a military response across the Indian Line of Control into disputed territory under
Pakistani administration, but the 26/11 SST massacre, which was far graver in terms of most
parameters, only evoked a meagre response in comparison.
My findings in the Indian case help prove a bigger point. In democracies, India among them, one
finds that the more hawkish the leader type, the likelier they are to use force against SST attacks
by an adversary – to show their rival country as well as the terrorist group by using force that such
limited cross-border breaches and low-intensity conflict shall not be tolerated and will be met with
force. This is because hawkish leaders prefer aggressive and violent solutions over nonconfrontational ones, which doves would rather opt for.
Now, my study’s methodological limitations should also be discussed. While data collection for
terrorism in general is difficult, SST takes the difficulty level a notch higher just because of the
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nebulousness of the acts themselves. It is often difficult to connect covert and clandestine links
between a state and terrorist organizations. Even if an attack were conducted by a certain terror
group allegedly supported by a specific state, conclusively pointing out the state’s involvement in
the specific incident is not always possible. The anonymity of the links are precisely the strengths
of such operations.
Further, there is the notorious problem of underreporting (Drakos and Gofas 2006a, 2006b) and
overreporting (Cubukcu and Frost 2018; McCann 2020) biases in terrorism data. The primary
concern with underreporting bias in terrorism studies is that not all terrorist incidents may have
been reported, and only those that have been reported in the media. Certain political and economic
conditions might affect this number. For instance, in vast stretches of rural Mali there may not be
enough reporting as opposed to a big city like Mumbai or Paris. Conversely, ordinary street crimes
or other violent acts may be referred to by some politically motivated governments as instances of
terrorism. That would classify as overreporting bias.
Definitions for terrorism and SST clearly vary and what constitutes a terrorist act for one set of
scholars may not be the same as that for a separate set of scholars. The sheer fluidity in the meaning
of terms and variability in reporting by states to further complicate matters, makes data collection
difficult.

Conclusion
As my analysis in this chapter restricts itself to only five instances of state-sponsored terrorism
that were conducted on Indian soil, there is much scope for future research to evaluate the myriad
other SST incidents in India which would aid in empirically bolstering my argument. Extending
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the study on SST to the universe of cases in India to quantitatively ascertain the validity of my
conjectures seems useful. A greater amount of fieldwork, including interview leaders and key
personnel in the Indian government, and archival work in local languages can refine the study and
provide a clearer picture of how important leader type is in determining SST responses.
Furthermore, assessing the effectiveness of SST responses is another worthwhile pursuit. A serious
study on this can aid policymakers in India, and by extension, in other democracies to assess what
works for a given situation, considering that every attack is different, and the circumstances and
calculus are varied.
Lastly, exploring whether or how 26/11 changed decision-making in India in any way, shape, or
form is another question that needs answering. While changes in the government structure were
made at the observable level with dedicated new counterterrorism and intelligence bodies being
created, of which the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) or National Intelligence Grid
(NATGRID) are the most well-known, it is important to understand whether this may have resulted
in higher quality decision-making. While improved instruments are likely to result in better
decisions, whether decision-making has been affected at a sub-surface level in India, can also be
an interesting academic quest. Nonetheless, initial evidence in this chapter does lead to the
preliminary conclusion that leader type is in fact an important deciding factor in determining
responses to SST.
In the next chapter, I look at the leader type and victim state SST response relationship once again,
this time through the lens of Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). My research
involves another in-depth case study of the responses by two Turkish leaders including the hawkish
Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the dovish Turgut Ozal to SST attacks by the PKK. I analyze the

96

personality types and backgrounds of both these leaders and subsequently evaluate the processes
behind their responses to said attacks.
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Chapter 3 - Leader Type and Responses to State-Sponsored Terrorism
Case Study: Turkey
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Abstract
State-sponsored terrorism (SST) attacks have for long been used as a form of low-intensity, high deniability
conflict between rival states in front of a global audience. The literature on SST has so far focused primarily
on the motivations, facilitating factors, and the timing of state sponsorship. Extant scholarship has ignored
an important factor in SST studies – victim state responses. Why does state response to SST vary spatiotemporally, under different governments, or even under different leaders of the same ruling political
dispensation in a country? I theorize that leader type - hawkish or dovish - is an important determinant of
SST response. This chapter provides an in-depth qualitative illustration of the link between leader type and
response to SST by evaluating three responses of the long-time Turkish leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan,
under whose leadership Turkey responded militarily to SST provocations, both severe and less severe, by
the PKK, a separatist group backed by Iran, Iraq, and Syria, as well as one response to a PKK attack by
Erdogan’s predecessor, Turgut Ozal. Using process tracing, I analyze the two leaders’ responses and
connect it to my broader topic of how leader type effects responses to SST. I find that, ceteris paribus, SST
response is influenced by leader type.

Introduction
A loud explosion rang out in Anafartalar Bazaar shopping center in the historic Ulus district of
Ankara in the evening of May 22, 2007. The detonation killed six people on the spot and three
others from injuries sustained, as well as injuring 121 others. A 28-year-old suicide bomber, Guven
Akkus (Hurriyet 2007), detonated an A4 bomb, taking his own life along with that of others near
him. The explosion also demolished the facade of a building at the shopping center.
The Turkish military alleged that Kurdish separatists were smuggling A-4 plastic explosives from
across the border in Iraq and that Kurds had threatened to attack tourist areas in Turkey, as revenues
from the tourism industry were funding military hardware against the Kurds. In addition, the
methods and equipment used were like what the Kurdistan Worker’s Party or Partîya Karkerên
Kurdistanê (PKK) typically resorts to, and the bombing has been attributed to one of the PKK’s
affiliate organizations, the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks or Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan (TAK).
Not only was this tourist season in Turkey but also a time when over thirty-five world leaders,
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including the then US President, had gathered for a NATO Summit. Moreover, multiple top brass
in the Turkish military including its chief, Yasar Buyukanit, were slated to gather for a major
defense fair in Ankara on the same day, thereby making it prime time for a PKK/ TAK attack to
send a resounding message to the Turkish leadership.
While the attack did not directly point to the state sponsors of the PKK, who are also rivals of
Turkey in the region, namely Iran, Iraq, and Syria, the support provided by these countries to the
PKK cannot be ignored. Without sanctuary in places like the Qandil Mountains that straddle Iraq
and Iran, the higher cadres of the PKK would have likely been in trouble from Turkey’s devastating
military assaults on their bases. While traditionally, a haven was the primary support the PKK
received from Iran, for instance, this changed to also receiving tangible military aid manifested in
Iranian-backed Shia militias along with arms and ammunition from Syria to Iran (Ozkizilcik 2021).
The problem that Turkey faces from state-sponsored terrorism (SST) is immense. What makes
Turkey’s conflict with the PKK an important topic of study is that it is one of the longest and most
complicated ethnic armed conflicts in the post-Second World War era, involving the use of terrorist
tactics (Gurses 2018). The primary objective of the PKK is to arm twist the Turkish government
in getting to the negotiating table (Stanton 2013). Over time, the academic discourse in Turkey
changed from considering the conflict with the Kurds a problem of “terrorism” and the “Kurdish
question” to “Kurdish conflict” (Biner 2020). The conflict has broadly been carved into three time
periods – the first, when the PKK started to transform the community ideologically (1984-90), the
second of competition with the state (1991-99), and the third, of deadlock since 2000 (Aydin and
Emrence 2015).
However, as mentioned earlier, the PKK is not alone in its fight against Turkey. The somewhat
Westernized Turkish society has many rivals in the region. Several states sponsor terrorism against
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Turkey. This includes Iran backing the Islamic Action aka Islamic Movement Organization against
Turkey (fas.org) as well as the PKK [Luleci-Sula 2020]. The PKK, which is an exclusionary group
with a third to a fourth of its members being female (Turk 2020), and one that has waged an on
and off guerilla war for autonomy against the Turkish state, has been backed inter alia by other
states including the former USSR/ Eastern Bloc,16 the United States, and Greece. However, my
focus in this chapter is on Turkey’s major regional rivals that support the PKK, specifically Iraq
(Davis et al. 2012), Iran, and Syria (Ozal 1991a, Cornell 2001; Salehyan et al. 2011, Sari 2021).
These states either directly or indirectly support the PKK as well as the Yekîneyên Parastina Gel
or People’s Protection Units (YPG), which is the primary martial arm of the Partiya Yekîtiya
Demokrat or Democratic Union Party (PYD) alongside the Women’s Defense Units or Yekîneyên
Parastina Jin (YPJ), offshoot organizations to the PKK and banned in Turkey (Ranj 2018).
International legal complications emerge here because Turkey alone considers the PYD and YPG
as terrorist groups along with the PKK, while the rest of the international community does not.
In the two previous chapters in this dissertation, I tested my theory of leader type being a crucial
variable in determining victim state responses to SST. This is a little researched area in political
science and terrorism studies. Most studies have focused on the SST attacks, but none to my
knowledge have empirically tested the correlation between leader type and SST response. The first
chapter tested this relationship using a small-n study of 19 SST cases from five different countries
and under 12 different leaders, some hawkish and others dovish. The 19 cases varied greatly in
terms of attack severity (12 severe and nine less severe) to ensure a study of responses by a variety
of leaders responding in different situations. After controlling for severity of attack, I found that

16

"Syria and Turkey: The PKK Dimension". washingtoninstitute.org. Archived from the original
on 2014-12-25. And currently the biggest successor of the USSR, Russia.
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the data largely supported my theory - hawks countered SST attacks with major responses in 69
per cent of cases, while doves resorted to minor responses in 83 per cent cases. In the second
chapter, I did a deep dive of the responses by three different Indian leaders in five SST cases
sponsored by Pakistan. Once again, the more hawkish leader responded militarily and overtly,
while the more dovish leader used non-military means in response to SST attacks.
In this chapter, I explore Turkey’s responses to SST attacks by the PKK supported by rival states.
The Turkish case should complement the India case study in the previous chapter well. This is
because Turkey has resorted to major responses (that is overt military strikes) more frequently than
in the case of India. It has militarily hit the PKK in three of four cases explored in this chapter.
Under Erdogan’s watch, Turkey did so every time whether they were minor or major SST attacks.
However, under his predecessor, Turgut Ozal, a dove, Turkey steered clear of a military response.
On the other hand, India’s responses were major only to two out of five cases studied here, while
she was hit with severe SST attacks in four of them. This should be an interesting contrast and
comparison between two democratic states with neighboring rivals that use SST to gain
geopolitical advantages.

Historical Background
Turkey has had a historical rivalry with Arabs owing to their Ottoman history. The dissolution of
this great empire led European powers to decide the creation of an independent Kurdistan at the
Treaty of Sevres in 1920. With the victory of the Turkish nationalists two years later, however,
this dream did not bear fruit. Bringing all groups under “one flag” became Turkey’s dictum and
has continued in the present day under Erdogan’s leadership, with only brief periods of relaxation
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such as in the 1960s. Also, the exclusionary policies of the founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk, in the ethnic, religious, and cultural domains did not end with him. As a result,
Kurds remain alienated from mainstream society, especially starting in the Justice and
Development Party or Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP’s) second term in 2007 (Sawae 2020)
when Erdogan colluded with the Turkish military to use force to suppress Kurdish resistance. The
Kurds, in fact, are not included as part of “the people” in Erdogan’s Yeni Turkiye (New Turkey)
vision (Christofis 2019) and his policies were designed to marginalize them, especially in major
cities (Yavuz and Ozcan 2019).
The Syrian Kurds have carved out an autonomous region for themselves in the north and east of
Syria called Rojava with American assistance. The American training received to fight the Islamic
State has resulted in their ending up being a more effective force against Erdogan’s Turkey, which
means NATO “allies” Turkey and the USA do not see eye to eye on the Kurdish matter (Karaveli
2018; Hlavsova et al. 2018) with Erdogan regularly voicing his displeasure about continued US
support to YPG/ PKK. He recently took up the matter with US President Joe Biden (Hurriyet
2021a) and was also quoted stating that “Our so-called friends did everything they could to weaken
us in the cross-border operations we carried out to ensure the safety of our citizens” referring to
the challenges Turkey faced with foreign intervention during the military assaults carried out by
its armed forces against the PKK/ YPG in Syria and Iraq (Hurriyet 2021b).
Turkey detests the idea of possible Kurdish independence in Syria, to which the Iraqi Kurds and
Turkey’s own Kurds could act as a force multiplier. Erdogan feels any of these factors alone or a
lethal cocktail of any of these can directly threaten Turkey. Apparently, Erdogan perceives Kurdish
occupied Rojava as the Israelis perceive Hezbollah-dominated southern Lebanon (Totten 2015).
As a result, he has launched multiple offensives against the strongholds of the PKK, YPG, and
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affiliated groups such as Operation Euphrates Shield in 2016, The Olive Branch in 2018, and so
on. Further, Turkey did not quite appreciate the creation under a UN Security Council resolution
of a safe zone for neighboring Iraqi Kurds because the PKK was able to establish a foothold in that
area as well to multiply Turkey’s security problems and start moving towards independence
(Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2012; Getmansky et al. 2019). The group had a large presence in the
northern Iraqi towns of Kerkuk, Sulaymaniya, Dukan, Arbil and Zakho, among others (Nachmani
2003). The Kurdish question, therefore, while it predates the modern Turkish state brought to life
by Ataturk, remains an enduring challenge for Turkey. The Turkish government under Erdogan
has suspended people’s rights multiple times stating the need to counter terrorism. The border
region between southeastern Turkey and northern Syria is a complex warzone that Turkey, the
Kurdish people, as well as the Islamic State (IS) want control over. In addition to fighting against
Kurds based in the southeastern corner of Turkey, Erdogan also launched an offensive against USbacked Syrian Kurdish militia in northwest Syria (Devi 2018).
The Kurds are an indigenous people of the Mesopotamian plains and highlands and are of IndoEuropean descent. They are the largest stateless nation (Rudko 2020; Dinc 2020) with most Kurds
living in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria (Bishku 2018), followed by Germany (DW News 2019).
The Kurds wish to establish a separate country called Kurdistan, that would be created by
combining geographically contiguous regions across the first four of those states, including much
of southeastern Turkey, northern Iraq, northwestern Iran, and northeastern Syria (Ekmekci 2011)
and perhaps a small portion of Transcaucasia, like parts of Armenia (Phillips 2009). Thus, their
struggle for a unified homeland becomes their clarion call to other Kurds in these countries to lend
a hand (Salehyan et al. 2011).
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Existing Research on State-Sponsored Terrorism in Turkey
While Turkey has experienced political violence since its foundation as a modern republic in 1923
(Unal 2012) including domestic terrorism and international terrorist incidents (Rodoplu et al.
2003), the literature on SST in Turkey has primarily focused on the activities of the PKK and
violence between that organization and the Turkish state. Intense military conflict occurred
between the Turkish Armed Forces and the Kurds during the so-called fifteen year-long emergency
period from 1987-2002 in the extremely underdeveloped or “under-underdeveloped” (Jafar 1976)
seven (Nachmani 2003) or ten (White 2015) southeastern provinces out of Turkey’s 76 and was
termed olağanüstü hal or OHAL (Biner 2020). The temporary “violent peace” (Visweswaran
2013) that had prevailed between Turkey and the Kurds was shattered (Yavuz and Ozturk 2020),
especially following the breakdown of the Oslo talks in 2011 between the two sides. In Turkish
cities that had mixed populations of Arabs, Syriacs, Kurds, and other races, the Kurdish
neighborhoods became branded as “terrorist neighborhoods” (Biner 2020). PKK elements not only
attacked Turks in Turkey, but also in other countries including Germany, where there is both a
large Turkish as well as Kurdish presence, despite being banned there (Eccarius-Kelly, 2011).
The PKK, an ethnicity-based guerrilla insurgency group employing terrorism since the late 1990s,
was founded by Abdullah Ocalan in the village of Fis in the province of Diyarbakir-Lice in
southeastern Turkey in 1978, who emphasized the need for violence to attain his goals. Most of its
members are from low-income and low-education families, with only 12 per cent of recruits having
university degrees and 18 per cent high school degrees (Unal 2012). It operated under multiple
names including KADEK and Kongra-Gel mostly between 2002-2004, and this period was
relatively peaceful, but renamed itself PKK once again in 2005 and the violence against Turkey
subsequently picked up again. The PKK needed a legitimate cause to rally support and claimed
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Turkey had colonized Kurdish lands in the southeastern part of the country and stressed a Kurdish
ethno-cultural and linguistic uniqueness.
Much like India’s case, a significant segment of Turkey’s fight against terrorism stems from state
sponsorship. While Pakistan is the main state sponsor of terrorism against India, in Turkey’s case
the problem is more scattered. Three states have mainly sponsored terrorism against Turkey,
whether actively (directly) or passively (indirectly) – Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Turkey has had longstanding disagreements over certain geopolitical issues with these states, issues that have generated
conflict between them. Water and other resources form part of the dispute with the Tigris and
Euphrates rivers being important fresh water sources for Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. While the
Euphrates River flows through Syria and Iraq, the Tigris flows from Turkey and into Iraq and Iran.
Turkey contributes 90 per cent to the Euphrates drainage system and Syria contributes about ten
per cent to the same (Kibaroglu and Scheumann 2013). Other reasons for mutual suspicion and
discord include any unilateral water-development projects, the fact that Turkey joined the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) while Syria and Iraq remained closer to the USSR
(Kibaroglu 2014), the sanctuary the PKK gets in Syria, Iraq, and Iran, and territorial disputes in
the Hatay province (Carius 2005).
Further, Iran’s more recent active backing of PKK members and coming to their aid using proxies
when the Turkish military increases pressure on the PKK generates frequent friction between Iran
and Turkey. In early 2021, Shia groups such as the Ashab al-Kahf and Harakat Hezbollah alNujaba have launched rockets against a Turkish military base in Mosul in retaliation for a Turkish
military offensive against the PKK (Mirzafarjouyan 2021) or issued open warnings (Ozkizilcik
2021) meant to harm Turkey if it did not quit operations against the PKK and exit Iraq,
respectively. As the Correlates of War (CoW) shows, Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs)
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between Turkey and Iraq in modern times began in 1962, while with post-Shah Iran, MIDs started
in 1986 (Maoz et al. 2018). These disputes continue until the present day.
Further, Syria had been a major supporter in the PKK’s fight against Turkey, an “enemy of an
enemy” (Ekmekci 2011) and “a valuable tool with which to punish Turkey,” (Barkey and Fuller,
1998) which has led to lukewarm to frosty relations with the latter country from time to time. Here
too, CoW lists interstate disputes between the two states starting in the 1950s (Maoz et al. 2018)
The PKK was useful to Syria as a bargaining chip to counter Turkey’s water warfare against it in
the form of the Euphrates River policy (Olson 1997). The PKK received major assistance from
Syria in the form of training facilities in the Bekaa Valley in the Syrian-controlled area of Lebanon,
and shelter to its leader Abdullah Ocalan, aka Apo (uncle), for over 18 years between 1980-98.
Thus clearly, the PKK enjoys ample state sponsorship. However, like in the Indian case with
Pakistan sponsoring terrorist groups, it is not easy for Turkey to go after the state sponsors but
easier to deal with the PKK, just like it is easier for India to deal with the Pakistan-backed terrorist
groups, rather than go to war with Pakistan itself. While the nuclear component to their rivalry is
unique to India and Pakistan in the context of SST, Erdogan cannot easily wage war against Iran,
Iraq, or Syria because of several other factors. These include international condemnation, domestic
audience costs, escalation of conflict especially with a militarily powerful country like Iran
limiting the probability of victory, and the economic and human toll direct war is bound to take.
While Turkey did attack the Syrian dispensation militarily as part of Operation Spring Shield in
2020, that was more of a retaliatory move following bombing of Turkish forces in Idlib,
northwestern Syria.
Nonetheless, Turkey has used non-military means, such as being vocal in international fora, to
speak out against the state sponsors of terrorism and affiliated terrorist organizations. For instance,
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in the 74th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) session in 2019, Erdogan proclaimed that
“…today Syria has become a place that hurts the most collective conscience of humanity, and it
has become a symbol of injustice. Since 2011, the regime and the terrorist organizations as well
as the forces encouraging them incessantly pursue a policy of perpetual crisis.” (United Nations
2019). Erdogan also stated that the Syrian conflict could only be solved if other terrorist
organizations in the region, such as the PKK, YPG, and Daesh were first taken care of (United
Nations 2019).

PKK founder, Abdullah Ocalan started calling for the creation of an independent Kurdish state in
the late 1970s and the use of violent tactics in 1984. While the violence was initially focused on
the police and the military, later attacks started including civilians to increase costs for and coerce
the government into negotiating. Ocalan vowed to hit “economic and tourist interests throughout
Turkey” if the country did not cooperate (Stanton 2013). The decision to hit tourist destinations
and civilian targets, especially in Istanbul and along Turkey’s coastline, was a calculated one – a
deliberate move in the hope that if SST attacks on state security personnel did not coerce the
government into conceding to the PKK’s demands, the democratic nature of Turkey would cause
it to shudder at any civilian lives lost and hopefully submit (Stanton 2013).
The sheltering of Ocalan ultimately led Turkey to issue an ultimatum to Syria to hand him over,
failing which Turkey threatened to launch a military assault against Syria (Mango 2005). However,
relations between the two states improved considerably following Ocalan’s expulsion from Syria
in 1998 right before the signing of the Adana Agreement and his subsequent capture in Nairobi
the following year because of an international effort, notably between Greece and the US Central
Intelligence Agency (Smith 1999). Ocalan’s arrest brought a temporary hiatus in PKK attacks but
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once again began to worsen starting 2002 and then again following the start of the Syrian Civil
War and the shooting down of a Turkish Air Force aircraft in 2012. Meanwhile, the PKK uses
Syrian territory amid the chaos to improve its position in its fight against Turkey. Strangely, the
United States remained an ally of the PKK until 2019 in their common fight against the Islamic
State, despite the US’ listing of PKK as a terrorist organization, which led to further tensions
between Turkey and the USA (Moghadam and Wyss 2020). Then Donald Trump’s sudden
withdrawal of US forces that year left the Kurdish people to face a Turkish offensive soon after
(Rudko 2020).
Turkey is a complex country when it comes to the use of SST, reminiscent of the dictum “the more
you know, the less you understand” (Wilson 2010; Kennedy and Dickenson 2013). Depending on
the perspective, it can be perceived as both victim and a state sponsor of terrorism at the same time
(Shaw 2019; Byman 2020). Hawaladars (or those that transfer hawala funds) based in Turkey have
been identified by US intelligence sources to be transferring funds to ISIS sleeper cells in Iraq and
Syria (Speckhard et al. 2017; Shelley 2020) and Turkey has been known to sponsor Hamas, al
Qaeda, and other groups (Hanson 2020). In this paper, however, my focus shall be on Turkey as a
victim of SST, rather than as sponsor.
The PKK has been classified by about two dozen countries and organizations as a terrorist group,
including the United States and the EU (Ekmekci 2011). While the PKK is known to have been
funded by various states, it has also benefited from smuggling oil from Iraq into Turkey by
imposing duties on goods passing through their territory (Cengiz 2017; Shelley 2020). Not only
has the PKK launched SST attacks against the Turkish state, but the Kurds were simultaneously
involved in fighting ISIS in Syria with US support in places like Raqqa (Azevedo 2020).
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According to Unal (2012), the PKK’s campaign beginning in 1984 has morphed over time from
guerilla warfare to urban terrorism.
Turkey has sought to deny the PKK safe havens from where to regroup or launch attacks (Carter
2012). Following the dissolution of the USSR, the Turkish Army’s Counter-Guerilla faction hit
the Kurds back by dressing up as the PKK and committing rapes and tremendous violence against
them in the southeastern villages in the country, where the Kurdish people are concentrated
(Everett 2007). Turkey has tried both carrot and stick to get the PKK into line, both micro-level
(tactical) and macro-level (strategic) social and political reforms, including creating a village guard
system and changes in language policy, but no combination of methods has entirely worked so far
except to bring brief periods of relative peace. It has relied heavily on tough deterrence-based
policies. Turkey conducted 25 cross-border attacks against PKK bases in northern Iraq between
1984-2008, including five major operations, all of which resulted in about 25,000 PKK casualties
until that year (Unal 2012). Fighting the PKK has been a financial nightmare for Turkey with onethird of its national budget being spent on counterterrorism ever since its inception in 1984.
Figure 3 represents the recorded incidents of SST carried out by the PKK (and its offshoot the
TAK) against Turkey between 1987-2019, the year of my first case up to the last available year in
Global Terrorism Database (GTD). PKK has been the most prolifically used instruments of
destruction by Syria and Iran against Turkey and, therefore, merits a closer look. The graph for
what I consider SST events in Turkey committed by the PKK has numerous synclines and
anticlines. There are major upticks in the number of SST incidents in the early 1990s and again
around 2015-16. The graph peaks at over 350 incidents in a single year in 2016. The total number
of recorded SST incidents including any disputable ones are 2,267 during this period, with 2,250
of those listed under the PKK name. The other PKK affiliates are not mentioned in the GTD.
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On the other hand, Figure 4 depicts the total number of terrorist incidents in Turkey between the
same years, 1987 to 2019. This graph includes all terrorist incidents including non-SST ones by
any group. The average number of attacks once again peak in the early 1990s and mid-2010s with
about 550 incidents in a single year in 2016. A total of 3,839 incidents are recorded. Therefore,
PKK SST attacks in Turkey in my count are a significant 59 per cent of total terrorist attacks in
the country between 1987-2019.

Theory – Leader Type and Victim State Response to SST
While terrorism studies have picked up in the aftermath of 9/11, research related to SST remains
underdeveloped. Particularly, to the best of my knowledge, there does not exist any Englishlanguage study that empirically ascertains the relationship between leader type in the SST victim
state and its response directed at either the perpetrator state, the associated terrorist group(s), or
both. Leader responses to SST can be categorized under foreign policy decision-making more
broadly, and this is no doubt a highly complex process in which multiple factors play a role.
However, my theory is that leader type matters in this calculation. It is a crucial factor in the puzzle
of why states respond the way they do to acts of SST in consonance with other factors such as
orientation of political party in power, severity of SST attack, nature of attack, timing of attack,
and domestic public mood/ opinion, that also need examination. I assert, therefore, that the type of
leader in power – that is, hawk or dove – is a linchpin in understanding SST responses by a victim
state.
Multiple factors likely influence decision-making. These include domestic and organizational
factors (Allison 1971) as well as global pressures. Leaders generally resort to those policies that
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Figure 4: SST incidents by the Kurdistan Workers Party and affiliates in Turkey between 19872019

Figure 5: Total number of terrorist incidents in Turkey between 1987-2019
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are synchronized with their belief systems, values, morals, motivations, and worldviews (Sprout
and Sprout 1956). Research relating to leadership and decision-making has evolved significantly.
Early studies of leaders focused on childhood experiences and their impact on decisions, while
later studies stressed personality traits such as dogmatism, nationalism, control over events, and
cognitive complexity. Hermann’s (1974, 1980) works are classic examples of studies that accorded
importance to personality traits and emphasized their centrality to leader decision-making (Brule
and Mintz 2010). The role of leaders in decision-making remained an important field of research
in international relations, but the more niche area of the role of leader type in connection with
response to SST has mostly been ignored by scholars.
Studies of leader type – referring broadly to hawkish and dovish personality traits – are abundant.
Borrowing the concepts enunciated by Snyder and Diesing (1977), Keller (2005), and Brown
(2017), I classify leaders into hawks and doves for this study. In the literature, hawks are typically
considered the more aggressive type, while doves are considered irenic, favoring peaceful
solutions to geopolitical issues. The conventional understanding is that hawks are more willing to
run the risk of escalation and demonstrate a willingness to use military force, while doves would
rather avoid using the military in favor of diplomatic solutions.
Barnes (2011) observes that hawkish behavior is "too aggressive to establish a long-term stability
and peace," and dovish behavior is "too weak to deal with the messy problems in harsh war zones".
Arce and Sandler (2009) classify hawkishness and dovishness as two extreme forms of behavior
where they denote “dove” as a form of full cooperation and “hawk” as the symbol for pre-emption.
Clements (2011) analyzes public opinion in Britain and categorizes men as more hawkish than
women because they “tend to be more likely to support overseas military interventions”, another
attestation to the aggressiveness of the hawk. Allison, et al. (1985) observe that hawks believe in
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the dictum “peace through strength” and counsel remaining resolute through adversity. Hawks
abhor exhibiting weakness to their adversaries and believe there is a benefit to using force that
would result in better political outcomes, while doves rather counsel compromise, negotiations,
and reassurances in solving bilateral or multilateral differences. Simply put, is the terms hawk and
dove refer to leaders that are in crisis situations either more risk-acceptant (hawks) or risk-averse
(doves).
However, the meaning of the terms hawk and dove are not set in stone – there is flexibility or a
kind of continuum between these two terms (Arndt 2013). Allison et al. (1985), likewise note that
a hawk is not always prone to violence and a dove, similarly, does not always choose the peaceful,
non-military option. It is rather about how far they may be pushed to take a certain course of action.
There can be relatively hawkish doves and relatively dovish hawks (Schultz 2005). Arndt (2013)
also notes that state policies such as airpower policy, defense spending, (de)escalation of conflict,
foreign military aid, inter alia can all be separate tests of hawkishness and dovishness and
concludes that hawkishness or dovishness in one issue space does not automatically carry over to
the other issue areas. Nonetheless, with these exceptions in mind, it is to be noted that the
consensus of the scholarly community is clearly that a hawk is more willing to behave aggressively
in matters of national security and interest, while doves see military force as costly and ineffective.
Therefore, leaders filter information about the world that they receive through their ingrained
belief systems that are like prisms or lenses to look through. Decision-makers organize this vast
information and data they need to process every single day according to their worldview. Leaders
thus end up choosing policies from among the available options that are consistent with their
values, motivations, and belief structures for making decisions about their state’s foreign policy,
including when deciding responses to acts of SST perpetrated against their country.
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Further, in this study, my Independent Variable (IV) is “leader type” and Dependent Variable (DV)
is “SST response.” First, I classify the IV, “leader type”, following Brown’s (2017) work. I
measure the Dependent Variable by creating a simple dummy that flags cases with either “minor
response” or “major response.” For the DV, I operationalize “major response” as “overt punitive
or coercive uses of military strikes by the victim state on infrastructure/ combatants of either the
terrorist group and/ or the state sponsor in location(s) within the sponsoring state’s territory to a.)
inflict costs or b.) in extreme cases, to bring about regime change.” A “minor response” is
operationalized as “any response by a victim state other than a major response, including
diplomatic isolation in international organizations/ fora, economic sanctions, minor covert
operations behind enemy lines, sponsoring terrorists in rival’s territory in a tit for tat response,
engaging the state sponsor in dialogue, or lack of a response.”
I also differentiate between a severe SST attack and a less severe one, based partly on a distinction
drawn by GTD on the same. I further operationalize a “less severe attack” as an incident where the
“casualty count is less than 25, and/ or financial damages to the victim state are up to $1 million,
and/ or no notable landmarks/ buildings/ seats of government are attacked.” A “severe attack” on
the other hand occurs when “either the casualty count is a minimum of 25, and/ or property
damages to victim state equals or exceeds $1 million, and/ or notable landmarks/ buildings/ seats
of government are attacked.” 25 casualties and property damage equaling or exceeding $1 million
is what I consider the turning point when a less severe attack becomes a severe attack in accordance
with the classification of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which defines 25 or more fatalities
in a single terrorist attack as highly lethal, and property damage equaling or exceeding $1 million
as “major.”

115

This logic leads to the following hypothesis regarding the relationship between leader type and
response to SST H1: Hawkish leaders, ceteris paribus, are more likely than dovish leaders to deliver major responses
to state-sponsored terrorist attacks.
Beyond leader type, severity of attack is likely another critical variable that may affect SST
response. The more violent an attack, the likely more drastic and forceful the response. Leng
(1983) finds that coercion begets coercion, for a state to avoid being perceived or branded as weak.
Demonstration of resolve may override prudence in such a case. Prins (2005) cautions that the
signaling of resolve between rivals in a dyad can follow a dangerous escalating spiral of
increasingly coercive behavior by either state. He argues that military action in crisis responses
increases with violent triggers (see also Keller 2005) and that “war strengthens the hand of generals
at the expense of diplomats.”
This argument leads to my second hypothesis:
H2: The higher the severity of an SST attack, ceteris paribus, the greater the likelihood of a major
response by the leader of a victim state, regardless of leader type.
It may be noted here that while these two hypotheses are not controversial, extant scholarship has
so far failed to examine the relationship between leader type, severity of SST attacks (trigger), and
response to SST. Leader type is important in determining the response to an SST attack. In this
article, I focus on the rivalry between the Turkey and the PKK (supported primarily by Iran, Syria,
and Iraq) to explore how responses to SST attacks by the PKK is influenced by leader type – that
is, whether the leader is a hawk or a dove.
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Leadership Structure of the Turkish Government
The Turkish political system underwent significant transformation in 2017. What used to be a
parliamentary democratic republic morphed into a Presidential republic. The post of the Prime
Minister, which had carried greater weight and more power vis-à-vis President was abolished, and
the associated responsibilities largely subsumed within the purview of the President’s authority.
The President turned into both head of state as well as head of government. Erdogan, as President,
thus became the head of the cabinet of ministers. Of the three pillars of democracy, the judiciary
alone remains independent. Erdogan was Prime Minister of Turkey between 2003-2014. Then he
stepped down from his Prime Ministerial position to don the Presidential mantle. While he did
have two prime ministers during his Presidency between 2014-17, until the constitutional
referendum and governmental transformation, critics claim that he was still the one with the power
while his prime ministers were docile and submissive. Therefore, Recep Tayyip Erdogan has
remained the de facto leader of Turkey from 2003 until the present day, and I consequently select
him as Turkish leader for three of the four cases from that country covered in this article – two in
his capacity as Prime Minister (both in 2007) and one in his later role as President (in 2020). For
the fourth case, I select Turgut Ozal, Erdogan’s predecessor with a contrasting personality, who
was Turkish Prime Minister between 1983-1989 and President from 1989 until his demise in 1993.
The four SST attacks on Turkey I have selected for this chapter are summarized in Table 7 below.
According to the Global Terrorism Database, between 1987-1992, Ozal’s Turkey faced about 100
SST attacks per year, while during 1994-2019, Erdogan’s Turkey faced approximately 62 attacks
per year. Nonetheless, Erdogan has tended to use more visibly major, military responses compared
to Ozal, who wished to negotiate with the PKK rather than resort to violent means.
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TABLE 7: SST ATTACK AND RESPONSE MAGNITUDES
VICTIM

YEAR

ATTACK SEVERITY

RESPONSE SEVERITY

TURKEY

06/1987

Severe

Minor

TURKEY

05/2007

Less severe

Major

TURKEY

10/2007

Severe

Major

TURKEY

2020

Less severe

Major

STATE
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Leader Type: Hawk – Recep Tayyip Erdogan
Since the time he was Mayor of Istanbul in the 1990s, Erdogan instituted measures to Islamicize
Turkey, such as banning alcohol in some cafes in the city, believing that religion ties the country
together. Erdogan, who tries to be the champion of Muslims worldwide primarily in Europe, the
Balkans, and now even in Africa, Asia, and the USA (Economist, The, 2020), donning the mantle
of “protector of Muslims, from the Philippines and Somalia to Myanmar and Bosnia,” (Karmon
and Barak 2018) has been portrayed in Turkish political cartoons as conservative and anti-Western
many a time. For instance, he was depicted as “giving the bird” to the West and saying, “We did
not take Science from the West, but immorality” (Aviv 2013). Further, those organizations,
newspapers, or individuals having a close affinity with the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
tend to have strong anti-Western, anti-US, and anti-Israeli views. As it has not completely
transformed itself into an Islamic entity from how its founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk had left it,
Turkey today is thus a combination of the latter’s legacy, and Erdogan and his then Prime Minister
Ahmet Davutoglu’s roadmap for a Neo-Ottoman Turkey, in which the “marriage of formal
democracy, free market capitalism, and (a toned down) conservative Islam” (Tugal 2016) exist
simultaneously (Lopes 2018).
About one half of the Turkish population views Erdogan as a father figure, the fearless lion from
Kasimpasa, who can lead Turkey to neo-Ottoman glory (Salt 2016). However, the other half of the
country views Erdogan as an unscrupulous autocrat, one that knows how to amass power but not
share it (Economist, The, 2018). He has been criticized for his intolerance of dissent as exemplified
following the 2016 coup attempt by sections of the Turkish military who were said to be associated
with the Hizmet Movement led by Fethullah Gulen, a former ally of Erdogan’s AKP. This strife
was a battle between dictatorship and democracy, with Erdogan being the dictator (Gokay, et al.
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2017) accused of trying to “Erdoganize” Turkey. Erdogan relies on slogans of nationalism and
chauvinism using terms such as “Turkish nation” to discourage any consolidation of a separate
Kurdish identity in Turkey (Azeri 2016), despite an estimated Kurdish population of around 20
million (Wakim 2014) or 15 to 25 per cent of the Turkish population (Totten 2015).
While he does equate electoral victories of the AKP with Islamic successes, his rhetoric against
the Kurdish and other minorities rarely assumes a religious angle (Rogenhofer and Panievsky
2020). His toughness leads him to mold his policies based on realpolitik (Bishku 2019), usually
all the while suppressing the aspirations of the Kurdish minority (Rogenhofer and Panievsky
2020). His comment stating, “one nation, one flag, one country” and any citizen not ready to accept
that policy should feel free to leave add to this suppression (Eccarius-Kelly 2011).
Further, Erdogan’s public statements like “the mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets,
the minarets our bayonets, and the faithful our soldiers” further demonstrate his pugnacious
personality. Kesgin (2020) finds that Erdogan appears even tougher than usual in several of his
foreign meetings and interviews, such as in Davos and in Copenhagen, while domestically he
appears more of a pragmatist. Erdogan famously stormed off the Davos stage in 2009 for the last
time over the limited time he felt he was given in responding to Israeli leader Shimon Peres. He
also introduced “aggressive” foreign policy from time to time and locked horns with the EU, Israel,
and other states over various global issues (Kesgin 2020). Perhaps his past experiences and the
Turkish domestic situation contribute to his ire against the Europeans for not helping Turkey in its
battle against terrorism (Kesgin 2020) as well as for siding with Israel over Palestine, which he
seeks to defend (Karmon and Barak 2018). Further, Erdogan periodically issued direct threats to
countries, had a high belief in his ability to control world events, and had an expansionistic
leadership style. He also did not shy away from provoking either Israel or the United States
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(Cuhadar et al. 2021). Yavuz (2009) observes that the Turkish population perceive Erdogan as a
kabadayi, or a figure of reputation, honor, and a “neighborhood disciplinarian.”
The AKP that was created in 2001 by Erdogan, former PM Abdullah Gul, and others as a
breakaway from the Virtue Party, filled a significant part of its cadre from individuals who had
been part of right-wing student’s organizations in their high schools and universities, including
Erdogan’s own National Turkish Student Union or Milli Turk Tarikat Birligi (MTTB) [Karaveli
2018].
Erdogan’s government has faced continuing challenges primarily from the PKK, founded by
Abdullah Ocalan in 1978, but also from its offshoots or splinter groups, such as the Kurdish
Freedom Falcons/ Hawks or Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan (TAK) [Salt 2016], and broadly from
allies such as the PYD and the YPG. The PKK recruited members from disenfranchised groups in
Turkey (Christofis 2019). In 2012, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad withdrew his troops from
northeastern Syria creating a vacuum filled up by PKK and the Kurdish Democratic Party (Wakim
2014). Three years later, several Kurdish terror attacks resulted in Turkey’s assaulting the Kurds
in Syria, including in the autonomous region of Rojava (Kurdish for “West-Kurdistan”), for which
it was vehemently criticized (Erdogan 2016, 125). That did not deter Erdogan. By early 2016, he
was absolutely focused on preventing the Syrian Kurds from creating a contiguous strip of territory
adjacent to Turkey’s southeastern border, which would allow the latter to maintain a supply line
through the “Azaz corridor.” The displacement of the Syrian government had become a secondary
objective at that point (Salt 2016). The Turkish strongman did not hold back from rebuking the
United States over choosing so-called “good terrorists” such as the YPG over bad ones. He claimed
that all terrorists are bad (Erdogan 2016, 127).
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However, the Kurds have been a thorn on the side of Turkey from well before Erdogan’s time.
Former PM Suleyman Demirel in 1991 launched offensives against the PKK in Northern Iraq,
where the group also had a strong presence. Through repeated incursions over the years, Turkey
demonstrated resolve to the PKK that while it may suffer casualties, it was unwilling to cave in
under violent pressures (Mango 2005). Thus, Erdogan’s hawkishness is a major factor in
determining Turkey’s responses to the following three cases – the May 2007 Ankara bombing, the
October 2007 Hakkari clashes, and even the pre-emptive 2020 Operations Claw-Eagle and ClawTiger.
Erdogan’s worldview is more hawkish than that of his predecessor Turgut Ozal. With his hawkish
foreign policy decision-making style, Erdogan is assertive about foreign policy. His perception
that major responses, that is the use of the military, are typically the optimal manner to best protect
Turkish interests against external threats by the PKK and its supporters led him to pursue major
responses/ preemptive strikes in the three cases as detailed below.

First test for Erdogan’s leadership – May 2007 Ankara Bombing
Under the shadow of a growing dissonance between Washington and Ankara starting 2003, with
Turkey having refused the US to use its territory to invade Iraq, the PKK started to take advantage
of the burgeoning camaraderie between the US military and Iraqi Kurds. PKK units crossed over
into the Kandil Mountains in Iraq, staying just out of reach of the Turkish government, and yet
poised to strike Turkish armed forces near the border areas at will. Turkey eventually threatened a
massive response if the USA failed to control assaults by the PKK on Turkish troops from the Iraqi
side of the border (Eccarius-Kelly, 2011).
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While the PKK and the Turkish government were engaged in talks in Oslo, Norway, and the PKK
declared a unilateral ceasefire in April 2007, the tranquility was ephemeral. On May 22, 2007, a
deadly A-4 bomb explosion ravaged the streets of downtown Ankara (Aydin and Emrence 2015)
following its detonation in a crowded market building (Davis et al. 2012). It was a suicide bomb
explosion attributed to the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK) that killed nine individuals and
wounded a further 121 individuals. The TAK has been linked to the PKK by Turkey, but PKK
denies any connection. The bombings came at a time when the leaders of 35 countries were in the
city for a NATO summit, including the US President.
While no important city landmarks were destroyed and only some shops were damaged, the attack,
one of several by the PKK in that period, changed the situation in the region. Even though the
Ankara attack qualifies as a less severe one, Erdogan did not take this act of terrorism lightly. The
decision to launch military assaults was not an easy one, especially with approaching elections.
Erdogan balanced regional and international realities and concerns expressed by other states with
Turkey’s capabilities (Efegil 2008). He made sure the world knew that the operations were only
meant to disband PKK camps in northern Iraq and put an end to PKK-generated terrorism, not to
threaten the integrity of Iraq in any way. After discussions with policymakers and the military
elite, he mobilized about 100,000 troops near Turkey’s border with Iraq following a total pullout
of US troops from Iraqi Kurdistan on June 2 (White 2015), threatening a cross-border assault on
PKK forces. Rumors arose that Turkey and the USA were planning to jointly assassinate PKK
field commanders and leadership. However, with media reports playing up this so-called covert
action, the cover was blown, and the element of surprise lost (Phillips 2009).
Nonetheless, after ensuring a Parliamentary adoption for a military course of action as well as
informing Middle Eastern neighbors and European and American partners, all diplomatically
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sound moves, Turkey retaliated three days later with both shelling and airstrikes on PKK bases in
Iraqi Kurdistan that led to an early demise of the ceasefire called by the PKK. On June 7, Turkey
allegedly sent in several thousand troops two miles into the Irbil area on Iraqi soil to carry out “hot
pursuit” of the perpetrators of the terrorist attack making it a major response to a less severe SST
attack under Erdogan’s leadership.
Erdogan’s beliefs and worldview clearly led him to use force. A believer in firm responses to acts
of terrorism with statements such as “We are not intimidated…this will not go unpunished”
(Euronews 2013) for other instances of terrorism, Erdogan demonstrated all the characteristics of
a hawkish leader in his response. Military retaliation was crucial to Erdogan in dealing with SST.
This was the first time since 1997 that Turkish troops had crossed the border into Iraq (White
2015). The death toll kept rising on both sides. In fact, just in the first half of 2007, 225 individuals
including 167 Turkish soldiers, were killed because of PKK attacks. About half of the casualties
were victims to roadside bombs and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), techniques the PKK
had learnt in Iraq (Phillips 2009). While a hawkish response did not stem the tide of PKKsponsored violence in the long run, Erdogan’s own perceptions led him down the path of a major
response against a violent PKK act.

Second test for Erdogan’s leadership – October 2007 Hakkari Clashes
The May 2007 exchange was not enough to deter the PKK. Following a thumping victory of
Erdogan’s AKP in national elections in July with Abdullah Gul as President, the government
continued its violent assaults on the Turkish military. The PKK attacked Turkish forces twice –
first between October 7-8 and then again on October 21. On October 7, a force of 40-50 PKK
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fighters ambushed a Turkish commando team of 18 soldiers in the Gabar Mountains, killing 15
and wounding three, leading to increased public outrage in Turkey against that non-state group.
Again, on October 21, about 150-200 PKK fighters once again struck hard and fast, this time at
the Daglica gendarme station in the city of Yuksekova, Hakkari Province of Turkey. The outpost
was manned by about 50 soldiers and the attack led to the deaths of 12, the capture of eight, and
injury to a further 17 (White 2015). While indeed two separate attacks, the individual incidents are
most often clubbed together as part of a single larger episode known as the Hakkari clashes and,
therefore, I consider this as one SST attack for the purposes of this chapter. The combined
casualties were thus 27, making the assaults from PKK severe. While the PKK later released the
captured soldiers unharmed after retreating into Iraq, the nature of the brutal consecutive assaults
with heavily armed fighters would set the stage for more violence to ensue.
The AKP never accepted Abdullah Ocalan as the legitimate leader of the Kurds and Turkey was
already utilizing a slew of measures to dismantle the PKK. The attacks hastened this process.
Turkey adopted economic, political, and cultural measures, which included adopting
developmental policies including industries in the southeast, encouraging families of militants to
call their children home, changing some laws in the Turkish Criminal Code favor of Kurds,
Erdogan also considered preparing a new constitution guaranteeing Kurdish rights at the individual
level, to eliminate support for the PKK (Efegil 2008). The AKP believed that the PKK should
disarm first and reintegrate with the Turkish social fabric using the rights that Erdogan was
providing through this newly modified Criminal Code (Efegil 2011). At the same time, he kept his
neighbors like Syria, Iraq, Iran, the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Administration, as well as the United
States diplomatically informed of his planned actions.
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However, non-military means were deemed not adequate as a strong response for the same reasons
described in the case of the Ankara 2007 bombing. Erdogan, being a hawkish leader, did not
believe in the efficacy of minor, non-military, responses, but his pugnacious approach to foreign
policy and responses to SST led him to resort to using force in assaulting PKK positions outside
the borders of Turkey. The month before the attacks, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ali Babacan,
had already declared in the USA that further violent provocations from the PKK would result in
cross-border military assaults by Turkey (Olson 2008). Additionally, after the October 21 attack,
the Turkish Air Force started baying for PKK blood and pressured the government to hit back
hard. The then Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and other high-ranking officials exhorted Erdogan
and their Turkish counterparts not to launch a military response.
It was clear to Turkey at this point that none of its allies in the region, including the United States
occupation forces, the Kurdistani Regional Government (KRG), nor the Iraqi government, were
going to help it fight the PKK (Olson 2008). The Erdogan-led Grand National Assembly (or
Turkish Parliament) determined that a violent military assault was the appropriate course of action.
Consequently, Erdogan ordered airstrikes into PKK strongholds well across the Turkish border
into Iraq, once again retaliating with a major response to what combinedly became a severe SST
attack. October 24, 2007, saw heavy bombardment by Turkey inside Iraqi Kurdistan and several
hundred Turkish troops advanced six miles into Iraqi territory killing 34 PKK fighters (Tran 2007).
Starting mid-December 2007, the next few months saw several offensives by Turkey engaging the
PKK inside Iraq including extensive air attacks by the Turkish Air Force (Olson 2008) with the
objective of eliminating them completely (Kaya 2012), including Operation Sun in February 2008.
By the end of 2007, Turkey claimed the destruction of over 200 PKK bases, multiple command
posts, logistical facilities, shelters, communication units, and weaponry as well as hundreds of
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PKK member deaths (Olson 2008), The US’ role in providing “actionable intelligence” was
acknowledged by the Turks in that it had helped kill PKK militants but not Kurdish civilians (Olson
2008; Kaya 2012). While there was loss of life on both sides and Operation Sun became a failure,
the PKK is said to have suffered many times more by way of casualties, and Erdogan’s position
was reinforced in his country by bolstering his strongman image (White 2015).

Third test for Erdogan’s leadership – 2020 Operations Claw-Eagle and Claw-Tiger
The Turkey-PKK conflict continued in the ensuing years with the PKK launching further surprise
attacks on the Turkish Armed Forces and Erdogan retaliating in kind. The Turkish PM adopted a
tough stance against the PKK and would not make any concessions, and the PKK would not back
down either. As debilitating attacks on Turkey continued, Erdogan stood his ground and stated that
he would make PKK pay “a high price” for the violence (White 2015). While Turkey was unable
to completely eradicate or incapacitate the PKK despite the use of force over decades and having
reduced its numbers from 50,000 down to about five or six thousand, the PKK too was not able to
achieve its political goals against Turkey and bring the latter state to the negotiating table despite
conducting numerous terrorist attacks against it.
In 2008, there were PKK ambushes on Turkish troops once again resulting in multiple soldier
deaths. There was a growing domestic pressure on the AKP government to respond militarily, with
other options not being considered (Eccarius-Kelly 2011). Oscillatory periods of hostility
interspersed with attempts at peaceful coexistence continued until early 2013 when about a twoyear period of calm and ceasefire from both sides occurred. Nonetheless, peace was not meant to
be, PKK surprise attacks on the Turkish military and civilians continued, and the conflict reached
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its epitome starting 2015, with the Turkish army laying siege to multiple Kurdish areas. It led to a
tremendous loss of life and property, most notably in cities like Diyarbakir, Cizre, Sirnak, and
Silopi (Gurses 2018).
Operations Claw-Eagle and Claw-Tiger were launched by Turkey in the Qandil Mountains and
Sinjar regions of northern Iraq on June 15 and 17, 2020, respectively. The Turkish Defense
Minister, Hulusi Akar, maintained that "terrorists were planning heinous attacks on our country,
nation and bases" from their shelters across the Turkish border (Hurriyet 2020a). Claw-Eagle
therefore included pre-emptive airstrikes against such PKK shelters in the Sinjar, Qandil, Karacak,
Zap, Avasin-Basyan, and Hakurk regions (Hurriyet 2020a), while Claw-Tiger involved a
simultaneous ground campaign by Turkish commandos with howitzers and multiple rocket
launchers in tandem with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned combat aerial vehicles
(UCAVs), and helicopters in Iraq’s Haftanin region against the PKK as part of Turkey’s
“legitimate defense rights” (Hurriyet 2020b). Turkey also tried to rope in Iraq in its fights against
the PKK (Hurriyet 2020c). The attacks were intended to ensure that the Turkish citizens and
soldiers would be safe from future PKK assaults, considering that the group had stepped up
operations against Turkish police and military bases. Akar claimed that over 700 targets of the
YPG/ PKK terrorist organization had been destroyed only in a few days of assault that included
about 150 caves that the PKK uses for refuge in the mountains, over 160 IEDs dismantled, and
large quantities of ammunition seized (Hurriyet 2020d). By August 2020, 83 YPG/ PKK members
had apparently been “neutralized”, according to Akar, which could mean that they were either
captured, they surrendered, or were killed (Haberler 2020). PKK sources, however, contest those
numbers and report a total of 51 killed (ANF News 2020). However, both sides inflate casualties
on the adversary’s side while keeping their own stated losses to a minimum.
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While these major pre-emptive operations by Erdogan ended in Sept. 2020, Turkey remains
determined to completely eradicate the PKK from Iraq. It has, therefore, kept up its major assaults
with the later Operation Claw-Eagle 2 in February 2021 against PKK positions in Dohuk, northern
Iraq, and Operations Claw-Lightning and Thunderbolt that were started in April 2021 and
continues until the present day. As of end-May, over 1,100 terrorists had been “neutralized” over
181 large- and medium-scale operations, according to the Turkish Defense Ministry (Hurriyet
2021c). The Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu observed in August that Ankara would
“never accept the presence” of the PKK in Iraq and the region (Hurriyet 2021d).

Leader Type: Dove – Turgut Ozal
Diametrically opposite to Erdogan in terms of his leadership traits was Turgut Ozal, a man lacking
the important traits of a politician - “ruthlessness and the killing instinct” (Candar 2013). Ozal was
Erdogan’s predecessor in the Turkish government and at its helm also in multiple roles like
Erdogan. While their respective approaches to foreign policy decision making and the Kurdish
conflict were very different, they held some of the same positions in Turkish government including
that of President and Prime Minister.
After a military coup removed Suleyman Demirel from the post of Prime Minister in 1980, Ozal
occupied the coveted position in 1983. He was then elected President of the Turkish Republic in
1989. Ozal’s newly created Motherland Party or Anavatan Partisi (ANAP) of centre-right political
leanings remained in power along with him between 1983-93 and maintained a position of majority
in the Turkish Parliament until 1991, following which Demirel made a comeback upon Ozal’s
sudden death in office. Ozal was half-Kurdish from his mother’s side and reached out perhaps the
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farthest among modern Turkey’s leaders to integrate Turkish Kurds, including the PKK, with the
rest of the country. He recognized the ethnic, social, and cultural differences in Turkey (Ataman
2002). He was bent on increasing the rights enjoyed by Turkish Kurds, partly to undercut PKK
support, and believed increasing cultural rights coupled with economic “carrots” was the right way
to end the Kurdish conflict (Aral 2001). He was quite hesitant in adopting strong military responses
to the SST by the PKK which the Turkish military did not like, but his leadership skills were
respected in Turkey and, therefore, he gained control over the SST response mechanisms despite
differences between the civilian government and the military (Pusane 2016). Therefore, while he
approved the Castle Plan, a Turkish government tool to widen the ways to fight the PKK, he was
opposed to it and caused severe delays in bringing it to life (HRFT 1998). In fact, Turgut Ozal was
considered the only positive political leader in Turkey by Kurdish leaders (Ataman 2002).
Ozal exhibited the characteristics of a dovish leader. Some of his own writings and interviews, as
well as the opinions of other scholars, testify to this fact. In a newspaper piece of less than 1200
words, Ozal (1991b) uses the term “peace” eleven times, “cooperation” five times, and the term
“war” only twice, and the latter term as something to be avoided if possible. “Turkey follows the
motto ‘Peace at home, peace in the world’ in its foreign policy,” he writes. He also asserts (Ozal
1991a) that he advised his government to “Talk to the Kurdish people in Iraq and [determine] what
they want to do” and that he also made it clear that his government was not against the betterment
of Kurdish living standards but would oppose creation of an independent state as that idea would
not be acceptable to any of Turkey’s neighboring states either. Ozal (1991a) also asserts that “wars
do not solve the problem. If it solves one problem, they may create new problems. That’s generally
true. …” Further, Ozal's foreign policy was designed to avoid war with Greece after the 1987
Aegean crisis (Hamit 2020) and, rather, focus on opening an introverted Turkish economy to
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global markets (Pope 1994). His affinity with economic issues was supreme and military and
security issues took a backseat in his government (Laciner 2009). Ozal’s worldview, therefore,
was that overtures of peace should ideally be the first option against an adversary, and this dovish
worldview led him to process information about international relations in the manner he did and
choose from the range of policy alternatives available at his fingertips. The result was the minor
response he demonstrated after the severe SST attack called the Pinarcik Massacre as referenced
below.

Test for Ozal’s leadership – 1987 Pinarcik Massacre
Within a year after the PKK started its full-scale insurgency against Turkey in 1984, the Turkish
leadership created village militias in the Kurdish-majority areas of Turkey to fight back. These
militias were trained and armed by the Turkish government. The villagers were often fellow Kurds
to the PKK. The PKK rebels wanted to coerce these militias to quit supporting the Turkish
government and normally would fire into the air near their habitations as a threat.
On the evening June 20, 1987, PKK rebels once again surrounded the village of Pinarcik, which
housed several of these militia families. However, this time the rebels started indiscriminate firing
at the village and, following an extended gun battle, killed over 30 people, including 16 children,
six to eight women, and eight male village guards (Marcus 2007). The Turkish media called this
the most brutal massacre ever since the state militias had been created to help the Turkish military
fight the PKK.
However, being dovish in his foreign policy decision-making, this attack by the PKK did not evoke
any overt military response from Ozal. For Turkey, Syria being one of the states where the PKK
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received sanctuary, it needed convincing to stop permitting the PKK to raid Turkey from across
its borders. Pinarcik was only about 25 kilometers (15.5 miles) from the Syrian border. In July
1987, Ozal successfully negotiated with Syria to have PKK camps removed from its territory as
well as ensure the PKK could not conduct cross-border raids (Gunter 1991). In return, Ankara
would supply a certain amount of water to Syria. Further, while these SST attacks galvanized
Turkish public opinion against the PKK, as well as turned Kurd against Kurd because of the
Pinarcik killings within the same ethnic community, Ozal only made non-military response
choices, which bears out my theory that leader type is important in determining SST response.

Case Selection
Case selection of Turkey should be justified. I selected Turkey for two reasons. First and foremost,
Turkey, especially when contrasted with another democracy such as India, exhibits the most
puzzling responses to SST attacks. For all less severe attacks in this study, Turkey’s responses
were major, while in the Indian case, India demonstrated considerable restraint and minor
responses to most of the severe SST attacks that it faced. Though Ozal was more of a dove and not
particularly inclined to use the military, Turkey’s other leader analyzed in this chapter, the hawkish
Erdogan delivered major responses to severe and less severe SST attacks alike, unlike Indian
leaders Vajpayee and Singh. To elaborate, two of four of my cases were less severe attacks on
Turkey while two of them was severe, but Turkey had major responses in all three of four instances
(75 per cent). In contrast, four of five (80 per cent) Indian cases were severe SST attacks, but in
only two of five (40 per cent) cases were the response major. This seems counterintuitive and
points to the importance of factors other than merely the severity of an SST attack in determining
response.
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Additionally, SST in Turkey has been less studied compared to, for instance, Israel and many other
states, despite its being among the worst affected as relates to SST and continues to be so. Crossborder state-sponsored terrorist attacks have been occurring in Turkey and India for decades and
continue to happen until the present day. Perhaps no other country except Israel has suffered as
many damaging losses in terms of sheer numbers of SST attacks inflicted and has had to spend as
much of resources in tackling what is purely an SST problem as in the case of these two. While
the USA decided to invade Afghanistan and pursue state-building activities there after dislodging
the Taliban from power following 9/11, which has turned out to be a long and costly affair, the
USA does not have neighbors that are strategic rivals and inflict SST attacks on a regular basis in
that country. While the UK is also no stranger to SST, the attacks in its case have petered out now
(the IRA Troubles).
Third, the leaders at the helm of these states when the SST attacks in the selected instances
occurred show a wide variation in personality, which makes it convenient to test my hypotheses
and try to ascertain objectively how far leader type and severity of SST attacks contribute to
determining a victim state response.

Discussion
The findings in this article highlight several important considerations. I argued that SST responses
from a victim state are directly influenced by a change in leader type as defined by Snyder and
Diesing (1977), Keller (2005), and Brown (2017). I hypothesized that the more hawkish a leader,
the likelier they are to use major responses, with the aid of the military, against their adversaries
when provoked with low-intensity SST attacks. From a close look at the Turkish leaders’, that is,
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Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s and Turgut Ozal’s, responses to SST by the Kurdistan Worker’s Party
(PKK), my theory seems to be borne out.
In this chapter, I first analyzed the personality type and background of Erdogan, President of
Turkey since 2014, a post he held onto even after abolition of the post of Prime Minister in 2017.
Erdogan was also Prime Minister previously between 2003-2014 which was the more powerful of
the two posts between itself and that of the President until 2014, and therefore has been the de
facto leader of the country ever since 2003. Then I evaluated the personality type and background
of Erdogan’s predecessor, Turgut Ozal, a former World Bank official, who was Prime Minister
between 1983-1989 and President from 1989 until his demise in 1993. I subsequently evaluate
their responses to four different SST attacks by the PKK (three under Erdogan and one under
Ozal), that is sponsored by multiple states including Iran, Iraq, and Syria, among other countries.
I found evidence to support H1 which hypothesized that hawkish leaders, ceteris paribus, are more
likely than moderate or dovish leaders to deliver major responses to state-sponsored terrorist
attacks. The hawkish Recep Tayyip Erdogan hit back with major responses to all three SST attacks
studied in this article, whether they were more severe or less severe. However, the dovish Ozal
delivered only a minor response to a severe SST attack. In other words, while half of my cases
were less severe attacks on Turkey and the other half was severe, Turkey delivered major responses
in three of four instances (75 per cent). The nature of the responses when certain leaders were in
power testify to the role played by leader type in SST response decision-making.
However, evidence with respect to H2, which hypothesized that the higher the severity of an SST
attack, ceteris paribus, the greater the likelihood of a major response by the leader of a victim
state, regardless of leader type, seems to be lacking. Even though two of the PKK attacks studied
here were less severe, Turkey’s responses were major even to them, militarily assaulting PKK
134

bases even across the border in their Iraqi camps and shelters. On the other hand, the tenure of a
dovish leader saw a minor response to a severe SST attack, the decimation of 32 individuals in
Pinarcik Village. Thus, severity of attack does not seem to matter as much in determination of
response.
My findings in this chapter tie in well with my findings in the previous chapters. In Chapter 1,
which covered 19 different SST incidents from across five countries with twelve different leaders
at the helm, I found that the data largely supported my theory that leader type influences responses
to SST. I demonstrated that hawks countered SST attacks with major responses in 69 per cent of
cases, while doves resorted to minor responses in 83 per cent cases. In my India-Pakistan case
study in Chapter 2, I once again found that the more hawkish leader, Prime Minister Modi,
responded militarily and overtly, while the more dovish leaders, Prime Ministers Vajpayee, and
Singh, tended to use non-overt military means in response to SST attacks. Chapter 3, therefore,
provides similar results compared to the previous chapters and bolsters my theory that leader type
matters in SST responses.
With respect to the Turkish cases also, my findings help prove a bigger point. In democratic
countries, Turkey among them, one finds that the more hawkish the leader type, the likelier they
are to use force against SST attacks by an adversary – to show their rival country as well as the
terrorist group that such limited cross-border breaches and low-intensity conflict shall not be
tolerated and will be met with force. This is because hawkish leaders prefer martial and belligerent
solutions over non-confrontational ones, solutions that doves would rather opt for.
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Conclusion
In this article, I found that leader type matters when deciding responses to state-sponsored
terrorism. However, as my analysis restricts itself to only four instances of responses to statesponsored terrorism by Turkey under Erdogan and Ozal, there is much scope for future research
to evaluate the myriad other SST responses by the state, which would aid in empirically assessing
my argument. Extending the study on SST to the universe of cases in the latter country to
quantitatively ascertain the validity of my conjectures seems useful. More fieldwork, including
interview leaders and key personnel in the Turkish government, who ideally will have been part
of the national security decision-making chain of command, can refine the study and provide a
clearer picture of how important leader type is in determining SST responses.
Furthermore, assessing the effectiveness of SST responses is another worthwhile pursuit. A serious
study on this can aid policymakers in Turkey, and by extension, in other democracies to assess
what works for a given situation, considering that every attack is different, and the circumstances
and calculus are varied.
Lastly, exploring whether or how any critical SST attacks by the PKK or other non-state groups
such as the Islamic Movement Organization changed decision-making in Turkey is another
interesting question that can be explored. Nonetheless, initial evidence in this article does lead to
the preliminary conclusion that leader type is in fact an important deciding factor in determining
responses to SST.
In the next section, I conclude this dissertation with a summary of findings about my theory
relating to the relationship between leader type and victim state SST response through this
dissertation from each chapter as well as by discussing the overall position in international

136

relations and conflict processes that this research is situated in. Finally, I briefly present
recommendations about how best to take this line of research forward and what might be
worthwhile endeavors.
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Conclusion
In 1988, the US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger wrote to Congress: “When terrorism is
sponsored by the leaders of sovereign states as a tool of aggression…it moves beyond the realm
of an internal police matter to a higher level – that of international conflict involving state-to-state
confrontation” (DoD 1988).
The research question of this dissertation was: “What explains the variation in responses to statesponsored terrorism by different countries and by different leaders?” To answer that question, the
study tried to empirically gauge my theory, that is, how far the type of leader in power in a country
– that is, hawkish or dovish – influences the kind of action taken in response by the victim state
against state sponsors of terrorism and/ or the terrorist groups themselves. In other words, the
purpose of this dissertation was to evaluate how responses to state-sponsored terrorism (SST) are
determined by governments, and specifically to answer the discombobulating question of under
what conditions a state responds militarily as opposed to a slew of other available options including
responding through economic sanctions, using diplomatic tools, lodging complaints with
international organizations (IOs)/ fora, or hitting back in a Rapoport-esque tit-for-tat with their
own SST? To the best of my knowledge, this was the first project to examine the relationship
between leader type and SST response empirically.
SST has long been used as a tool by countries to inflict costs on rival states without direct
confrontation, as the latter risks inviting limited to full-scale war. Research on SST has so far
focused primarily on the motivations, facilitating factors, and the timing of state sponsorship. What
has been insufficiently studied, however, are the responses of victim states to the attacks. Why do
state responses to SST vary spatially and temporally in different countries, under different
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governments, and even under different leaders of the same ruling party? I explored these
relationships using a small-n research design, examining cases from several different countries. In
the first chapter, I explored the decision-making of 12 separate leaders, from five different
countries when it comes to responding to 19 separate terrorist attack incidents by groups supported
by rival states. In the second chapter, I took a deep dive into the India-Pakistan rival dyad,
examining responses by three different Indian leaders to five instances of alleged Pakistansponsored terrorism between 2000-2019. Finally, in my third chapter, I studied three responses of
the Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan and one by his predecessor, Turgut Ozal, to SST attacks
orchestrated by the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), an organization backed by multiple states
(most importantly for this dissertation, Iran, Iraq, and Syria).
Assumptions are an integral part of the explanation for the reasons behind SST responses.
Interestingly, while severity of the state-sponsored terrorist attack may seem to be the primary
driver or, at the very least, an essential driver of a government response, this is not always the case.
For example, the Indian government’s response to the 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India, by the LeT
that did not draw a major response against the state sponsor, Pakistan, seemed puzzling to me when
far less deadly attacks on Turkish soil by the PKK resulted in airstrikes by the Turkish state. I
argued that the type of leader in office plays a critical role in government responses to statesponsored terrorist attacks. Drawing on research by Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing (1977),
Jonathan Keller (2005), and Adam David Brown (2017) on leader typologies, I theorized that
leader beliefs about the role and usefulness of military power help shape responses to SST attacks.
However, empirical testing was crucial. I then empirically examined whether leader type improves
a model explaining foreign policy responses to terrorist attacks. If my theory were to be accurate
that leader type influences responses to SST – equally or more so than other plausible factors
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including severity of SST attack, nature of attack, timing of attack, political party in power, gender
of leader, previous military experience of leader, domestic public opinion, and/ or nuclear
deterrence (specifically in the case of India and Pakistan) – and that a hawkish leader makes the
likelihood of a major response higher compared to a dovish leader in power in a victim state, then
an empirical test would have to show significant differences between hawkish decision-makers
responding to either major or minor SST attacks compared to dovish decision-makers responding
to SST attacks of a similar magnitude. In that case, a notable difference should be at least visible
in the number of major responses taken by hawkish leaders when compared to those taken by
dovish leaders in either category – severe attacks as well as less severe attacks. That result is borne
out in this study.
The three chapters in this dissertation complement one another in evaluating the veracity behind
my theoretical framework of leader type influencing victim state SST response. A primarily
qualitative method research design was used to test the hypotheses. The research design relied
mainly on primary and secondary sources, which were triangulated with a small-N study in
Chapter 1, and two explanatory case studies for Chapter 2 and 3 using process tracing. The primary
sources I used for this study included interviews of key, sometimes former high-ranking, personnel
in the SST decision-making apparatuses in the Indian and American governments, who were privy
to decisions taken by their respective leaders and other top brass. Besides the personal interviews,
archival research (including the use of foreign language documents and video sources in Hindi,
Urdu, and Bengali) was carried out. To get more detail of when and where SST attacks were carried
out, multiple databases were also accessed in this study, including the Global Terrorism Database
(GTD), International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE), and Stanford Center
for International Security and Cooperation’s (CISAC) Mapping Militants Project.
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The core tool used by this research was the selection of 19 case studies in Chapter 1 based on
varied leader types and attack severity across five democracies, which are or have been among the
most afflicted by SST. While this was not the universe of cases, the variation in the cases selected
was meant to ensure the least possible bias in the research. I identified cases in which leaders of
the victim state were hawkish, and others in which leaders were dovish. To understand how this
gamut of leaders responded to various kinds of SST attacks, I included SST attack instances that
vary greatly in severity as well, thereby ensuring a study of responses by a variety of leaders in
different situations. I selected some of the most prominent SST attacks since the 1980s on some
of the worst SST-affected states in the world, and some lesser-known attacks to maintain a balance
in attack severity.
Second, the cases selected were all reflective of dyadic rivalry between the state sponsor of
terrorism and the victim state that responded to the terrorist attack. All these cases were examples
of SST attacks orchestrated by one state against its rival within a dyad, and the rival state (victim)
responding to it in some fashion. For instance, all the attacks on India catalogued in this dissertation
were believed to be perpetrated by terrorist groups based out of Pakistan with the blessings of the
Pakistani “deep state,” a powerful politico-military clique in the country, that is not the global face
of its government, but operating from behind the scenes and known to manipulate government
policy. The attacks on US interests by Hezbollah had support from Iran, and those by al Qaeda
show clear signs of passive support at the very least by the then Taliban dispensation in
Afghanistan, two governments that are known for their anti-Western stance. Turkey’s struggle
with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) likely was made more difficult because of either
sponsorship or support that PKK enjoys/ enjoyed from multiple states that rival and dislike a strong
Turkish presence in the region including Syria, Iraq, Iran, Greece, Cyprus, and debatably Armenia.
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However, my focus was on the sponsorship by the first three of those states. Similarly, Israel is
kept on its toes by Hamas and Hezbollah. While the former organization has been variously
supported by Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Syria, among others, Hezbollah receives Iranian support.
Finally, the UK faced a protracted struggle against the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in its various
avatars and under multiple names. The IRA received support from Libya under Muammar Qaddafi,
at a time when Libya’s relations with the western world, particularly the USA and the UK, were
low.
Third, the individual terrorist attack cases selected within each rival dyad have been selected to
minimize extraneous variance and to demonstrate that very different types of attacks (in terms of
severity) do not necessarily result in a proportional response from the victim state. Rather, I employ
novel testing strategies to demonstrate empirically that it is the personality of the leader of the
victim state that is strongly correlated with response to SST.
In Chapter 2, I discussed five SST cases that I analyzed to study responses of three different Indian
Prime Ministers from across the personality as well as political spectra – that is, hawkish or dovish,
and left-leaning to right-leaning. I analyzed the SST responses by Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 2000
and 2001, Manmohan Singh in 2008, and Narendra Modi in 2016 and 2019, respectively, and
connected it to the broader topic of how leader type effects responses to SST. I found evidence to
support my hypothesis that the type of leader in power in a state is an important factor determining
quality of SST response. In other words, I found that SST response does covary with leader type
even in the Indian cases that I selected when studied in isolation.
I argued that SST responses from a victim state directly covary with a change in leader type. I
hypothesized that the more hawkish a leader, the likelier they are to use aggressive and major
responses, with the aid of the military, against their adversaries when provoked with low142

intensity SST attacks. I analyze the personality types and backgrounds of three different Indian
prime ministers and subsequently evaluate their responses to five different SST attacks
sponsored from neighboring Pakistan. I found evidence to support my argument. While the more
dovish (Manmohan Singh) and (Atal Bihari Vajpayee) leaders had the more restrained and minor
responses even for severe SST attacks, the more hawkish leader (Narendra Modi) was more
likely to respond aggressively even to a less severe SST attack. The Uri attack, which according
to this article, was a less severe attack, was dealt with heavy handedly by the Indian dispensation
under PM Modi using a military response across the Indian Line of Control into disputed
territory under Pakistani administration, but the 26/11 SST massacre, which was far graver in
terms of most parameters, only evoked a meagre response in comparison. Severity of SST attack
did not seem to matter significantly.
In Chapter 3, I did a deep dive into Turkish responses to SST between 1987-2021. I analyzed the
personality type and background of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Turgut Ozal, who were both
Prime Ministers as well as Presidents of Turkey. Erdogan was Prime Minister of Turkey between
2003-2014 and remains President ever since. Therefore, he has been the de facto leader of the
country ever since 2003. Ozal, for his part, was Prime Minister between 1983-1989 and
President thereafter until his death in 1993. I subsequently evaluate their responses to four
different SST attacks by the PKK, that is sponsored by multiple states including Iran, Syria, and
Iraq, among other countries. The first of these attacks occurred in 1987 under Ozal’s leadership.
The next three occurred under Erdogan’s watch - two in 2007 and the third in 2020.
I found that the hawkish Recep Tayyip Erdogan responded aggressively to all three SST attacks
studied in this article, whether they were more severe or less severe. However, Ozal had a minor
response for a severe attack. In other words, while half of my cases relating to Turkey were less
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severe SST attacks and only the other half was severe, Erdogan’s Turkey delivered major
responses in all three instances while Ozal’s response was minor in the one instance. This
testifies to the role played by leader type in SST response decision-making. Once again, as in the
case of India, the severity of the SST attacks did not seem to matter.
My findings in the Indian and Turkish cases help prove a bigger point. In democracies, India and
Turkey among them, one finds that the more hawkish the leader type, the likelier they are to use
force against SST attacks by an adversary – to show their rival country as well as the terrorist
group by using force that such limited cross-border breaches and low-intensity conflict shall not
be tolerated and will be met with force. This is because hawkish leaders prefer aggressive and
violent solutions over non-confrontational ones, which doves would rather opt for.
My Independent Variable in this study was “leader type”, that I classify into “hawkish” and
“dovish”. As I mentioned in my study, a hawkish leader is one that follows the philosophy of peace
through strength or is more likely to use military responses against SST attacks. On the other hand,
a dove is risk- and violence-averse, and believes in reassurance and compromise in crisis
situations, rather than violence. My Dependent Variable is “SST response” categorized into either
“major” or “minor.” In brief, while a major response involves overt punitive military strikes on
the terrorist group or the state sponsor, usually in territory controlled by the state sponsor, minor
responses include other ways to deal with SST responses, including diplomatic isolation in
international organizations, economic sanctions, tit for tat responses such as supporting its own
separatist groups/terrorist organizations to get back at the rival state, engaging in dialogue with the
state sponsor, covert military operations behind enemy lines, and or no response. Basically, any
instrument besides overt military action.
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I also differentiate between a severe SST attack and a less severe one, based partly on a distinction
drawn by GTD on the same. I find ten major responses to SST attacks out of my 19 cases, with the
other nine being minor responses. I further operationalize a “less severe attack” as an incident
where the “casualty count is less than 25, and/ or financial damages to the victim state are up to $1
million, and/ or no notable landmarks/ buildings/ seats of government are attacked.” A “severe
attack” on the other hand occurs when “either the casualty count is a minimum of 25, and/ or
property damages to victim state equals or exceeds $1 million, and/ or notable landmarks/
buildings/ seats of government are attacked.” I chose 25 casualties to be that turning point when a
less severe attack becomes a severe attack in accordance with the classification of the Global
Terrorism Database (GTD), which calls 25 or more fatalities in a single terrorist attack as highly
lethal, and property damage equaling or exceeding $1 million as “major.” Twelve of the 19 cases
were severe attacks and seven were less severe.
The hypothesis H1 suggested that all other things remaining equal, a hawkish leader will be more
likely to respond aggressively than a dovish leader. Out of the 19 cases selected for study in
Chapter 1, hawkish leader types do in fact respond militarily far more often than dovish leader
types both in case of severe and less severe attacks. In fact, hawks respond more aggressively more
often even in case of less severe attacks when compared to doves responding to severe attacks. In
each of my 19 cases, I first hold severity of the SST attack constant and then vary leader traits. I
test whether hawkish and dovish leaders respond differently for both severe as well as for less
severe attacks.
While in case of severe SST attacks, the general propensity to deliver a major response increases
for hawks as well as doves, and there is a reduced proclivity to do so in case of less severe SST
attacks for both leader types, a wide gulf in response types between hawks and doves in both
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categories is undeniably maintained. I find that hawks typically counter SST attacks with major
responses (69 per cent cases), while doves typically resort to minor responses (83 per cent cases).
Further, 82% (9 out of 11) of leaders with non-obvious responses (that is, responses to SST attacks
not easily explained by attack severity) qualify as support for my conjectures. Five of the nine
leaders were hawkish and responded majorly to less severe SST attacks, and the other four leaders
were dovish, who preferred to go with minor responses, i.e. non-use of military, to severe SST
attacks. Overall, therefore, there seems to be a significant effect of the leader type measure on SST
response. In other words, I see support for the primary hypothesis of the leader type argument.
The hypothesis H2 asserted that all other things remaining equal, a severe SST attack would elicit
a major response compared to a less severe SST assault, and that too regardless of leader type.
From this dissertation, however, it became evident that empirical support for H2 is suboptimal. Out
of the 19 cases in Chapter 1 – 11 of those being severe SST attacks and eight less severe attacks –
only one response (just over 9 per cent) by Clinton in 1998, a dove, is non-obvious and does not
correspond to my leader type theory. Rather, that one odd case supports the hypothesis of severity
of attack as leading to a stronger response by the victim state. Similarly, only two out of eight (25
per cent) cases of less severe attacks see non-obvious responses (Thatcher in 1983 and 1987, a
hawk) that support hypothesis H2. This result only strengthens the notion that other factor(s) play
a more important role in determining magnitude of SST response than severity of attack, one of
them being leader type.
Severity of SST attack, which is likely to be an immediate trigger for the victim state to respond
to its rival state or the terrorist group(s) colluding with the latter, was an important consideration
in this study. No prior research in my knowledge has empirically evaluated the role of severity of
an SST attack in determining victim state response. Given how deeply seated this conventional
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idea that a severe attack would draw the ire of the victim state more than a less severe attack is,
we see astonishingly little support for it empirically. The findings referred to above are uniform
across cases, countries, and time periods. From 1982 to 2019, the hypotheses hold mostly true in
the USA, India, Israel, the UK, and Turkey. In India, PM Vajpayee, a dove, delivers a minor
response to the 2000 Red Fort attack. The following year, while mobilizing many Indian troops in
response to the Parliament attacks, he does not give a final go-ahead to them for a large-scale
military confrontation. Further, PM Manmohan Singh, another dove, as elaborated earlier, affords
only a minor response to the severe Mumbai 26/11 assault in 2008. On the other hand, the more
hawkish PM Narendra Modi twice responded militarily against SST attacks in 2016 and 2019.
While even Modi did not respond militarily to every SST incident in India, it is important to note
that a hawkish leader would be more likely to deliver a major response to provocations, even if
they do not follow through every single time. This can be clearly seen from the examples above.
The overall project is situated in an important research area. Not enough research on conflict
processes has looked at the impact leaders have on decision-making. This dissertation, therefore,
intends to fill that lacuna while being theoretically informed, empirically compelling, and of
interest to current policy makers. It tries to bridge the various literatures on terrorism, leader type,
and foreign policy decision-making. The study concludes with several important findings about
the relationship between leader type and factors determining SST responses. First, that leader type
is indeed pushing towards the nature of response adopted by a victim state of SST. Second, the
study also finds that major attacks do not always lead to major responses. Finally, 83 per cent of
leaders, that is ten out of twelve, with non-obvious responses (or responses to SST attacks not
easily explained by attack severity) support my conjectures. Leaders seem to perceive the world
according to their own tuning – their world view is key to driving SST response.

147

Future research may extend the study on SST to the entire universe of state-sponsored terrorist
attack cases. More fieldwork, and archival work in local languages, including further interviews
with leaders and key personnel in governments would be useful. Assessing the effectiveness of
SST responses can be another area to focus attention on, as sufficient study does not exist in that
domain. Lastly, an exploration into whether or how 9/11 in the United States and 26/11 in India
changed decision-making and response mechanisms to SST attacks could be another useful
research endeavor.
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Appendices
APPENDIX I – Personal Interview Questions

Zoom Interview 1
Shivshankar Menon, former National Security Advisor and former Foreign Secretary of
India:
1.) How did you define terrorism when you were part of the decision-making chain in India
and how would you distinguish it from insurgencies or civil wars?
2.) Do you think hawkish and dovish are rational choices/ positions by a leader or do they have
a more psychological/ cognitive basis to them?
3.) How does government decision-making happen, let’s say in India, for national security
purposes? Are any of the responses based on game theory – concepts such as probability
of victory minus costs associated?
4.) How far does the Indian Prime Minister have a role to play in SST response decisionmaking? And how far do other Cabinet Ministers or the Indian President have a role to play
in the same?
5.) Any academic inputs from scholars during this decision-making process?
6.) What other factors might affect response to decision-making?
7.) Did the 26/11 Mumbai attacks change decision-making in India with respect to SST beyond
the creation of new organizations such as the National Intelligence Agency (NIA)?
8.) Following the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, did India’s response look weak in the eyes of the
international community?
9.) Why would the same leader sometimes use different responses?
10.) What made the response calculus different for Modi following different SST attacks such
as Pathankot, Uri, Nagrota, etc.?
11.) When sponsoring a terrorist group, are there any advantages for the sponsoring state in
using foreign fighters as opposed to local people in fomenting unrest/ terrorism?
12.) What is India’s strategic goal with respect to Pakistan?
13.) What are the aims/ goals of the terrorist organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and
Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) with respect to India?
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Zoom Interview 2
Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow Cato Institute, Former Special Assistant to President Reagan:
1.) What was your role in the Reagan Administration?
2.) What were the years that you worked in the Reagan Administration?
3.) Did you get an opportunity to meet George Schultz and Caspar Weinberger? They are
important to my theory. I am trying to understand why President Reagan pulled out US
troops from Lebanon in 1983 following the Marine barracks attacks.
4.) What are the factors that affect decision-making at the highest levels in government?
5.) Was President Clinton more dovish than President Reagan was?
6.) Did 9/11 change national security decision-making in the USA (other than infrastructure
creation and rearranging/ merging of government departments)?
7.) What other factors might affect response to decision-making?
8.) How do you define hawkish and dovish? Do you think hawkish and dovish are rational
choices/ positions by a leader or do they have a more psychological/ cognitive basis to
them?

Zoom Interview 3
Leon Panetta, Former US Secretary of Defense, CIA Director, White House Chief of Staff:
1.) What differences did you notice between Presidents Clinton and Obama in terms of their
personalities with respect to how they handled foreign policy decision-making? How
much was up to them and how much did they delegate? Any academic inputs at all from
scholars?
2.) 1983, 1993, 1998, 2001 - Is state sponsorship an issue in these attacks? Did the US
Presidents in power then consider the attacks to be SST or just terrorism?
3.) For 9/11 then, was the Taliban/ Afghan government also considered guilty?
4.) Would you be able to characterize Presidents Clinton, Reagan, and Bush, Jr., as hawkish
or dovish?
5.) What factors, in your opinion, affect foreign policy decision making and by extension, a
response from a government to SST attacks?
6.) Did 9/11 change national security decision-making in the USA (other than infrastructure
creation and rearranging/ merging of government departments)?
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APPENDIX II – Detailed List of SST Attacks and Responses

India

a. December 22, 2000 - Red Fort attack
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Severity of attack – Severe
Nature of attack – Important Landmark (historic site)
Party in power – Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition
translated to Indian People’s Party
Leader – Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee
Leader Type – Dove
Response – Minor (No response – stressed continuing peace talks with Pakistan)
Perpetrator group – Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
State sponsor – Pakistan
Casualties – 3 killed

b. December 13, 2001 - Indian Parliament
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Severity of attack – Severe
Nature of attack – Important Landmark (seat of democracy)
Party in power – Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition
Leader – Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee
Leader Type – Dove
Response – Minor (massive military mobilization with Operation Parakram but no real
counterattack)
Perpetrator group – Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)/ Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)
State sponsor – Pakistan
Casualties – 9 killed

c. November 26, 2008 - Mumbai 26/11 attacks
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Severity of attack – Severe
Nature of attack – Important landmarks and religious sites
Party in power – Indian National Congress (INC)-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition
Leader – Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
Leader Type – Dove
Response – Minor (mainly diplomatic).
Perpetrator group – Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
State sponsor – Pakistan

183

•

Casualties – At least 165 killed (multiple nationalities), over 300 wounded

d. September 18, 2016 - Uri attack
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Severity of attack – Less Severe
Nature of attack – Military targets
Party in power – BJP
Leader – Prime Minister Narendra Damodardas Modi
Leader Type – Hawk
Response – Major (surgical strikes along the Line of Control between India and Pakistan)
Perpetrator group – Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)
State sponsor – Pakistan
Casualties – 19 killed

e. February 14, 2019 – Pulwama attack
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Severity of attack – Severe
Nature of attack – Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) paramilitary convoy targeted
Party in power – BJP
Leader – Prime Minister Narendra Damodardas Modi
Leader Type – Hawk
Response – Major (Bombing across the Line of Control in Pakistani territory)
Perpetrator group – Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)
State sponsor – Pakistan
Casualties – 40 killed

United States of America
a. October 23, 1983 – US Marines Barracks bombing
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Severity of attack – Severe
Nature of attack – US Marine base
Party in power – Republican
Leader – President Ronald Wilson Reagan
Leader Type – Hawk
Response – Minor (Pullout of US troops from Lebanon)
Perpetrator group – Hezbollah
State sponsor – Iran, Syria
Casualties – 241 killed
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b. February 26, 1993 – World Trade Center, New York, bombing
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Severity of attack – Less Severe
Nature of attack – Important economic landmark
Party in power – Democratic
Leader – President William Jefferson Clinton
Leader Type – Dove
Response – Minor (Arrests of perpetrators)
Perpetrator group – Liberation Army Fifth Battalion/ al Qaeda
State sponsor – Afghanistan, Sudan
Casualties – 6 killed, over 1000 wounded.

c. 1998 - US Embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Severity of attack – Severe
Nature of attack – Government installations abroad
Party in power – Democratic
Leader – President William Jefferson Clinton
Leader Type – Dove
Response – Major (Operation Infinite Reach - Cruise missile strikes in Sudan and Afghanistan)
Perpetrator group – al Qaeda
State sponsor – Afghanistan, Sudan
Casualties – Over 200 killed

d. September 11, 2001 – 9/11
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Severity of attack – Severe
Nature of attack – Government and economic landmarks – Pentagon, Capitol Hill/ White House/
original World Trade Center towers.
Party in power – Republican
Leader – President George Walker Bush
Leader Type – Hawk
Response – Major (Invasion of Afghanistan)
Perpetrator group – al Qaeda
State sponsor – Afghanistan
Casualties – Nearly 3000 killed, over 25000 injured, $10 billion property damage
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Turkey
a. June 20, 1987 – Pinarcik Massacre
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Severity of attack – Severe
Nature of attack – Massacre, shooting, arson
Party in power – Anavatan Partisi (ANAP) translated to Motherland Party
Leader – Prime Minister Turgut Ozal (President Kenan Evren)
Leader Type – Dove
Response – Minor (Negotiations with Syria)
Perpetrator group – Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)/ Kongra-Gel
State sponsor – Iran, Iraq, Syria
Casualties – 32 killed

b. May 22, 2007 – Ankara suicide bombing
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Severity of attack – Less Severe
Nature of attack – Suicide bombing in city
Party in power – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) translated to Justice and Development Party
Leader – Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (President Ahmet Necdet Sezer)
Leader Type – Hawk
Response – Major (Cross-border attacks into Iraq)
Perpetrator group – Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)/ Kongra-Gel
State sponsor – Iran, Iraq, Syria
Casualties – 9 killed, 121 wounded

c. Oct. 2007 (7-8 and 21) – Ambush of Turkish soldiers
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Severity of attack – Severe
Nature of attack – Suicide bombing in city
Party in power – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) translated to Justice and Development Party
Leader – Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (President Abdullah Gul)
Leader Type – Hawk
Response – Major (Cross-border attacks into Iraq)
Perpetrator group – Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)/ Kongra-Gel
State sponsor – Iran, Iraq, Syria
Casualties – 27 killed

d. 2020 Joint Operations Claw Eagle and Claw Tiger
•
•
•
•

Severity of attack – Less Severe
Nature of attack – Pre-emptive strike by Turkey
Party in power – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) translated to Justice and Development Party
Leader – President Recep Tayyip Erdogan
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•
•
•
•
•

Leader Type – Hawk
Response – Major (Cross-border attacks into Iraq)
Perpetrator group – Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)/ Kongra-Gel
State sponsor – Iran, Iraq, Syria
Casualties – None

Israel
a. June 1, 2001 – Tel Aviv discotheque Dolphinarium bombing
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Severity of attack – Less Severe
Nature of attack – Suicide bombing outside disco
Party in power – Likud
Leader – Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
Leader Type – Hawk
Response – Minor (No immediate retaliation – later led to creation of Israeli West Bank barrier)
Perpetrator group – Hamas
State sponsor – Iran
Casualties – 21 killed

b. Aug. 9, 2001 – Jerusalem Sbarro restaurant bombing
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Severity of attack – Less Severe
Nature of attack – Suicide bombing
Party in power – Likud
Leader – Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
Leader Type – Hawk
Response – Minor (Israeli border police captures PLO offices in Jerusalem)
Perpetrator group – Hamas
State sponsor – Iran
Casualties – 15 killed, 130 wounded

c. Aug. 31, 2004 - Attack on Beersheba city buses
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Severity of attack – Less Severe
Nature of attack – Suicide bombing in 2 Beersheba city buses
Party in power – Likud
Leader – Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
Leader Type – Hawk
Response – Major (Attack on Hamas training camp Sept. 7)
Perpetrator group – Hamas
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•
•

State sponsor – Iran
Casualties – 16 killed, 100 wounded

e. Nov. 11, 1982 – Tyre, Lebanon, Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) building bombing
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Severity of attack – Severe
Nature of attack – Suicide car bombing
Party in power – Likud
Leader – Prime Minister Menachem Begin
Leader Type – Hawk
Response – Minor (Israel denies attack to date)
Perpetrator group – Hezbollah
State sponsor – Iran, Syria
Casualties – 89+ killed, unknown wounded

f.

Oct. 18, 2015 – Beersheva Bus Station Shooting

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Severity of attack – Less severe
Nature of attack – Shooting
Party in power – Likud
Leader – Prime Minister Menachem Begin
Leader Type – Hawk
Response – Major (Air and ground strikes in Syria)
Perpetrator group – Hezbollah
State sponsor – Iran, Syria
Casualties – 3 killed, 11 wounded

United Kingdom
a. December 17, 1983 - Harrods bombing
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Severity of attack – Less severe
Nature of attack – Car bomb outside Harrods department store
Party in power – Conservative
Leader – Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
Leader Type – Hawk
Response – Minor (No notable response)
Perpetrator group – Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)
State sponsor – Libya
Casualties – 6 killed
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b. November 8, 1987 – Enniskillen/ Remembrance Day bombing/ Poppy Day Massacre
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Severity of attack – Less severe
Nature of attack – Time bomb
Party in power – Conservative
Leader – Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
Leader Type – Hawk
Response – Minor (Economic sanctions against Libya)
Perpetrator group – Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)
State sponsor – Libya
Casualties – 12 killed, 63 injured or 11 killed, 31 injured according to different sources

c. Feb. 9, 1996 - Canary Wharf/ London Docklands bombing
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Severity of attack – Severe
Nature of attack – Truck bomb
Party in power – Conservative
Leader – Prime Minister John Major
Leader Type – Hawk
Response – Minor (Engaging/ negotiating with the IRA)
Perpetrator group – Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)
State sponsor – Libya
Casualties – 2 killed, 100+ injured, £100-150 million damages
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APPENDIX III - Major SST Groups

This appendix briefly describes the state-sponsored terrorist organizations referred to in this dissertation.
The sources are majorly drawn from a combination of databases, author’s personal interviews of
government officials, and scholarly works, notably the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the RAND
Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI), the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist
Events (ITERATE) database, the US State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism (formerly Patterns
of Global Terrorism), Stanford CISAC’s Mapping Militants Project, Christine Fair’s 2014 book Fighting
to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War, and Daniel Byman’s 2005 work Deadly Connections.

Al Qaeda – The al Qaeda is a Salafi fundamentalist organization founded in 1988 by Osama bin Laden
with its headquarters in Afghanistan and Pakistan and operating in dozens of countries with worldwide
affiliates. Its multiple goals include the establishment of a pan-Islamic Caliphate in the world, the overthrow
of regimes within the Muslim world it deems un-Islamic, the withdrawal of Western, principally US, forces
from the Arabian Peninsula, and destruction of Israel. The group is widely known for its failed World Trade
Center bombing attempt in 1993, US Embassy bombings in Africa in 1998, the attack on Charlie Hebdo
newspaper offices in Paris, but became a truly household name following 9/11. While initially a lot of
funding came from bin Laden’s personal funds, donations from other organizations in the Middle East also
sustained its operations. The Taliban provided the al Qaeda with sanctuary. The group is currently led by
Ayman al-Zawahiri.17
Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent – AQIS is an affiliate organization of the mother group, al Qaeda,
based in Pakistan and threatens to carry out attacks in Afghanistan, India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. It
was created in 2014 by al Qaeda leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. In a video that year, Zawahiri pledged to
resurrect the Islamic caliphate that once stretched into these regions, which has led many analysts to
attribute AQIS’s formation as an attempt by AQ to reclaim control of the Global Jihadi movement from the
Islamic State (IS). So far, however, AQIS has not been very successful in carrying out the attacks it
threatened during its creation. The group suffered numerous setbacks due to US drone strikes and Pakistani
operations against terrorist groups in its tribal regions. AQIS is headed by Sheikh Asim Umar and is
believed to draw fighters from multiple Pakistani terrorist groups, which are, in turn, nurtured by Pakistan’s
deep state.18
Anjuman Sipah-e-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP) – The SSP was founded in 1985 in Pakistan as an anti-Shia
splinter militant Deobandi group emerging from the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam with support from the regime
of Zia al-Huq and funding from Saudi Arabia. It was established by Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi and
several others, and its current political leader is Muhammad Ahmed Ludhianvi. SSP cadres received
training from both the HuM and JeM terrorist groups, all based in Pakistan. The LeJ group was created
from SSP ranks in 1996. Soon after its creation, JeM held a "Crush India" rally where then-SSP leader
Azam Tariq declared that "one hundred thousand Sipah-e-Sahaba workers will join Jaish-e-Mohammad to
17

Personal Interview by author of former US Secretary of Defense and CIA Director, Leon Panetta, December 21,
2021; Personal Interview by author of former Special Assistant to US President Reagan for Policy Development and
Senior Fellow, Cato Institute, Doug Bandow, December 17, 2021; US Department of State, Patterns of Global
Terrorism 2003 [https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/31912.pdf].
18
Olmstead, Jordan (2014). “The Real Reason al-Qaeda Is Establishing an India Branch.” The Diplomat, Sept. 23.

190

fight the infidels." Therefore, elements in the Pakistani deep state believe that the SSP retains value as a
tool of foreign policy against India.19
Hamas – Hamas is an acronym for Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah, meaning "Islamic Resistance
Movement.” It is a Sunni Islamic Palestinian group established in 1987 as an offshoot of the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood that aspires to destroy Israel and establish a Palestinian state. Hamas has received
limited support in the past from Iran and Syria, and operates in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israel. Ismail
Haniyeh is the Chairman of Hamas. The group’s tactics against Israel have included suicide bombings and
rocket attacks. In 2001, Hamas bombed both a Tel Aviv discotheque as well as a Sbarro restaurant in
Jerusalem. Further, in 2004, it bombed a Beersheva city bus.20
Haqqani Network - The Haqqani Network (HN) is a Sunni Islamic nationalist insurgent group that
operates in the porous border areas in the Southeastern region of Afghanistan and the Northwestern
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan. It was formed in the early 1970s by the antiSoviet fighter Jalaluddin Haqqani. Since 2001, HN has sought to drive the U.S.-led NATO coalition out of
Afghanistan and reestablish Taliban rule in the country. The group has conducted multiple attacks against
American as well as interests in the region, including the 2011 US Embassy and NATO headquarters in
Kabul, and is known to be supported by Pakistan’s ISI.21
Harakat-ul-Mujahidin (HuM) – The HuM or “Movement of Holy Warriors” is a Pakistan-based militant
group formed in 1985, split from Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), to combat Soviet troops in Afghanistan.
Much like the JeM, the HuM also aspires to wrest Kashmir from India and make it Pakistani territory. The
group has been alleged to receive sponsorship from Pakistan’s ISI as well as donations from sympathizers
in several Middle Eastern states including Saudi Arabia. Among its most famous attacks are the hijacking
of an Indian airliner in 1999 to force India to release some of its top leaders in captivity, including JeM
founder Masood Azhar. The group’s militant wing has been considered inactive after 2015.22
Hezbollah – Hezbollah or “The Party of Allah/God”, is a Lebanese Shia political and military group. It
came into existence in 1983, launching its first attack in the same year, and remains active to this day. Its
goals are to destroy Israel and oust Western influence from Lebanon and the rest of the Middle East.
Hezbollah is supported by Iran, Syria, and worldwide fundraising networks, especially within the Arabian
Peninsula, Europe, the Middle East, and the United States. Hassan Nasrallah is Hezbollah’s current leader.
Some of its most heinous attacks were the Tyre truck bombing against Israel in 1982, US Embassy bombing
in Beirut in April 1983, and the US and French military barracks bombing in October 1983.23

19

US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 [https://20092017.state.gov/documents/organization/31912.pdf].
20
US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1989 [https://20092017.state.gov/documents/organization/31944.pdf].
21
Kaura, Vinay (2021), “The Haqqani Network and India’s Afghan Dilemma,” September 14, ISAS Briefs,
National University of Singapore [https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/the-haqqani-network-and-indias-afghandilemma/]; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, USA, Counterterrorism Guide,
[https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/haqqani_network.html]; Fair, C. Christine (2014). Fighting to the end: the
Pakistan Army's way of war, New York: Oxford University Press.
22
US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 [https://20092017.state.gov/documents/organization/31912.pdf].
23
US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1989 [https://20092017.state.gov/documents/organization/31944.pdf].
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Irish Republican Army (IRA) – The IRA was established in 1919 and was the most active paramilitary
group during the Troubles in the UK. The IRA has undergone many splits, mergers, rebrandings, and name
changes. Affiliated organizations include the Sinn Fein, Provisional, Official, Real, Continuity, and New
Irish Republican Army, of which the latter remains active today. The IRA’s goal was to merge Northern
Ireland with Ireland and thereby create a unified, independent Ireland. Historically, the IRA received arms
and ammunition from Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya as well as the Palestine Liberation Organization.24
Jaish al-Adl (JaL) – JaL or “Army of Justice”, founded in 2012 by Salahuddin Farooqui, is a Salafi jihadist
militant organization that is based in southeastern Iran, which has a concentration of ethnic Sunni Baluchis
and a porous border with Pakistan. It fights against what it says is discrimination against Sunni Muslims
and ethnic Baluch in the Iranian province of Sistan and Baluchistan. Iran believes the group has links with
al Qaeda, and also that Pakistan does nothing to stop the Jaish militants from using its territory to attack
Iran. The group has claimed responsibility for dozens of deadly bombings, abductions, ambushes, and other
attacks on Iranian security forces. India claims that Pakistan’s ISI backs and used JaL to abduct the Indian
naval officer, Kulbushan Jadhav, from Iran’s Chabahar Port and transported him to Pakistan. However,
Pakistani claims are that he was spying inside Pakistani territory.25
Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) – JeM or “Army of Muhammad” is another Pakistan-backed Sunni extremist
organization formed in 2000 by radical Islamist cleric Masood Azhar, the year it conducted its first attack.
The group seeks to annex Indian-administered Kashmir to Pakistan, govern Pakistan according to an
extreme interpretation of Shariah law, and drive all non-Muslim presence from the Indian subcontinent.
The JeM is an instrument of Pakistani foreign policy against India and Afghanistan, and reportedly receives
assistance from the Pakistani deep state, notably the ISI. Notable attacks against India include the 2001
Parliament attack (in association with the LeT), the 2016 Uri attack, and the 2019 suicide bombing in
Pulwama.26
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) – Established by Amanullah Khan in 1977, JKLF sought
to establish an independent Jammu and Kashmir. It is a separatist group active in both the Indian- and the
Pakistani-administered portions of Kashmir. Its secular and less violent stance, especially coming from its
Indian wing led by Yasin Malik after a split, has been castigated by many other radical Islamic terrorist
organizations in the region and this caused a growing distance between itself and Pakistan’s ISI, which had
previously supported the JKLF against India. Later, the ISI started to marginalize this group and favor other
groups whose ideology aligned more with that of the Pakistani deep state.27
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and affiliates - The PKK is an ethnicity-based guerrilla insurgency
group employing terrorism since the late 1990s. It was founded by Abdullah Ocalan in southeastern Turkey
in 1978. Ocalan emphasized the need for violence to attain his goals, which is the creation of an independent
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Kurdistan. Most of its members are from low-income and low-education families. It operated under
multiple names including KADEK and Kongra-Gel mostly between 2002-2004 but renamed itself PKK
once again in 2005. To rally support, the PKK claims that Turkey colonized Kurdish lands and stressed a
Kurdish ethno-cultural and linguistic uniqueness. The PKK’s main sponsors are Iran, Iraq, and Syria.28
Lashkar-e-Omar (LeO) – LeO was founded in 2002 from elements of other terrorist groups including
Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), and Jaish-e-Muhammad. In addition, it includes
members of the Taliban and al Qaeda. This group receives sanctuary in the Pakistani state and specializes
in attacking American citizens in Pakistan and its members have been connected to the murder of journalist
Daniel Pearl. The LeO’s version of Islam is akin to that of the Afghan Taliban and its ideology is a synthesis
of Islamist fundamentalism and totalitarianism. Maintaining close ties with al Qaeda and several other
terrorist groups in Indian-administered Kashmir, the LeO is led by Qari Abdul Hai, who exited the LeJ
group.29
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) – LeT or “Army of the Pure/ Righteous” was founded in 1989/90 under its present
name as the armed wing of the Markaz al-Dawah Irshad (MDI) or “Center for Preaching and Guidance”.
The LeT wishes to establish an Islamic state that includes all Muslim majority regions surrounding, and
including, Pakistan. It has historically received support from Pakistan’s external intelligence agency, the
ISI. The LeT headquarters is in Muridke, Pakistan, and the organization is headed by Hafiz Saeed. It
conducted its first operation against India in 1990, the very same year that it was founded, and since then
has been linked to several outrageous attacks against India including the 2000 Red Fort attack, the 2001
Parliament attack (in association with the Jaish-e-Muhammad), 2006 Mumbai train bombings, 2008
Mumbai 26/11 attack, and so on.30
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APPENDIX IV – Alternative Explanations to SST Responses
Year Cntry

Leader
Name

Leader
Type

Attack
Severity

1982
2002
2004

Israel
Israel
Israel

Begin
Sharon
Sharon

Hawk
Hawk
Hawk

2015

Israel

Netanyahu Hawk

05/0
7
10/0
7
2020

Turkey

Hawk

1983

UK

Erdogan
(PM)
Erdogan
(PM)
Erdogan
(Pres.)
Thatcher

Severe
Severe
Less
severe
Less
severe
Less
severe
Severe

1987

UK

Thatcher

Hawk

1996
1983
1993
1998
2001
2000
2001
2008
2016

UK
USA
USA
USA
USA
India
India
India
India

Major
Reagan
Clinton
Clinton
Bush
Vajpayee
Vajpayee
Singh
Modi

Dove
Hawk
Dove
Dove
Hawk
Dove
Dove
Dove
Hawk

2019

India

Modi

Hawk

Turkey
Turkey

Hawk
Hawk
Hawk

Less
severe
Less
severe
Less
severe
Severe
Severe
Severe
Severe
Severe
Severe
Severe
Severe
Less
severe
Severe

Party Rel.
Ornt. Mil.
Pwr
R
R
R
-

Gender Mil.
Exp

Response

M
M
M

Yes
Yes

Minor
Major
Major

R

-

M

Yes

Major

R

+

M

No

Major

R

+

M

Major

R

+

M

Major

R

+

F

R

+

F

R
R
L
L
R
R
R
L
R

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M

R

+

M

No

Minor
Minor

No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No

Minor
Minor
Minor
Major
Major
Minor
Minor
Minor
Major
Major

This table illustrates the validity of several alternative explanations to my primary theoretical
concerns of leader type and severity of attack in determining SST response. While I do not have
sufficient variation in my data for some of these explanations, for other explanations, this data can
be a good starting point to examine their validity.
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First, for Party Orientation, one might typically expect leaders of right-wing political parties to be
more conservative and hawkish to maintain support of their right-leaning voter base (Klingemann,
Hofferbert & Budge, 1994; Prins 2001; Kiratli 2020).31 In my cases, only three leaders belong to
left-leaning parties, and two of those leaders show minor responses as a more left-leaning party
leader may be expected to. However, there is not enough information or variation in my data to
conclude that when a right-wing party is in power in a victim state, the response will likely be
major and that when a left-wing party is in power in a victim state, the response will likely be
minor.
Second, one might expect that if a victim country’s Relative Military Power is more vis-à-vis that
of its rival, the state sponsor (as determined by CINC scores in the years of the attacks), it would
be more likely to initiate a major response against the state sponsor/ terrorist group because the
victim country is better placed vis-à-vis its rival to do so. In four of the 19 cases enumerated here,
the victim state is militarily weaker than the state sponsor and stronger in 15 cases. However, in
three out of four instances in which the victim state is militarily weaker, the response is nonetheless
major. Also, in eight of the other 15 instances in which the victim state is militarily stronger, the
response is minor. Therefore, I find counterintuitive responses in 11 of 15 cases, which shows a
lack of support for the explanation that a militarily more powerful state will necessarily have a
major response to an SST attack.

Kiratli, O. S. (2021). “Where do hawks and doves fly when shots are fired?” Party Politics, 27(6), 1172–1183;
Prins, Brandon C. (2001). “Domestic politics and interstate disputes: Examining US mid involvement and
reciprocation, 1870–1992”, International Interactions, 26:4, 411-438; Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Richard
Hofferbert, and Ian Budge (1994). Parties, Policies and Democracy. Boulder, CO: Westview.
31
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Third, one might surmise the effects of Gender of a victim state’s leader on SST response (Dube
and Harish 2017; Koch and Fulton 2011; Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis 2015).32 However, with
Margaret Thatcher being the only female leader in my cases, there is insufficient data at this point
to determine any potential relationship between leader gender and SST response.
Fourth, according to a strain of studies originating from Huntington (1957),33 Previous Military
Experience should reduce inclination to fight (Janowitz 1960).34 In my case set, five out of 12
leaders have previous military experience. However, three of them resort to major responses to
SST attacks. Further, three of seven leaders without previous military experience
counterintuitively produce minor responses and a fourth, President Bill Clinton, chooses a minor
response in one case and a major response in the other. In sum, therefore, going by a relationship
between a leader’s previous military experience and their SST response, six leaders with or without
previous military experience produce counterintuitive responses and one leader partly does the
same. While other scholars have disputed the theory of previous military experience reducing a
leader’s inclination to fight wars, in any case I do not find a statistically significant correlation
between previous military experience of a leader and SST response whichever way one looks at
it. And finally, I do not empirically explore the relationship between public opinion about a leader
and SST response. Future research can examine this connection.
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